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On 18 December 2018, Xi Jinping 习近平, the most powerful man in an in-
creasingly powerful People’s Republic of China (PRC), marked the fortieth 
anniversary of the Reform Era with a speech reaffirming China’s commit-
ment to the path of economic reform and opening up to the outside world. 
Describing the reforms as a ‘great reawakening’ of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), Xi credited the Party, of which he is the chairman, with ‘the 
most profound and the greatest social transformation in Chinese history’. 
The speech was peppered with phrases for power, from ‘irresistible 
and magnificent power’ 势不可挡的磅礴力量 to ‘modern socialist power-
ful nation’ 社会主义现代化强国. There are many words and phrases for 
power in Chinese, each with its own unique history and significance. That 
significance changes from place to place and time to time — in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, for example, a ‘person from a powerful nation’ 强国人 can be 
an ironic or satirical reference to mainlanders, especially those who are 
boorish or don’t follow local rules and customs. The four characters on the 
cover, which can be combined either left to right or top to bottom to form 
phrases indicating various kinds of power, don’t even begin to exhaust the 
The Politburo attend a grand gathering to mark the fortieth anniversary of the Reform Era, December 2018
Source: news.cn
vocabulary of power, as seen in a number of contributions to this Year-
book (see Paul J. Farrelly’s essay in the opening forum ‘Powerful Words, 
Powerful People’ and the chapters by Michael Schimmelpfennig, ‘Immu-
nity to Temptation — “Power” in Chinese Language’, and Gloria Davies, 
‘Talking (Up) Power’). 
Power has many definitions. These include the ability or capacity 
to do certain things or behave in a certain manner; physical strength or 
prowess that in national terms can be military or economic, for example; 
personal or institutional authority; a large quantity of something; and en-
ergy. It can be a verb as well as a noun, meaning to supply something with 
energy or to move with great speed or force. 
In 2018, mainland China was, by most measures, more powerful than 
at any other time in its modern history and one of the most powerful coun-
tries in the world. Its economy, while facing serious challenges, including 
from the ongoing ‘trade war’ with the US, still ranked as the second largest 
in the world. A deft combination of policy, investment, and entrepreneur-
ship has also turned it into a global ‘techno-power’, and it aims, with a good 
chance of success, at becoming a global science and technology leader by 
2049, the one-hundredth anniversary of the People’s Republic. (See An-
drew Kennedy’s chapter ‘Technology: Rapid Ascent and Global Backlash’, 
and Natalie Köhle’s forum on the controversial medical experimentation 
possibly leading to the world’s first human head transplant.) Its military 
continued its course of rapid modernisation, beginning construction on a 
large-scale pier at its first overseas base in Djibouti (see Zhang Jian’s chap-
ter on China’s progress ‘Towards a “World-Class” Military’, and the forum 
by Olivia Shen on ‘China’s Base in Djibouti: Who’s Got the Power?’). Its 
investments in Africa and elsewhere, particularly in areas earmarked for 
the Belt and Road Initiative, though often controversial, continued to ex-
pand (as discussed in Beyongo Mukete Dynamic’s chapter on ‘China’s Pow-
er in Africa: Rhetoric and Reality’, and forum essays on Cambodia by Ivan 
Franceschini, Alibaba in South-East Asia by Qian Linliang, and Chinese 


















































involvement in the international refugee protection regime, becoming one 
of the world’s most ‘potentially influential actors’, according to the forum 
by Song Lili. 
Xi’s December speech made it abundantly clear that China’s path to 
becoming globally strong and powerful could only possibly be achieved 
under the banner of his own leadership, wisdom, and thought on Social-
ism with Chinese Characteristics 中国特色社会主义 — a term mentioned 
twenty-eight times in the speech. While this was less than the seventy-five 
times he mentioned it in his first major speech as PRC President back in 
2012 (discussed in Jane Golley’s chapter in the 2013 Yearbook), it has be-
come increasingly evident that during his reign, the state will triumph 
over the market if and when he, or the Party, deems that necessary. This 
can be seen in Ben Hillman’s chapter on ‘the state advancing and the pri-
vate sector retreating’ 国进民退, and in Carolyn Cartier’s chapter on the 
extensive state planning that underpins urban development — giving ‘an-
thropomorphic’ cities a power all of their own.  
Such empowerment has not been granted to some of China’s most im-
poverished rural citizens, providing a clear example of where the state 
has instead retreated and the private sector advanced, with mixed results. 
Chen Mengxue looks at the relationship between town and country, wealth 
and poverty, and the future of the delivery of health services in China in 
her forum ‘Towards a Healthier Future’. As Xi noted in his speech, quoting 
Comrade Deng Xiaoping 邓小平: ‘Poverty is not socialism. We must catch 
up with the times. This is the purpose of reform’. Xi will need to get the 
balance between state and market right if he truly wants Deng to be prov-
en right on this point.  
Xi also took the opportunity in his speech to remind the world that 
‘no one is in the position to dictate to the Chinese people what should and 
should not be done’. The Party had the right and duty to ‘control all tasks’, 
he said. But there were some things, of course, that the Party simply did 
not have the power to control on its own. The trade war that US President 
Donald Trump had been threatening began in earnest on 22 January with 
him imposing tariffs worth US$8.5 billion on imported solar panels and 
US$1.8 billion on washing machines. By March, Trump had authorised 
tariffs of twenty-five per cent and ten per cent on steel and aluminium, 
and, by 1 April, the PRC began retaliating with tariffs affecting US$3 bil-
lion of American goods. And on it went, with US tariffs on Chinese imports 
skyrocketing to reach US$200 billion by September, when China’s retali-
atory tariffs on US imports reached US$60 billion. The ninety-day ‘truce’ 
reached by the leaders of the two superpowers in Buenos Aires in Decem-
ber amounted to an agreement to halt further escalation of tariffs, with 
negotiations on the final deal ongoing — not the agreement that Xi Jinping 
would have wished for in a world in which he was in complete control.
Power Walking
Taiwan and Hong Kong, meanwhile, continued to feel both direct and in-
direct pressure from Beijing in 2018; in this Yearbook we focus on Taiwan 
(in forums by Mark Harrison and Graeme Read), and how global ‘tectonic 
forces’ have influenced power politics there in some surprising ways, re-
sembling a kind of ‘politics with Taiwanese characteristics’ that is distinct-
ly more democratic than the PRC’s. See pp.xxii–xxiii for an infographic of 





















































Taiwan and Hong Kong were not the only places feeling the pressure 
of China’s growing power in 2018. Despite Xi’s insistence in his December 
speech that ‘Chinese development will never constitute a threat to any oth-
er country’, international concern that it was using its power to influence 
the politics and policies of other countries, from Australia to Zimbabwe, 
grew as well (see David Brophy’s chapter on Australia’s China debate and 
also Beyongo Mukete Dynamic’s chapter on China’s power in Africa). 
In December, Canadian authorities detained Huawei Chief Financial 
Officer Meng Wanzhou 孟晚舟: the US wants her extradited to the US to 
face criminal charges for alleged dealings with Iran. John Demers, the 
head of the US Justice Department’s National Security division insisted the 
warrant was based on years of investigation and not politics — Trump 
undercut this with a suggestion he might intervene to help boost a deal 
with China. But Demers, speaking on Bloomberg TV, said that the US had 
been very patient with Huawei and others despite China adopting what he 
described as a ‘rob, replicate and replace approach to economic develop-
ment’. Over the next three weeks, Chinese authorities arrested three un-
related Canadians in what seemed like a politically motivated retaliation.
Beijing’s soft power, perhaps not surprisingly, lagged in 2018, with 
the PRC dropping a few places to number twenty-seven on the Global Soft 
Power 30 index; in cultural soft power, it fared better at number nine, but 
was still down one from the previous year (see Linda Jaivin’s forum ‘Soft 
Power, Hard Times’). 
Power Giveth and Power Taketh Away
Star power couldn’t save internationally famous Chinese film actress 
Fan Bingbing 范冰冰 from the consequences of tax fraud. She was ‘dis-
appeared’ in June and then reappeared in October, contrite and owing 
the Chinese government some US$97 million. Her first act back on social 
media was to criticise pro-independence statements made by a Taiwan-
ese winner at the Golden Horse Awards in November. Another surprise 
disappearance was that of Interpol’s 
first Chinese president, Meng Hongwei 
孟宏伟, a former vice-minister of securi-
ty, who sent his wife an emoji of a knife 
to let her know that he was in danger, 
after returning unexpectedly to China 
on 25 September. He is currently in de-
tention under investigation for taking 
bribes. Xi has made fighting corruption 
in the Party and government a hallmark 
of his rule — and a bulwark of both his 
and the Party’s legitimacy in power (see 
Tobias Smith’s forum on China’s new 
national supervisory commission), de-
signed to up the ante on tackling cor-
ruption. 
One of power’s greatest objectives is its own maintenance. In his 
speech, Xi stated that the first lesson of the last four decades of reform 
was that ‘the Party’s leadership over all tasks must be adhered to, and 
the Party’s leadership must be incessantly strengthened and improved’. 
That includes the power to determine how to read the Marxist canon: 
in 2018, self-identified Marxist students on university campuses were 
‘disappeared’ for activism on the part of workers’ rights (see William 
Sima’s forum on ‘Passing Marx’); Party power also trumped ‘Girl Power’ 
in 2018 (the title of Jane Golley’s chapter). The power of God was also no 
match for the power of the Party, with religions coming under increas-
ing pressure to ‘Sinicise’ (discussed in a forum by Xie Shengjin and Paul 
J. Farrelly, ‘Raising the Flag: Loving Religions, Loving the State’) — and 
in the second half of the year, even the Pope genuflected after a manner, 
agreeing to share with the Party-state the authority to appoint Chinese 
Catholic bishops (see Paul J. Farrelly’s forum on ‘Rapproachment with 
the Vatican’). Nowhere did the Party wield the sharp end of its power 
Life in plastic, not so fantastic:  
Fan Bingbing Barbie


















































more forcefully in 2018 than Xinjiang, consigning an unknown num-
ber of Muslim Uyghurs — reportedly hundreds of thousands, or even 
millions — to punitive ‘re-education centres’ from which few have thus 
far emerged, and ramping up policing and surveillance throughout the 
‘autonomous region’, even forcing Muslim Uyghur families to host Han 
Chinese who monitor what goes on and what is said in their own homes 
(the topic of Gerry Groot’s chapter this year). 
Power Lifting
Xi’s own power, already formidable, grew even 
greater in 2018, weathering media and other 
speculation that China had reached ‘peak Xi’. In 
March, the National People’s Congress (NPC) con-
firmed his reappointment and, as signalled late 
the previous year, abolished the ‘two-term rule’ 
that had been in place since Deng’s time to en-
sure that no single leader would rule indefinitely 
as Mao had done, and with devastating conse-
quences. No one at the NPC actually said that, of 
course, but rather noted that the rule had never 
been part of the actual Constitution. It has been 
some time since there has even been public dis-
cussion of the Party’s 1981 declaration that Mao 
had been ‘seventy per cent right and thirty per 
cent wrong’; the Party under Xi has used its pow-
er to suppress not just internal dissent but any 
discussion of history that does not accord with 
its own, selective telling and interpretation of 
events. It is little wonder that some are asking ‘Is Xi the new Chairman 
Mao?’, the opening to Bryce Kositz’s forum on two of the most powerful 
men in the PRC’s history.
Has China reached ‘peak Xi’?
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
There are still those brave enough to speak up about abuses of pow-
er, however. In 2018, no one did so as eloquently as Tsinghua Universi-
ty law professor Xu Zhangrun 许章润, who wrote a scathing essay called 
‘Imminent Hopes, Imminent Fears: A Beijing Jeremiad’, which went viral 
in July.1 Xu begins with the point that ‘people throughout China — includ-
ing the entire bureaucratic class — are feeling a sense of uncertainty, a 
mounting anxiety in relation both to the direction the country is taking as 
well as in regard to their own personal security’. He then expounds on the 
CCP’s attack on the personal freedoms of ‘absolutely powerless’ Chinese 
citizens and the lack of political reforms, asking questions such as ‘Will 
you be bankrupted if you happen to fall foul of one of the Power-Holders?’ 
Geremie R. Barmé, who translated three of Xu’s essays in China Heritage, 
commented that 
Xu Zhangrun’s powerful plea is not a simple work of ‘dissent’, as the 
term is generally understood in the sense of samizdat protest litera-
ture. Given the unease within China’s elites today, its implications are 
also of a different order from liberal pro-Western ‘dissident writing’. 
Xu has issued a challenge from the intellectual and cultural heart of 
China 文化中国 to the political heart of the Communist Party.2
For the time being, however, Xi and the Party are firmly in control of the 
narrative, and the ‘political heart’ of the Party does not look like softening 
any time soon. 
*
As Darren Lim and Victor Ferguson point out in their forum on ‘Power 
in Chinese Foreign Policy’, ‘the pathways to power are numerous, diverse, 
and complex’. This is also evident in James Reilly’s forum on China’s di-
plomacy in North Korea, and indeed in many of the topics covered in this 
book. In presenting the constituent elements of power as embodied by the 
Chinese state, we hope readers develop a sense of how it has developed 


















































the China Story Yearbook, here we place important developments in the 
context of themes that are unfolding over periods of time much longer 
than one year, and adopt a cross-disciplinary approach. We believe that 
such things as the discourse around popular television shows (seen in 
Zhou Yun’s discussion of the hit TV historical drama series of 2018, The 
Story of Yanxi Palace 延禧攻略), for example, may be as illuminating as of-
ficial rhetoric in 2018. In the final forum in the book, Peter Connolly looks 
at the relationship between blockbuster films and reality, reflected in the 
growing need and desire of Chinese citizens for protection overseas. This 
is just one of the diverse reflections in this Yearbook, which explores from 
myriad angles how the nature of Chinese power manifested in 2018.
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The Cover Image
The characters in the centre of this 
Yearbook’s cover are 权势威力. The four 
characters on the cover can be combined 
either left to right (权势 and 威力), top 
to bottom (权威 and 势力), or diagonally 
(权利 and 威势). All combinations form 
phrases indicating various kinds of 
power. For more information on the 
etymologies of these characters, see 
Chapter 1 ‘Immunity to Temptation — 
“Power” in Chinese Language, pp.14–24. 
The book cover has been designed 
to echo Quotations from Chairman Mao 
Zedong 毛主席语录, more commonly 
known as Mao’s Little Red Book. Most editions were published with a 
printed red vinyl cover and were pocket size so that they could be used at 
any time for easy practice, learning, and application. 
The imagery on the front cover all depicts symbols of power used by 
the People’s Republic of China in its state propaganda. 
The building in the centre is Tiananmen — the southernmost gate of 
the sprawling 72-hectare Forbidden City in Beijing. Due to its historical 
significance, Tiananmen appears on the National Emblem of the People’s 
Republic of China. Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders stand on its 
rostrum to view military parades, give speeches, and meet with foreign 
dignitaries. 



















































A hammer and sickle appear above Tiananmen. It was first used in 
the Russian Revolution to symbolise proletarian solidarity. Since 28 April 
1942, the Communist Party of China (CCP) has used them as its symbol. 
The five stars are taken from China’s flag, also known as the Five-
starred Red Flag. It was officially adopted on 1 October 1949. The largest 
star is said to represent the CCP; the four smaller stars connote the social 
classes of the Chinese people (the proletariat, the peasants, the petty 
bourgeoisie, and the ‘patriotic capitalists.’) Other explanations of the stars’ 
symbolism suggest that the large star may stand for China and the smaller 
stars for its many ethnic groups.  
Clouds are associated with the celestial realm. Multi-coloured clouds 
are associated with good fortune. From at least the Zhou dynasty (circa. 
1046–221BCE), cloud motifs were cast on bronze ritual vessels; they later 
appeared on furniture, porcelain, jewellery, and clothing. They are often 
used in literary metaphor. More recently, in 2008, a cloud design was used 
on the Beijing Olympic torch.
The circle and star motif comes from the ceiling of the Auditorium 
of Ten Thousand People in the Great Hall of the People. The Great Hall 
of the People is the political hub of Beijing. It is used for legislative and 
ceremonial activities. It was here, in March 2018, that Xi Jinping and the 
rest of China’s legislature unanimously voted to remove the presidential 
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A global infrastructure network
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POWERFUL WORDS,  
POWERFUL PEOPLE 
Constantly Strive to Become Stronger 
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ON 10 APRIL 2018, Xi Jinping gave a speech at the closing ceremony 
of the annual Boao Forum for Asia, 
China’s geopolitical forum for global 
elites. Having expressed his desire for 
China to work with other nations in 
addressing the world’s challenges, to-
wards the end of his speech he noted:
In the New Era, the Chinese peo-
ple will continue to constantly 
strive to become stronger ziqiang 
buxi 自强不息
Xi often uses the idiom ziqiang buxi, 
commonly translated as ‘self-improve-
ment’. In a speech in Rwanda in July, 
he referred to the citizens there as 
also having ‘ceaselessly self-strength-
ened’ (translated in the official English 
version as ‘unremitting efforts’).1 We 
translate it as ‘constantly strive to be-
come stronger’ to better encapsulate 
the full meaning of the original Chinese 
text, which alludes to self-strengthen-
ing, self-renewal, and national and per-
sonal self-improvement  — a striving to 
become ever more powerful.
The expression ziqiang buxi 
comes from one of the earliest extant 
Chinese texts, the Book of Changes, or I 
Ching 易经, the first versions of which 
appeared around 1000 BCE. The Book 
of Changes is still used in divination 
and it has influenced thousands of 
years of literature and philosophy, in-
CO N S TA N T LY  S T R I V E  TO  
B E CO M E  S T R O N G E R
Paul J. Farrelly 
















































cluding political philosophy. Ziqiang 
buxi appears in the commentary sur-
rounding the first hexagram, 乾: 天行
健，君子以自強不息, and can be trans-
lated as: ‘The action of heaven is strong 
and dynamic. In the same manner, the 
noble man never ceases to strength-
en himself’.2 Another translation, by 
John Minford, is: ‘Strong is the Move-
ment of Heaven/ Tirelessly/ The True 
Gentleman/ Tempers himself’.3 There 
are so many possible interpretations 
of the Book of Changes’ pithy and al-
lusive commentaries that they have 
remained relevant throughout the mil-
lennia, taking on meanings suitable for 
successive eras. Xi’s 2018 reference, 
which implies the continued strength-
ening of the nation, echoes the use 
of the expression by a number of re-
form-minded intellectuals in the nine-
teenth-century Qing court. In the wake 
of the devastation of the Opium Wars 
and the Taiping Rebellion, they argued 
that China needed to ‘self-strength-
en’, by learning from powerful for-
eign nations, especially about mili-
tary technology and strategy.4 China’s 
‘Self-Strengthening Movement’ 自强运
动 lasted from 1861 to 1895. 
The motto of Xi’s alma mater, the 
prestigious Tsinghua University, which 
A wall decal sold online 
for nineteen yuan stating 
‘constantly strive to become 
stronger’ 
Source: item.jd.com
was founded at the start of the Repub-
lican period in 1911, implores students 
to ‘ceaselessly self-strengthen’. The 
second line of the motto, drawn from 
the second hexagram in the Book of 
Changes, kun 坤, reads ‘with great vir-
tue one can take charge of the world’ 
厚德载物. The motto comes from a 
speech given at the university in 1914 
by Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873–1924), 
who had recently returned from ex-
ile after the ill-fated Hundred Days of 
Reform in 1895. By using ‘constantly 
self-strengthen’, Xi consciously (or per-
haps, even, unconsciously) places him-
self in an intellectual lineage of mod-
ern reformers and institutions, while 
demonstrating his bona fides as a stu-
dent of Chinese history. The extant to 
which China will successfully continue 
to strengthen in Xi’s New Era will have 
far-reaching implications. 
Liang Qichao appears 
briefly in the 2018 
Chinese film, Forever 
Young, a four-part 
drama depicting 
China’s modernisation 
process, with Tsinghua 
University linking 
















































































IS XI JINPING the new Chairman Mao? Now that the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) has eliminated 
the two-term limit for the leader of 
the People’s Republic of China, there’s 
nothing to stop Xi from serving as 
leader-for-life — despite official deni-
als that he intends to do so. Like Mao 
Zedong, Xi has carefully crafted a nar-
rative of his personal history to legiti-
mise his power and policies. Both Mao 
and Xi built a story, or mythos, about 
their lives that positioned themselves 
as the representative of the nation as 
a whole, with their personal struggles 
being depicted as identical to those of 
China.
Mao told his version of his story to 
American journalist Edgar Snow, who 
published his account, Red Star Over 
China, in 1937. As he described it to 
Snow, each period of his life followed 
M A O  A N D  X I :  S TO R Y  O F  T H E 
M A N ,  S TO R Y  O F  T H E  P E O P L E
Bryce Kositz 
Liu Shaoqi (L), Mao Zedong (C), and 





















































graphical work: ‘No matter where I go, 
I will always be a son of the loess lands 
黄土地’.1 Similarly, he described his 
work as provincial governor in Zhe-
jiang by saying, ‘I have seen nearly all 
of Zhejiang’s mountains and waters … 
and personally experienced the state 
and characteristics of Zhejiang and 
all its counties’.2 Xi presents himself 
as China’s son, revolutionary by birth, 
humble by experience, and rising to 
power through hard work: a mirror of 
China’s progress over his lifetime. Dur-
ing his first visit to the US as General 
Secretary, Xi even returned to a town 
in Iowa that he had visited during an 
agricultural survey in 1985 to recon-
nect with ‘old friends’.3 So, not only is 
he connected to all the Chinese people, 
a similar pattern: Mao recognised 
right from wrong and was punished 
for pointing it out, but after gather-
ing allies to fight with him, he and his 
ideas eventually emerged victorious. 
Mao’s narrative of his life story reflect-
ed China’s struggle for independence 
from the foreign powers that had es-
tablished their power over it since the 
1839–42 Opium War. He struggled with 
his highly traditional father to educate 
himself in new, Western topics in-
cluding Marxism. He persevered and 
struggled with enemies outside the 
Party and rivals within it, until he won 
the right to lead the CCP, which was 
fighting against both the Japanese and 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist govern-
ment. His personal struggle embodied 
that of the Party; Mao’s victory was 
that of the Party — and China itself.
The son of Mao’s comrade Xi 
Zhongxun, Xi Jinping was sent to 
work in the rural area of Liangjiahe 
in Shaanxi during the Cultural Revo-
lution before eventually climbing the 
ranks to become General Secretary of 
the CCP in 2012. His preferred narra-
tive is that of the ‘man of the people’ 
who achieved power and prominence 
while remaining grounded in the 
realities of China’s least privileged 
citizens. It can be summed up by the 
closing sentence of a short, autobio-
‘Son of the loess lands’: Five-year-old Xi Jinping (L) 
with his younger brother, Xi Yuanping, and father, Xi 
Zhongxun, 1958
Source: Wikipedia
Xi also has friends abroad — an impor-
tant point for an outward-looking Chi-
na. These friends in Iowa, moreover, 
reinforce Xi’s story about remaining 
grounded in the struggles of the least 
privileged, even as China asserts itself 
globally.
Both Mao and Xi spoke sparingly 
about their personal histories and only 
during the early years of their political 
career, thereafter letting their allies 
elaborate on their stories for them. Of 
his interview with Mao, Edgar Snow 
remarked that, ‘During Mao’s recollec-
tions of his past I noticed that an audi-
tor at least as interested as myself was 
Ho Tze-nien [He Zizhen] — his wife. 
Many of the facts he told about him-
self and the Communist movement she 
had evidently never heard before’.4 
Snow’s interview of Mao is one of the 
only records of Mao discussing his per-
sonal life. Xi, likewise, has spoken little 
about his life and only during the ear-
ly years of his political career, largely 
in the single-page autobiographical 
work, written in 1998, quoted above.
Most importantly, Xi Jinping and 
Mao Zedong both used their personal 
stories to define the story of China for 
their times, legitimise their policies, 
and control political discourse. As seen 
through the prism of the official narra-
tive, Mao’s personal struggle for recog-
nition within the CCP stood in for the 
history of China from the beginning 
of its loss of national independence in 
the 1840 Opium War; the story of all 
Chinese history since 1840 condensed 
down into the story of one man — Mao. 
Mao thus predicted that, just as he had 
gained control of CCP to fix the prob-
lems within the Party, so would his 
power within China solve its national 
problems. This legitimised his power 
over the Party and explained the ne-
cessity of his policies of resistance and 
collectivisation.
Xi’s story about rising through 
the ranks of the Party while remaining 
in touch with all levels of society sim-
ilarly projects a narrative of China’s 
retention of its revolutionary ideals 
after 1949. The story portrays Xi, and 
the Chinese nation as, having learned 
the revolutionary morality of the Mao 
era, using these inherited values to 
guide the modern economy — thus the 
importance of his campaign against 
corruption, for example. Xi, moreover, 
likens his own rise to personal power 
within the Party to his plans for China 
to rise in prominence and power on the 
world stage, ensuring that all its people 
can attain the China dream in the pro-
cess. Like Mao Zedong, if he has to take 
a lifetime to achieve these national 




























































IMMUNITY TO TEMPTATION —  
‘POWER’ IN CHINESE LANGUAGE
Michael Schimmelpfennig
ACCORDING TO PLATO, only he who does not 
want power is fit to hold it. According to Laozi 
老子, he ‘who overcomes others is strong 有力 and 
he who overcomes himself is mighty’ 彊.1 The 
Han dynasty commentator Heshang Gong 河上公 
(200–150 BCE) understood Laozi to mean that for 
overcoming others, the type of power one needed 
was military force or strength 威力, whereas the 
kind of strength derived from power over one’s own 
‘lusts and desires’ was superior and even made a 
man invincible.  
A gold sword hilt decorated with interlaced dragons, Eastern Zhou 
dynasty, 6th–5th century BCE



























































While Plato is concerned with limiting the excesses of power, Laozi, at least 
in the understanding of the Han commentator, defines the preconditions 
for absolute power as immunity to temptation. Laozi’s formula became a 
central idea of kingly rule within Legalist thought — the philosophy em-
braced by the emperor Qin Shi Huang, founder of the Qin dynasty in 221 
BCE. 
The evolution of ideas and language around the notion of ‘power’ that 
led to today’s most common term for power, quanli 權力 (权力 in simplified 
characters), is remarkable: and not only for the continuity between Lao-
zi’s ancient idea of absolute power and the political agenda of Xi Jinping.
Early Terms and Ideas
The character li 力 means ‘strength’ or ‘force’. Popular etymology con-
ceives the character as depicting a muscled arm. More recent archaeo-
logical finds and palaeographic comparisons indicate that the character 
more likely depicts a farm implement similar to a plough. The character 
has become part of the modern compound for ‘physical force’, ‘strength’ 
or ‘ability’ (liliang 力量), which is also a kind of power. The character qiang 
強 (强 in simplified characters) means ‘mighty’, ‘powerful’, or ‘to force’. 
Originally, it designated the larvae of the corn-weevil (qiang 彊), which 
was used as a homophone for ‘strong’. Today, it appears in expressions 
such as ‘brute force’ 强力, a ‘strong’ or ‘powerful’ state 强国, and in formu-
las such as ‘strengthen the state and enrich the people’ 强国富民. This is an 
inversion of a proverb dating back to 81 BCE, recorded in the Discourses 
on Salt and Iron 鹽鐵論, which argued for taxation: ‘In a state made rich 
the people become strong’ 國富民強.2  
The character 力 is a pictogragh of a plough: the upper part, which curves at the bottom, is the wooden handle, 
and the lower part is its iron head
Source: chinesetimeschool.com
Wei 威, which, in combi-
nation with li, implies military 
strength or force, means ‘im-
posing’, ‘impressive’, or ‘ma-
jestic’. It appeared frequently 
in ancient Chinese texts to de-
scribe strong rulers or military 
leaders. The modern Chinese 
compound weili 威力 extends 
its meaning to ‘power’ or 
‘might’ as embodied or execut-
ed by a person. 
Among other ancient 
terms expressing the power of 
a person are shen 神 and yan 
嚴, the first referring to a su-
pernatural or divinely sanctioned authority, the second to both the power 
that grows from authority and the reverence such authority deserves.3 An-
other character, de 德, is commonly rendered as virtue. It denotes a tool-
set of qualities for successful government only certain rulers are imbued 
with. Yet one quotation from the Confucian Analects illustrates its relation 
to power: ‘The Master said, “Governing with virtue can be compared to 
being the Pole Star; it remains in its place yet receives the homage of the 
myriad lesser stars” ’.4  
Then there is shi 勢 (势 in simplified characters), of which li 力 is the 
carrier of meaning. In military texts, shi may denote the strategic advan-
tage one army has over another by occupying the high ground, or the 
‘power of position’.5 We accept persons of a certain social standing, edu-
cation, or institutional affiliation are invested with this kind of power, yet 
it remains unclear what triggers our submission to their authority. For 
Legalist thinker Han Feizi 韓非子 (279–233 BCE) shi refers to the phenom-
enon by which some people can enforce their will on others because of the 
social role they occupy.6 In his view, the power of position is distinct from 
‘Governing with virtue can be compared to being the Pole 
Star: it remains in its place yet receives the homage of the 




























































de (virtue), since without shi a ruler possessing only virtue lacks the ability 
to enforce his power.
A final ancient term that is relevant here is quan 權 (权 in simplified 
characters), which originally referred to weights. The traditional Chinese 
weighing device is a steelyard — a handheld balance beam, with a weigh-
ing dish at one end, and a sliding weight on a string that can be moved 
along it at the other. Quan thus implies ‘leverage’, and by extension, ‘politi-
cal leverage’. Another Daoist philosopher, Zhuangzi 莊子, referred to both 
senses of quan when he observed that ‘whoever is partial to power will not 
share its handle with others’ 親權者不能與人柄.7
A New Term for an Old Idea?
The most common contemporary Chinese compound word for power, 
quanli 权力, has been used from the Han dynasty onwards, but appeared 
rather infrequently in ancient times.8 It first occurred four times in an 
early Western Han work attributed to an advisor to Liu Bang 劉邦, the 
founding emperor of the Han dynasty (r. 202–195 BCE). This suggests that 
the political reset after the fall of the Qin dynasty created a need for a new 
or at least modified terminology of power. The advisor Jia Yi 賈誼 (200–168 
BCE) warned the new emperor that his decree to entitle some of his former 
comrades in arms to their own land would alter their behaviour: it ‘has 
furthered their weight quan, increased their strength li, and made them 
develop untamed minds that can hardly be made to follow’. Jia Yi is mainly 
concerned with the behaviour of these vassals: 
When clothing [of higher ranks] is imitated, it is called contending for 
precedence; when generous favours [proper to superiors] are imitat-
ed, it is called contending for reward; when the weight and [executive] 
strength [of higher ranks] quanli are imitated this is called contending 
for might.9  
In the view of the historian of early Chinese political thought, Charles 
Sanft, Jia Yi’s point is that in a system imbued with hierarchical signifi-
cance, to unduly claim the privileges of a higher rank is an act of aggres-
sion.10 Such imitation can also indicate an imminent power struggle. 
Comparing both of Jia Yi’s admonishments shows that the one expres-
sion, quanli, denotes two different aspects of power: the weight a person 
gains by taking up a rank within a feudal hierarchy, and the executive 
reach or leverage his position entails. 
An annotation in the influential commentary of the Song philosopher 
Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200 CE) to the Confucian Analects suggests a mean-
ing for quanli that oscillates between physical strength, brute force, and 
power. Zhu refers to Yi 羿, the legendary archer, and Ao 奡, said to have 
the strength to tow boats. Both tried to usurp their rulers’ positions, and 
were killed as a result. Zhu describes them as examples of ‘those who pos-
sessed power quanli in that age’ 當世有權力者.11 Zhu Xi’s use of quanli is 
decidedly negative. 
The current meaning of quanli as power appears to be a creation of the 
nineteenth century. The German historian Reinhart Koselleck has named 
A chestnut hawker uses a 
steelyard to weigh his goods 



























































the time between 1750 and 1850 the ‘saddle period’; it was then that in-
dustrial development forced the rising nations of Europe to redefine their 
political vocabulary to suit the requirements of modernity. In China, the 
aftermath of two Opium Wars, including the forceful opening of coastal 
cities to foreign trade, spurred a comparable process of the modernisation 
of language, including of the vocabulary of power. 
A flurry of glossaries and Chinese–English dictionaries appeared from 
the 1870s onwards.12 The modernisation process of Japan preceded that of 
China, and provided Chinese intellectuals studying there with translations 
for new ideas conveniently rendered in Chinese characters, called kanji, 
that were re-imported into the Chinese lexicon. 
The chart on the right provides a list of works in order of publication 
that address the notion of power by using the term quan.13 Works from the 
nineteenth century show a wide variety of expressions for ‘power’ involv-
ing quan as well as combinations of characters mentioned above — yet 
the expression quanli is rarely used.14 There is not enough information to 
determine the role, if any, that Japanese may have played in furthering the 
usage of quanli. In any case, quanli came into wider use beginning in the 
early twentieth century, and the newly introduced bilingual dictionaries 
translated it as power. 
The Language of ‘Power’ in China Today
The three-hour report delivered by Xi Jinping to the Nineteenth Nation-
al Congress in October 2017 (for further details, see Chapter 1 ‘The Nine-
teenth Party Congress: Here Comes the Future’, the China Story Yearbook 
2017: Prosperity, pp.18–26) laid out a road map for the ‘New Era’ of China 
becoming a world power. In the words of Jiang Shigong 强世功, renowned 
legal scholar and professor at Peking University, Xi’s address is the core 
text for understanding the Xi Jinping era and the CCP’s mission over the 
next thirty years.15 Xi’s speech presents a variety of expressions of power 
LIST OF WORKS IN ORDER OF PUBLICATION THAT ADDRESS THE NOTION OF 
POWER BY USING THE TERM QUAN
•  1844 大權 power over major issues (y) Haiguo tuzhi  
•  1852 政權 political power (y) Zengguang Haiguo tuzhi 
•  1879 權力 power (y) Lundun yu Bali riji 
•  1884 權勢 power (n) Tetsugaku jii ( Japan)
•  1884 權威 power (n) Tetsugaku jii ( Japan)
•  1894 權分 division of power (y) Shengshi weiyan
•  1894 權利 power (y) Shengshi weiyan
•  1893 政柄 political power (y) Faguo zhengbing ji
•  1895 權力 power (y) Shengshi weiyan
•  1895 權勢 power and influence (y) Zengguang haiguo tuzhi 
•  1895 權勢 power and influence (y) Shengshi weiyan
•  1903 權力平均主義 balance of power doctrine (y) Guoji sifa ( Japan)
•  1903 政權 political power (y) Zhongguo zhuanzhi zhengti jinhuashi lun
•  1905 大權 monarchical power (y) Kaocha zhengzhi riji
•  1905 權力 power (y) Chushi jiuguo riji 
•  1907 權力 power (y) Hanyi falü jingji cidian ( Japan)
•  1907 官制權 administrative power (y) Hanyi falü jingji cidian ( Japan)
•  1909? 權力 power (y) hengshi weiyan houbian
•  1911 大權 power (y) Putong baike xin da cidwian
•  1912 權力平衡 balance of power (n) Tetsugaku jii ( Japan)
•  1912 權力平均 balance of power (n) Ying Hua da cidian 
•  1913 權力 power (n) Chinese New Terms and Expressions
•  1913 權力 power (y) Hanyi riben falü jingji 
•  1913 政權 political power (n) Chinese New Terms and Expressions 
•  1916 政權 political power (n) English-Chinese Dictionary of Standard Chinese 
•  1922 權力 power (n) A Mandarin-Romanized Dictionary of Chinese



























































used in political speech today. In addition, it facilitates understanding of 
the signals some of these new terms send for China’s current and future 
aspirations. 
Expressions that appear in the official translation of Xi’s speech as 
some variant of the English word ‘power’ (as well as ‘strength’, ‘ability’, ‘en-
ergy’, ‘influence’, and other related terms) include a range of compounds 
involving four characters for strength, li 力; might, qiang 强; weight or 
power, quan 权, and a few others. The people, for instance, are the ‘fun-
damental force’ 根本力量 that determine the Party’s and the country’s fu-
ture. This is a Party that ‘always remains a powerful leadership core’ 始终
成为坚强领导核心, ‘exercises power in the interest of the people’ 执政为
民, increases ‘China’s economic power’ 经济实力 and ‘composite national 
strength’ 综合国力 with its ‘ability to innovate’ 创造力, its ‘power to unite’ 
凝聚力, and its ‘energy to fight’ 战斗力. While China still dreams of ‘build-
ing a stronger military dream’ 强军梦, it has increased its ‘international in-
fluence’ 国际影响力, its ‘ability to inspire’ 感召力, and its ‘power to shape’ 
塑造力. By 2035, China’s ‘soft power’ 软实力 will have grown much strong-
er, Chinese culture will have ‘greater appeal’ 影响力, and China, grounded 
in twenty-first century Marxism, will emanate ‘a more compelling power 
of truth’ 有说服力的真理力量.  
  Compound expressions that contain quan 权 often leave out li 力 for 
the sake of brevity. They share a strong emphasis on executive powers 
or agency: China’s ‘sovereignty’ 主权 shall be safeguarded but Cold War 
mentality and ‘power politics’ 强权政治 — Xi’s reference to Donald Trump 
— shall be rejected. The principle of ‘one country, two systems’ shall be un-
waveringly upheld through overall ‘jurisdiction’ 管治权 over Hong Kong 
and Macao while granting a high degree of ‘autonomy’ 自治权 to both re-
gions. The development of crime prevention and control systems shall be 
accelerated to protect ‘personal rights’ 人身权, ‘property rights’ 财产权, 
and the ‘right to dignity’ 人格权. To expand orderly political participation, 
legal protection for ‘human rights’ 人权 shall be strengthened and institu-
tions of democracy at the primary level — actually a policy to crush the 
impact large clans have on local village governments — will improve the 
people’s ‘right to be informed’ 知情权, ‘to participate’ 参与权, ‘to be heard’ 
表达权, and ‘to oversee’ 监督权.16    
Setting aside the paradoxical nature of some of the above pairings, 
such as upholding ‘jurisdiction’ to grant autonomy, or protecting personal 
rights through accelerated development of control systems, most expres-
sions in Xi’s speech bespeak two related agendas: the increase of power 
in the sense of global influence, and the increase of control within and 
beyond the mainland. 
The attempt to control is most evident in Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
campaign — one of his key agendas since coming to power in 2012. This 
agenda is evident from the large number of cadres at all levels that have 
been persecuted, and also in the recent expansion of the campaign to over-
see all public servants through the establishment of the State Supervisory 
Commission in March 2018 (see Chapter 1 Forum ‘Power Surge: China’s 
New National Supervisory Commission’, pp.31–33), the introduction of 
new legislation including the State Supervision Law 国家监察法 also in 
March, the issuing of revised Regulations for Disciplinary Measures 纪律
处分条列 in August, and the Central Committee’s eleventh study session of 
the Institutional Reform of State Supervision in December 2018.   
 The debate whether Xi is genuinely convinced of the need to eradi-
cate corruption or whether this campaign essentially serves the consoli-
dation of his power by purging possible opponents continues. While those 
convinced of Xi’s genuine motives point out that prosecution did not ex-
clude members associated with the camp of Xi’s mentor, Jiang Zemin,17 
their opponents see the establishment of parallel organisations including 
the State Supervisory Commission that act above the law and are equipped 
with more powers than the Supreme Court as clear indicators of Xi’s ef-
forts to consolidate power.18 Cases of trumped up corruption charges or re-
ports of the attempts by six high-ranking Party members to overthrow Xi 
suggest that the President does not act entirely from conviction.19  Whatev-



























































the Party has not only undermined the credibility of the CCP but has also 
undermined the Party’s control on all levels of politics, administration, 
and economy. If we conceive Xi’s anti-corruption campaign to be at least 
partly founded on this awareness, his continuous efforts to erase what 
Laozi called ‘lusts and desires’ — that is, corruptive behaviour among CCP 
members and, since March 2018, among the entire administration — have 
two aims: to render cadres and officials immune to temptation, and, as a 
consequence, to further consolidate the power of the CCP and its present 
leader. It is here where the conceptions of absolute power of the ancient 
thinker Laozi and Xi Jinping converge.
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DURING XI JINPING’s first term in office, his flagship anti-corruption 
drive roiled through the Party; in 
his second term, it is reshaping the 
state. In March 2018, the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) established 
the National Supervisory Commission 
(NSC) — a massive new anti-corruption 
body — and introduced the Supervision 
Law of the People’s Republic of 
China to regulate it. The new NSC is 
a powerhouse. It reports directly to 
the NPC, making it a co-equal branch 
of government with the judiciary, the 
Supreme’s People’s Procuratorate, and 
the State Council.  
The Supervision Law concentrates 
power in the NSC by consolidating 
anti-corruption work that had pre-
viously been parcelled out among 
multiple state and Party agencies. On 
the state side, these include the Proc-
uratorate, the State Council, and the 
National Bureau of Corruption Pre-
vention. Many of the duties of state 
agencies have been folded into the 
NSC. On the Party side, the Central 
Commission for Discipline and Inspec-
tion (CCDI) formerly spearheaded anti- 
corruption efforts. The Party-led CCDI 
remains intact, but it now works hand-
in-glove with the NSC. 
Critics argue that the Supervisory 
Law removes the legal circuit break-
ers that are used to partially regulate 
anti-corruption power. Previously, 
state anti-corruption bodies nominally 
adhered to administrative and crimi-
nal law. Meanwhile, the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) enforced discipline 
P O W E R  S U R G E :  C H I N A’ S  N E W 
N AT I O N A L  S U P E R V I S O R Y 


























































through an extralegal political channel, 
which allowed the CCDI to use fear-
some detention measures known as 
shuanggui 双规.1  
The new Supervision Law crosses 
the state and Party wires. It provides 
the NSC with a new investigative pow-
er — liuzhi 留置 (retention in custody) 
— that is remarkably similar to shuang-
gui. Liuzhi allows the NSC to hold a sus-
pect in custody for six months without 
counsel or a hearing. Unlike the pre-
vious Party-enforced measure, it has 
been enacted. But this law stands in 
direct legal tension with due process 
protections laid out in China’s Crimi-
nal Procedure Law, China’s Constitu-
tion, and international law.2 So, while 
the new Supervisory Law formally re-
routes anti-corruption power through 
legal circuits, it damages those circuits 
as well.
The Supervision Law extends the 
grid of anti-corruption powers over 
more Chinese citizens than ever before. 
The CCDI already had the power to in-
vestigate and detain Party members, 
but only about eighty per cent of civil 
servants are in the CCP.3 The NSC now 
has jurisdiction over state actors who 
are not Party members as well. Its man-
date is to investigate public employees 
and ‘relevant personnel’ including not 
only officials, but also managers at 
state-owned enterprises, people en-
gaged in management in public educa-
tion, scientific research, culture, health 
care, and sports, and ‘other personnel 
who perform public duties in accord-
ance with the law’. 
While the NSC is a behemoth, 
its amalgam of state and Party power 
might ironically prove that the whole 
is less than the sum of its parts. 
From the state’s perspective, some 
of the NSC’s authority is sapped from 
other agencies. For example, the 
Procuratorate, a major state power 
player, stands to lose out. Previously, 
a corruption case investigated by the 
Party required re-investigation by the 
Procuratorate before charges were laid. 
The new law strips it of that mandate. 
While this change is officially billed as 
reducing administrative duplication, it 
also reduces the Procuratorate’s power. 
Anti-corruption personnel are also 
being transferred to the NSC, despite 
resistance from the Procuratorate.4 
From the Party’s perspective, the 
Supervision Law is one of a number 
of reforms that increase political do-
minion over formal state governance, 
targetting public employees and CCP 
members alike for elevated scrutiny 
and discipline. But it is not clear that 
this will increase Party power over 
time. The CCP has enjoyed surprising 
longevity — a fact that may owe to the 
innovation of a hyphenated Party-state, 
in which the hyphen delineating pol-
itics and administration makes the 
compound durable; as Party and state 
merge, both may become more fragile. 
While critics worry that the NSC 
signals even more centralised power 
under the Xi administration, the forma-
tion of the NSC may instead highlight 
the surprising powerlessness of Bei-
jing against local interests. The central 
government’s concern that corruption 
undermines legitimacy is not always 
shared by local governments.5 And it is 
local government that is most powerful 
on the ground in China. This problem 
is not new. The balance of power be-
tween central and local administrators 
is arguably the most enduring histori-
cal challenge of Chinese statecraft. Un-
able to restrain corruption using local 
government hierarchies, administra-
tions from late imperial China to the 
present have turned to external over-
seers — such as the Censorate in the 
Ming dynasty, the Control Yuan under 
the Republic, and the NSC today — as 
top-down workarounds. While these 
overseers may have had some short-
term success, none has fixed the struc-
tural divide between local and central 
interests that is at the root of the issue.
The formation of the NSC seems 
to indicate a surge of power away from 
the law, towards the Party and the cen-
tre, but it remains unclear whether 
this power will flow as predicted, and 
whether the circuits can handle the 
load; too much power all at once may 
cause a power outage, or, even worse, 
burn down the house.













































TALKING (UP) POWER 
Gloria Davies
ON 2 MARCH 2018, Amazing China 厉害了, 我的
国 — a ninety-minute, state-funded documentary 
film — opened in movie theatres across China. The 
film begins with footage of Xi Jinping from a press 
conference on 15 November 2012, when he had just 
been appointed as the Chinese Communist Party’s 
(CCP) General Secretary. To the accompaniment of 
a rousing symphonic score, we see Xi promising, on 
behalf of his fellow-Politburo members, ‘to attend to 
our duties day and night with diligence, and strive 
to deliver a satisfactory answer sheet to history 
and the people’.1 As the music builds, the film cuts 
to a scene of children playing outdoors, followed by 
images of a mother and her young son, smiling as 
they give a thumbs-up sign with both hands, then 
individual smiling workers, and then a group of 
happy students waving with their hands raised, 
each making a peace sign, as the narrator intones: 
‘Five years have passed. More than 1.3 billion 
Chinese citizens have received an answer sheet of 
this kind.’2  






































The remainder of the film is devoted to showcasing the nation’s many ma-
jor achievements since Xi took power. It focusses on high-tech industries 
such as China’s 5G mobile technology, the deep-water drilling rig Blue 
Whale 2, and the construction in Guizhou of the Five-hundred-Metre Ap-
erture Spherical Radio Telescope (known as FAST), the rig and telescope 
being the largest of their kind in the world. Amazing China, with its daz-
zling images, high-definition graphics, and high-quality sound, reflects the 
sophistication of Party propaganda under Xi. It was no accident that the 
release of this celebratory film coincided with the annual gathering in Bei-
jing of delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Known colloquially as 
the Two Sessions 两会, these meetings of China’s legislature (the NPC) and 
the Party’s highest advisory body (the CPPCC) ran from 3 to 20 March. 
A week into the Two Sessions, on 9 March, Xinhua reported 
that Amazing China had become China’s ‘all-time highest-grossing 
documentary’.3 Other state media sources also praised the film. The na-
tional broadcaster CCTV reported on 11 March that the film had generated 
‘a tide of favourable comments by people from all walks of life and del-
egates to the Two Sessions’.4 Yet, in mid-April, the Party’s Central Propa-
ganda Department issued instructions for theatre screenings and online 
distribution of the film to cease.5  
Still from Amazing China film
Source: YouTube
State censorship ensured that, at least within China, speculations 
about this unexplained about-face did not circulate widely. Outside China, 
however, online commentators linked the film’s withdrawal to the onset of 
the US–China ‘trade war’, following the imposition of the first US tariffs on 
a range of Chinese products in late March. Several of these commentators 
singled out the ban that the US Commerce Department had imposed on 
Chinese telecom company ZTE on 16 April, preventing ZTE from buying 
essential components and software from its US suppliers. (This ban was 
lifted on 7 June). 
Amazing China presents ZTE (founded in 1985 and formerly known 
as Zhongxing Telecommunication Engineering Corporation) as a shining 
example of the nation’s technological prowess. The US ban, by contrast, 
revealed the extent of ZTE’s reliance on US-made technology. On 17 April, 
one day after the ban was imposed, ZTE announced it had ceased ‘major 
operating activities’. Trading in the company’s shares was suspended and 
the resulting loss of investor confidence, together with growing uncertainty 
about China’s trade relations with the US, affected the development plans 
of two other major Chinese telecom companies — Huawei and Xiaomi.6 On 
the Q&A platform Pin-cong 品葱, one commentator wrote that the problem 
with ZTE’s prominence in the film was that ‘while people may be indif-
ferent to politics, they care greatly about their hard-earned money’.7 This 
commentator averred that the film was pulled for the following reason: if 
people who were already ‘angry and anxious’ because ZTE’s misfortunes 
had caused them to lose money were to watch ZTE being lauded in Amazing 
China, ‘their indifference would likely turn into an angry political reaction’. 
In an interview with Voice of America’s Chinese-language service on 
23 April, the Beijing-based social critic and historian Zhang Lifan 章立凡 
observed that news of the film’s withdrawal might have been overstated as 
he was still able to access it online. However, what was indisputable was 
that ‘the film has not ceased to be parodied and pilloried’.8 
Amazing China is a loose translation. The film’s Chinese title, Lihai 
le, wode guo 厉害了, 我的国, means ‘How formidable you’ve become, my 





































ilar-sounding alternative title, Ni hai 
le wode guo 你害了我的国, meaning 
‘You’ve destroyed my country’. Zhang 
said, ‘Naturally, those who have done 
the destroying know who they are’.
The film’s Chinese title is a riff on 
the online expression, lihai le, wode ge 
厉害了，我的哥, meaning ‘You’re the 
best, bro’ and used by Chinese-speaking 
gamers to commend an extraordinary 
or unbeatable player. However, the 
word lihai 厉害 has ambivalent conno-
tations. Depending on context, lihai can mean that a person is ‘highly capa-
ble’, even ‘formidable’, or alternatively ‘harsh’, ‘severe’, or ‘ruthless’. When 
lihai is used to describe an incident, situation, or natural phenomenon (for 
instance, a fight or a storm), an alcoholic beverage or personal experience 
(such as of hunger or grief), it highlights the extreme nature or intensity of 
the thing in question. 
The ambivalence of lihai owes to the second character, hai 害, which 
carries a range of negative connotations. Used as a noun, hai means ‘evil’, 
‘disaster’, or ‘trouble’, and, as a verb, it means to ‘destroy’, ‘endanger’, ‘in-
jure’, or ‘kill’. The alternative title Zhang mentioned, Ni hai le wode guo, 
plays on these connotations of hai. Similarly, the gamers’ expression can 
also be used sardonically to mean, ‘So you think you’re the best, bro?’ In 
changing wode ge 我的哥 (my brother) to wode guo 我的国 (my country), 
the film’s producers evidently did not consider the parodic potential of 
their chosen title. 
‘Being Prepared for All Contingencies’
An alertness to power as double-edged is implicit in the word lihai. People 
who rise to power quickly are described as lihai. People who are lihai are 
wary of rivals who may be equally or even more lihai than them. When 
Chinese online expression, lihai le, wode ge, 
meaning ‘You’re the best, bro’
Source: soogif.com
Xi Jinping addressed senior Communist Party officials on 5 January 2018, 
the first day of a four-day workshop on ‘Studying and Implementing the 
Spirit of the Nineteenth National Party Congress’ in Beijing, he urged his 
audience to be vigilant against unforeseen dangers. Xi did not use lihai to 
describe China’s economic might. Instead, he spoke more circumspectly of 
China having arrived at ‘a time of great promise and historic opportunity’ 
in which ‘the overall situation for its further development is good but one 
cannot expect plain sailing as we move forward’.9 Xi elaborated: 
The greater our achievements are, the more cautious we must become, 
as if we were walking on thin ice, and the more prepared we must be 
for danger. We absolutely cannot afford to make strategic mistakes 
or allow disruptions to occur. We face a volatile international situa-
tion and find ourselves in complex and sensitive surroundings as we 
shoulder the arduous and demanding responsibility of ensuring sta-
ble reform and development. We must thus pre-empt risks and have 
masterful ways at our disposal for dealing with and resolving risks 
and challenges … . We must continue to advance our great struggle, 
which has acquired many new historical characteristics, and be pre-
pared to overcome all difficulties and obstacles. We will go forward 
boldly, guided by the noble goals that our Party has established.  
Xi used an eight-character premodern ex-
pression to sum up what he meant: ‘Make 
it the normal practice of our state to be pre-
pared for all contingencies’ 备豫不虞, 为国
常道. This quotation, taken from a Tang-era 
book on statecraft by the scholar-official 
Wu Jing 吴兢 (670–749) titled Essentials of 
the Good Government of the Zhenguan Era 
贞观政要, quickly became a key Party slo-
gan. It soon appeared in dozens of articles 
in China’s state-run media. 
Graphic illustration of ‘Make it the nor-
mal practice of our state to be prepared 
for all contingencies’ 备豫不虞, 为国常道 






































Chinese historians have traditionally and to this day represented the 
Zhenguan 贞观 era (627–649) of the second Tang emperor Taizong’s reign 
(r. 626–649) as a ‘prosperous age’ 盛世 in which people enjoyed an abun-
dance of food; trade and cultural activities flourished; and the empire was 
at peace. The expression ‘governance during Zhenguan’ 贞观之治 is syn-
onymous with ‘good government’. By quoting from Essentials of the Good 
Government of the Zhenguan Era, Xi Jinping is implicitly comparing his 
newly declared New Era 新时代 to that of the Zhenguan era. Endymion 
Wilkinson describes this Tang-era classic on statecraft as:
A collection of anecdotes and conversations between the emperor and 
his ministers that gives an idealised picture of government at a crucial 
moment in the establishment of Tang power … . During the Yuan and 
Qing, emperors received lectures on it as part of their education and 
the same was true of the rulers of Japan, Korea, and other nearby king-
doms until the early twentieth century.10  
Among those who lauded Xi’s use of this Tang dynasty expression was 
Yang Chaoming 杨朝明, Director of the Confucius Research Institute of 
China in Qufu, Shandong province — the birthplace of Confucius. Twelve 
days after Xi’s speech, Yang published an essay-length exegesis in the lead-
ing Party newspaper of ideas, Guangming Daily, in which he explained the 
meanings of the eight characters and their origins in early Chinese texts. 
He noted that the appearance of the second character 豫 yu (prepared-
ness) as a hexagram in the nearly three-thousand-year-old Chinese classic, 
the Book of Changes 易经, indicates that the Chinese have always valued 
the idea of being prepared and that it is thus an enduring Chinese trait. As 
Yang puts it: 
‘Being prepared for all contingencies’ is hence a kind of spirit and an 
ability. From [the time of the legendary sage rulers] Yao and Shun to 
the present, successive generations of Chinese have paid attention to 
‘reverence’. In statecraft, one is required to ‘revere virtue to protect 
the people’. Individuals must have the mettle to make something of 
their lives and constantly seek to strengthen themselves. All these ex-
emplify what ‘being prepared’ [备豫] means.11 
Accentuate the Positive
US President Donald 
Trump talks trade with 
Chinese Vice-Premier Liu 
He, May 2018
Source: Wikimedia
The increasingly severe tariffs that US President Donald Trump’s admin-
istration imposed on China from March onwards presented an enormous 
challenge for Xi and his administration. Because the value of Chinese ex-
ports to the US are more than quadruple that of US exports to China, the 
Chinese government is constrained in its ability to resolve the problems 
caused by the tariffs. Nonetheless, it has the power to block its citizens’ 
access to bad news concerning the tariffs and rising tensions between Chi-
na and the US. By June 2018, the Party’s Central Propaganda Department 
(CPD) had formulated a strategy both for shaping mainland media cover-
age of the trade war and suppressing what it perceived as unfavourable 
international media reports. 
On 29 June, the CPD issued a set of instructions to mainland media out-





































The media are to echo the statements made by Vice Premier Liu He 刘鹤, 
China’s chief trade negotiator. They must present the US as waging ‘a war 
against China’s rise’. As the outcome of this trade war depends on ‘which 
one holds out to the end,’ the CPD instructed, ‘we absolutely must not show 
any hesitation or softness’ 看谁能坚持到底，绝不能手软嘴软. Moreover, 
the media ‘must not attack Trump’s vulgarity, so as to avoid starting a war 
of insults’. The Department also issued two general directives: 
Economic achievements and new developments must be given promi-
nence. This will show that our economy has improved at a steady pace 
as planned. Place important economic reports on prominent pages. 
Timing is of the essence. Interviews must be sought from academic 
experts who have been recommended by the various departments. 
Information published on websites, Weibo and WeChat accounts must 
be well coordinated so that we present a picture of strength in our 
online propaganda. 
Above all, do not mention ‘Made in China 2025’. There will be conse-
quences if you do.12 
This injunction against ‘Made in China 2025’ was consistent with the with-
drawal of Amazing China. The Made in China 2025 initiative had been 
introduced to develop precisely the same varieties of Chinese high-tech 
manufacturing that the film had praised Xi’s administration for having 
achieved ‘amazingly’ quickly. Launched by Premier Li Keqiang in 2015, 
Made in China 2025 is an ambitious ten-year plan to turn China into a 
global leader in information technology; robotics; the production of aer-
ospace, aeronautical, agricultural, maritime, and new-energy equipment; 
and ‘green’ cars as well as nanomaterials, biopharmaceuticals, and new 
medical products.13  
The economic setbacks caused by incremental US tariffs on Chinese 
goods, coupled with growing international concern over China’s coercive 
influence abroad, including interference in other countries’ domestic pol-
itics, have, evidently, led Party leaders and senior propaganda officials 
to tone down talk of Chinese might and technological prowess. They are 
also aware that in the digital age their ability to suppress inconvenient 
information is relatively limited. The CPD’s directives (including the one 
of 29 June mentioned earlier) are regularly leaked and published on the 
US-based website China Digital News, in Chinese and English translation. 
Readers outside China can easily find out what is being blocked in China 
at any given time. Within China, however, censorship, together with the 
threat of penalties, has proven sufficiently effective in coercing media to 
comply with the CPD’s directives. 
Unlike a multi-party democratic system where, ideally, policy and law 
are shaped by contestation and cooperation among the elected represent-
atives of rival political parties, China’s one-Party system operates on the 
presumption that the Party knows best what the people need. Censorship 
and propaganda have, thus, always remained essential tools of social and 
political control for the CCP. While censorship prevents open challenges to 
the Party’s policies and actions, propaganda inducts people into how the 
Party wants them to think. 
A September 2018 study by Damien Ma and Neil Thomas of recent 
propaganda work under Xi indicates that it has intensified such that ‘there 
will be less internal debate over the interpretation of high-level directives, 
less bureaucratic resistance to central policy preferences, and easier re-
course to shut down publications and silence troublemakers’.14 Ma and 
Thomas highlight an important difference between Xi’s approach to prop-
aganda and that of Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Whereas his predecessors 
had allowed some local decision-making by state agencies on cultural and 
media matters, Xi has concentrated these decision-making powers in the 
CPD. 
From the start of the Reform and Opening Up process in 1978, a key 
reform had been the development of Party and state institutions into sep-





































Party and state bureaucracies have been reorganised or merged to en-
hance the Party leadership’s control over different areas of government, 
ranging from market and media supervision, through management of the 
environment and natural resources, to the implementation of ‘socialist 
rule of law’. Party theorists, many of whom are also academics, have vig-
orously defended this development. Essays with titles such as ‘To Uphold 
and Strengthen the Party’s Comprehensive Leadership is Both Logically 
Necessary and Practically Indispensable’ 坚持和加强党的全面领导 pres-
ent the type of message Xi’s administration sees as positive, and draw on a 
Party slogan promoted since 2017.15   
We can only speculate about the extent to which people accept and be-
lieve such messages. However, what is certain is that publications lauding 
Xi and the Party’s ‘comprehensive leadership’ have become increasingly 
common in mainland public and academic culture. This is as good an in-
dication as any that the Xi-led Party’s aggressive efforts at censorship and 
propaganda are achieving some results. 
The Anxieties of ‘Homo Xinensis’ 
In January 2018, Jiang Shigong 强世功, a well-known legal scholar at 
Peking University’s Law School, published a masterful account of Party 
thinking that attracted local and international attention.16 Jiang is an elo-
quent interpreter of the present-day CCP’s ‘guiding thought’ 指导思想 (in-
augurated at the CCP Congress in October 2017 as ‘Xi Jinping Thought on 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’). Echoing and elabo-
rating on Xi’s October 2017 report, Jiang wrote that the ‘Xi Jinping Era’ had 
propelled China into ‘a new historical period’ and opened ‘a new political 
space’, enabling the nation to enter the fourth stage of its progress since 
the founding of the CCP in 1921: that of China ‘becoming powerful’ 强起来. 
(The three earlier stages were: ‘realising the great leap from … autocratic 
politics to popular democracy’, 1921–49; ‘standing up’, 1949–77; and ‘get-
ting rich’, 1978–2012). Jiang explained that this way of periodising modern 
Chinese history is analogous to how ‘illus-
trious figures in Chinese political history 
like founding emperors Qin Shi Huang 
[r.247–220 BCE], Han Wudi [r.141–87 
BCE], Tang Taizong [r.626–49 CE] or Song 
Taizu [r.960–76 CE]’ have been histori-
cised. These were people who ‘because 
of the historical space they opened up 
through their actions  … created political 
time, thereby furnishing the coordinates by which future generations de-
marcated historical periods.’17 
Jiang is a model academic in Xi Jinping’s China and an apt example 
of what Geremie Barmé has parodically referred to as ‘Homo Xinensis’ 
— people who eulogise Xi Jinping and do the Party’s bidding, and whose 
careers have benefitted from doing so.18 Yet, as the sudden reversals that 
befell Amazing China and Made in China 2025 from April to June 2018 
made clear, even singing Xi’s praise and assertively promoting the ‘Xi Jin-
ping Era’ can be fraught with complications. 
In early July 2018, the People’s Daily published an unusual series of 
opinion pieces titled ‘Three Critiques of Writing in a Hyperbolic and Boast-
ful Style’ 三评浮夸自大文风. In his translation of these pieces, Barmé has 
noted that their publication in the CCP’s ‘official media organ’ meant that, 
They would have most probably been written under the guidance 
of the Party’s Propaganda Department and this is why independent 
online commentary was particularly scathing: critics of the critiques 
immediately lambasted the articles and pointed out that as the Party 
propaganda system was the main source of media hyperbole and bom-
bast, such editorial finger-wagging deserved nothing but contempt. 
While publications critical of Xi and the CPD (or that lament the increas-







































outside China, they are accessible to concerned and engaged members 
of the mainland reading public when they travel overseas or through 
one or another form of proxy access within China. Of these critiques, a 
lengthy essay published in July 2018 by Tsinghua University legal schol-
ar Xu Zhangrun 许章润 has attracted significant attention outside China, 
and, surreptitiously, in China as well. Xu expressed ‘eight fears’ and ‘eight 
hopes’ for China under Xi. Of the increasingly repressive policies pursued 
by Xi’s administration, he wrote that they risked turning China into ‘little 
more than a cultural backwater of intellectual dwarfs’. Unlike Jiang, who 
lauds Xi for propelling China toward greater power, Xu laments that under 
Xi, ‘the engine of reform’ has ‘been idling for the last few years’ and warns: 
‘if it isn’t used to propel us forward, we will go into reverse’.20  
A growing number of online commentators share Xu’s fear of Chi-
na’s ‘return to totalitarianism’ 极权政治全面回归. In an interview with 
the Chinese-language edition of the Financial Times in July 2018, the Bei-
jing-based independent scholar and social commentator Rong Jian 荣剑
remarked that ‘totalitarian’ is an inaccurate description. He pointed out 
that ‘apart from political rights and the right of speech’, most Chinese cit-
izens today enjoy ‘several basic rights such as those of personal freedom 
and property’ and because these ‘are subject to legal protection’, they ‘can 
thus be said to objectively exist as part of China’s civil society’.21  
The Party’s increased control over all aspects of government is not 
necessarily a sign of power. China’s present Party leaders may regard the 
intensification of censorship and propaganda as necessary for sustaining 
one-party rule. Yet in a society that has long outgrown the totalitarian pol-
itics and command economy of the Maoist era, these coercive practices 
may backfire. The preoccupation of Xi’s administration with ‘being pre-
pared for all contingencies’, when set against its self-congratulatory talk 
of China ‘becoming powerful’ under Xi, betrays an unshakeable anxiety 
about the continuing legitimacy of CCP rule.
‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ — The People’s Daily’s attempt to 
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WITH CHINA HAVING the world’s second largest economy, in-
creasingly sophisticated armed forces, 
deepening networks of foreign rela-
tions, and prominent participation in 
international institutions, discussions 
of its foreign policy increasingly in-
volve the consideration of ‘power’.2 Yet 
‘power’ can mean many things in the 
Chinese context. It may refer to China’s 
identity in international politics: var-
iously a ‘rising power’, a ‘partial pow-
er’, and a ‘potential superpower’.3 It 
may describe the means or resources 
through which Beijing pursues its for-
eign policy objectives: including ‘mil-
itary power’, ‘economic power’ or, in-
creasingly, ‘technological power’.4 The 
pursuit of ‘power’ may even constitute 
China’s ultimate goal in world politics.5
The pathways to power are numer-
ous, diverse, and complex. As an exam-
ple, consider the two-day APEC summit 
held in Papua New Guinea in Novem-
ber 2018. This illustrated the multiple 
ways in which Chinese diplomacy may 
have affected events: the soaring rheto-
ric of Xi’s speech, allegedly controver-
sial negotiating tactics by the Chinese 
delegation, lucrative deals for certain 
South Pacific nations but not others, 
and the ultimate failure of participants 
to agree on a joint communiqué. 
This forum offers a conceptu-
al framework for analysing power in 
Chinese foreign policy, including in 
instances such as we saw at APEC.6 
Employing a simple and widely used 
definition of the English word power, 
roughly equivalent to quánlì 权力 (see 
Chapter 1 ‘Immunity to Temptation — 
“Power” in Chinese Language’, pp.14-
24) we identify five discrete pathways 
states can take to exercise power in 
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phasises that power is relational and 
strongly conditioned by the context 
of attempts by one state to influence 
another, including the identity of the 
target(s) and the matter(s) over which 
influence is sought. Devoid of context, 
the mere possession of resources is not 
a reliable measure of an actor’s abili-
ty to change others’ behaviour. While 
China’s resources — military, econom-
ic, and otherwise — are growing, this 
does not automatically mean Beijing 
enjoys a commensurately enhanced 
ability to change others’ behaviour. 
The statement ‘China is becoming 
more powerful’ says little about over 
whom, and to do what.9 
their external affairs, illustrating the 
mechanism through which each oper-
ates, with examples from the Chinese 
experience.7 
The Concept of Power 
While power is defined and concep-
tualised in numerous ways, for the 
practical purpose of evaluating foreign 
policy successes, we use Robert Dahl’s 
intuitive idea that ‘A has power over B 
to the extent that [they] can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise 
do’.8 This definition rejects the idea 
of power as an attribute determined 
by a state’s possession of tangible and 
intangible resources. Rather, it em-
APEC leaders, Papua New Guinea, 2018
Source: commons.wikimedia.org
Five Pathways to Power in Chinese 
Foreign Policy
Coercion
Coercion takes place where China im-
poses (or threatens) costs on a target to 
change its behaviour. Coercion seeks 
to manipulate a target’s decision-mak-
ing calculus such that the costs of re-
sisting the demand (and protecting its 
interest in dispute) outweigh the ben-
efits.10 While typically associated with 
military force, China uses a variety of 
instruments to coerce others. 
One prominent example is in-
formal economic sanctions.11 When 
South Korea agreed to jointly deploy 
a US-supplied Terminal High-Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence 
system in July 2016, China curtailed 
the import of certain Korean goods 
and services, restricted outbound 
group tourism to Korea, and disrupt-
ed the operations of key Korean firms 
on the mainland.12 (For more on this, 
see China Story Yearbook 2017: Pros-
perity, Chapter 3 ‘North Korea: A Year 
of Crisis’, pp.83–93.) Combined, these 
measures were estimated to shave 0.4 
per cent off South Korea’s economic 
growth in 2017. The purpose of inflict-
ing these economic costs appeared to 
be to push Seoul to reverse the THAAD 
decision; however, Beijing appears to 
have had limited success so far.
Bargaining
Bargaining power is exercised through 
voluntary exchange, where a state 
exchanges (or offers to exchange) 
something of value with the target.13 
A straightforward case would be the 
provision of (usually economic) bene-
fits in a direct quid pro quo for a policy 
concession. For example, Beijing exer-
cises bargaining power to isolate Tai-
wan diplomatically — in 2018 the Do-
minican Republic, Burkina Faso, and 
El Salvador severed ties with Taipei, 
reportedly in exchange for economic 
benefits from Beijing.14 The Belt and 
Road Initiative similarly involves deals 
where recipients offer concessions 
that privilege Chinese firms, or may 
yield strategic advantages, in exchange 
for infrastructure loans.15 
Agenda setting
Agenda setting occurs where a state 
is able to shape the parameters of 
what is legitimate or feasible for oth-
er states to do within a specific insti-
tutional framework or issue area. A 





















































substance of and procedure for discus-
sions within international forums. For 
example, as chair of the 2018 Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation summit in 
Qingdao, Beijing set both the topics for 
discussion and the framework for how 
they would be discussed in service of 
its own priorities.16
On a broader level, a state may go 
so far as to create or shape the rules, 
practices, norms, and institutions that 
govern inter-state relations. China’s 
creation of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, for example, may fa-
cilitate the reshaping of certain rules, 
and, accordingly, the behaviour of oth-
ers, in the field of multilateral develop-
ment financing.17 
Persuasion
Persuasion is the use of communica-
tion to alter beliefs about what is true, 
right, or appropriate.18 It relies on the 
provision of information about empir-
ical facts or normative principles and 
how they relate to a target’s interests. 
If successful, this method can cause 
others to perceive their interests as be-
ing in line with those of the persuading 
actor. 
 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
through public, diplomatic, and oth-
er channels, the Chinese government 
has consistently provided information 
about its capabilities, development 
trajectory, and strategic intentions 
to South-East Asian states concerned 
about China’s rise.19 The goal has been 
to minimise concerns about the ‘China 
threat’ and encourage greater engage-
ment with Beijing.
Attraction 
Attraction, commonly termed ‘soft 
power’, operates where a target’s be-
liefs and, possibly, actions change to 
become more aligned with the attract-
ing state’s preferences due to admi-
ration or a desire to emulate. It is the 
ability to make targets ‘want what you 
want’.20 Many factors might contribute 
to a state’s ‘attractiveness’, such as its 
culture, policies, and domestic insti-
tutions.21 (See Chapter 8 Forum ‘Soft 
Power, Hard Times’, pp. 237–241.)
In 2007, president Hu Jintao 
胡锦涛 called for greater investment 
in ‘soft power’. Beijing has spent bil-
lions supporting initiatives to cultivate 
positive perceptions of China abroad, 
including educational and cultural 
exchanges; the staging of cultural ex-
hibitions and concerts; inserts and 
supplements in foreign-language news 
outlets; and educational programs in-
cluding more than 500 Confucius In-
stitutes.22 Yet China’s greatest source 
of attraction may be its post-Mao eco-
nomic model, which raised hundreds 
of millions out of poverty and poten-
tially provides a template for other de-
veloping nations to emulate.23
Conclusion
Distinguishing the pathways through 
which China can exercise power helps 
elucidate a newer concept used to de-
scribe aspects of China’s foreign poli-
cy behaviour: ‘sharp power’. Initially 
described as the strategy whereby 
states sow discord or silence criticism 
by ‘manipulating or poisoning the in-
formation’ that reaches target audi-
ences,24 it has also been defined as the 
use of ‘subversion, bullying and pres-
sure … to promote self-censorship’,25 
and even a ‘shorthand for information 
warfare’.26 While discussion of the 
concept is united by a concern about 
the vulnerability of open, democratic 
societies to such influence, its parame-
ters are somewhat unclear.
Our framework views sharp 
power less as a new and unique form 
of influence, but rather as the coordi-
nated use of existing means to achieve 
particular objectives — deterring crit-
icism and promoting a positive narra-
tive. Threatening to restrict access to 
the Chinese market for an Australian 
publisher of a book critical of China 
is coercion; making payments or do-
nations to politicians in exchange for 
support of Chinese policies is bargain-
ing; and obtaining financial interests 
in media organisations to limit critical 
coverage is a form of negative persua-
sion, because it denies communication 
that might alter beliefs. Together, these 
constitute ‘sharp power’. For state or 
other actors interested in countering 
it, they need to understand the differ-
ent pathways through which it works 









































WHEN 2018 DAWNED OVER the Korean peninsula, the pros-
pects for peace looked dim. Following 
North Korea’s sixth nuclear test on 3 
September 2017, US President Donald 
Trump warned that ‘all options are 
on the table’, threatening the  Democ-
ractic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) 
with ‘fire and fury’. On New Year’s Day, 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un re-
sponded sharply: ‘The US should know 
that the button for nuclear weapons is 
on my table’. 
Yet just weeks later, Kim Jong-un 
sent his younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, 
to attend the Winter Olympics open-
ing ceremony in South Korea, where 
she shined alongside the determined-
ly dour visage of US Vice-President 
Mike Pence. On 27 April, Republic of 
Korea President Moon Jae-in met Kim 
Jong-un on the southern side of the 
truce village of Panmunjom. Their 
‘Panmunjom Declaration’ announced 
their intent to formally end the Korean 
War. Less than a month later, they met 
again on Panmunjom’s northern half, 
laying the groundwork for President 
Moon’s historic September 2018 visit 
C H I N A’ S  KO R E A  D I P L O M A C Y
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to North Korea. North–South summitry 
also facilitated the first-ever meeting 
between a sitting US president and a 
North Korean leader — held in Singa-
pore on 12 June. 
By September, Kim’s dance card 
began to fill up. President Putin is-
sued an open invitation to visit Russia. 
Trump began seeking a second meet-
ing, while Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe announced he wanted to 
visit Pyongyang soon to ‘break the shell 
of mistrust’.
To many observers, China was 
being left behind. ‘The White House 
stunned Beijing’ with the Singapore 
summit, two US journalists with NBC 
News suggested. ‘Fearing a loss of influ-
ence with its often recalcitrant ally, Chi-
na invited Kim to three successive sum-
mits in China, in March, May and June.’1 
Such arguments, although widely 
accepted among Western observers, 
misunderstand Beijing’s strategic prior-
ities, ignore China’s proactive diploma-
cy, and vastly underestimate Chinese 
influence with North Korea. 
China’s Priorities 
Beijing has long sought to discourage 
Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weap-
ons while promoting regime stability, 
border security, and economic re-
forms.2 Pyongyang’s efforts to bolster 
diplomatic ties and reduce security ten-
sions with the US and South Korea ad-
vance these goals by reinforcing regime 
stability and encouraging economic re-
form and openness, while eroding its 
justifications for nuclear weapons. 
More broadly, Pyongyang’s diplo-
matic engagement undermines the US’s 
justification for its military presence 
in South Korea, including some 28,000 
US soldiers and the recently deployed 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) missile defence system. US–
North Korean rapprochement would 
also undermine US criticism of China’s 
enforcement of UN sanctions on the 
DPRK (North Korea), easing this reputa-
tional cost for Beijing.
Xi Jinping hardly fears a loss of 
influence: China has been and will re-
main the most important economic, 
strategic, and diplomatic partner for 
the DPRK. Despite persistent North Ko-
rean unease at the country’s extreme 
economic dependence upon China — a 
key motivator for Kim’s wider diplo-
matic forays — South Korea and the US 
remain existential threats to the DPRK 
regime. And that puts China in prime 
position for pursuing its own agenda 
on the troubled peninsula. 
Chinese Diplomacy
Beijing’s diplomatic activism began 
with the ‘freeze for freeze’ proposal 
(see China Story Yearbook 2017: Pros-
perity, Chapter 3 ‘North Korea: A Year 
of Crisis’, pp.83–93), first announced 
by Foreign Minister Wang Yi 王毅 in 
March 2017:
China proposes that, as a first step, 
the DPRK suspend its missile and 
nuclear activities in exchange for 
a halt of the large-scale US–ROK 
exercises. This suspension-for- 
suspension can help us break out 
of the security dilemma and bring 
the parties back to the negotiat-
ing table. Then we can follow the 
dual-track approach of de- 
nuclearising the peninsula on the 
one hand and establishing a peace 
mechanism on the other.3 
In July, Pyongyang offered its support 
for Beijing’s initiative.4 In August, Chi-
na, joined by Russia, reiterated its pro-
posal at UN Security Council meetings. 
By January 2018, the International Cri-
sis Group had declared China’s ‘freeze 
for freeze’ to be ‘the most viable and 
realistic, if unsatisfactory, option for 
parallel de-escalation’.5 
In support of this initiative, Xi Jin-
ping invited Kim to Beijing in March 
2018 — Kim’s first overseas trip as the 
DPRK’s Supreme Leader — where they 
pledged to retain close, high-level com-
munication, while Xi endorsed Kim’s 
plans to meet with Trump. After the 
Panmunjom summit, Kim returned to 
China, meeting Xi in Dalian on 7 May, 
where Xi praised the recent Korean 
Workers’ Party statement announcing 
‘the suspension of nuclear tests and 
intercontinental ballistic missile tests 
and the abandonment of the northern 
nuclear testing ground’.6 
Following Pyongyang’s pledge, 
Trump fulfilled his side of the bar-
gain, promising in Singapore that ‘we 
will be stopping the war games’ tem-
porarily, describing US–ROK military 
exercises as ‘very provocative’.7 Bei-
jing quickly praised his pledge, declar-
ing: ‘the China-proposed “suspension 
for suspension” initiative has been 
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) hosted North 










































materialised and now the situation is 
also moving forward in the direction 
of Beijing’s “dual-track” approach’.8 
Kim soon returned to Beijing, where Xi 
praised Kim’s ‘major decision to shift 
the focus to economic construction’.9 
To encourage this shift, Xi be-
gan to loosen the purse strings. By 
June, Chinese flights to Pyongyang 
and group tours had resumed after a 
hiatus of several months. Customs in-
spections on cross-border trade eased 
slightly, as Beijing issued an aid ship-
ment of fertiliser, just in time for the 
spring planting season.10 
Although Pyongyang remains re-
luctant to forgo its nuclear weapons 
program, Kim’s proactive diplomacy 
vindicates Beijing’s longstanding em-
phasis on economic development — a 
strategy neatly captured by Professor 
Gong Yutao 宫玉涛 in late 2016:
If North Korea’s economic adjust-
ment measures can have a signif-
icant impact in improving its do-
mestic economy, this will stabilise 
internal governance and increase 
the leadership’s confidence in 
their ability to ensure national se-
curity while reducing their fears 
of external threats. This will en-
hance their willingness to engage 
with the outside, including im-
proving relations with South Ko-
rea and the US, leading to greater 
stability on the Korean peninsula, 
with positive implications for Chi-
na’s own security.11 
In sum, the dramatic developments on 
the Korean peninsula in 2018 reveal 
not an erosion of Chinese influence, 
but rather point to the diverse means 
by which Beijing is increasingly able to 
deploy its economic power to shape its 




















































TECHNOLOGY: RAPID ASCENT AND 
GLOBAL BACKLASH
Andrew Kennedy 
IN THE REALM OF technological innovation, 
China has arrived. China has launched manned 
space flights, constructed the world’s largest radio 
telescope, and sent the world’s first quantum-
communications satellite into space, among 
other achievements in recent years. Its pursuit of 
‘innovation-led development’ — including such 
schemes as the ‘Made in China 2025’ program (for 
more on this, see Chapter 2 ‘Talking (Up) Power’) 
and the Internet Plus initiative — promise more 
accomplishments to come. President Xi Jinping 
wants China to become one of the world’s most 
innovative countries by 2020 and a leading global 
science and technology power by 2049.
Space development planning of Xi’an High-tech Zone 


















































In 2018, however, China’s grand ambitions came face to face with dra-
matic changes in the outside world. In the US, the Trump administration 
spearheaded a series of higher tariffs and tighter technology controls, 
prompting former Treasury secretary Hank Paulson to warn of a loom-
ing ‘Economic Iron Curtain’ between the US and China.1 In Europe and 
Asia, other developed countries are taking a hard look at their collabora-
tions with China as well. Whatever happens in the end with the US–China 
‘trade war’, China’s relationships with the world’s traditional technology 
powers are clearly changing. China can no longer rely as heavily on en-
gagement with the outside world to drive its technological development. 
Rapid Ascent
To understand China’s rise as a technology power, first consider the 
country’s stunning increase in research and development (R&D) spend-
ing. In 2017, China’s total R&D spending reached an estimated 1.75 tril-
lion yuan (US$445 billion in purchasing power parity terms) — a sev-
enty per cent increase in the figure for 2012. China now stands as the 
second-largest investor in R&D worldwide, after the US, which spent an 
estimated US$538 billion in 2017.2 China invests 2.1 per cent of its GDP in 
R&D — more than many European countries but still short of the United 
States (2.7 per cent), Japan (3.3 per cent), and South Korea (4.2 per cent).3 
Most of China’s R&D spending (78 per cent in 2017) comes from business 
— both state and privately owned.4 
China is also working hard to attract high-tech talent from overseas. 
In 2003, the Chinese Communist Party Politburo created the Central Co-
ordinating Group on Talent (CCGT) 中央人才工作协调小组. In 2008, the 
CCGT launched the Thousand Talents Program 千人计划 and other initi-
atives to attract promising scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs, par-
ticularly from within the Chinese diaspora, to work in China. By 2016, 
more than 6,000 individuals had registered to return under the Thou-
sand Talents program — far in excess of the initial goal of 2,000 over 
ten years.5 
This combination of money and talent is paying off. China’s meteor-
ic rise in the world of scientific publishing is particularly impressive. To 
be sure, scientific journals have retracted an alarming number of articles 
by Chinese scientists in recent decades due to plagiarism, fraudulent re-
search, and faked peer review. In 2017, for example, the journal Tumor Bi-
ology decided to retract 107 articles published by Chinese authors.6 More 
generally, however, China’s rise in basic science is quite impressive. The 
annually updated Nature Index records the institutional affiliations of 
scholars publishing in the most prestigious scientific journals around the 
world. US-based scientists continue to publish more articles in these jour-
nals than those of any other country, giving the US the highest score of any 
country in the index. Since 2012, however, China’s score has risen from 
twenty-four to forty-six per cent of the US score — a remarkable jump in 
just six years (see Figure 1 above). About half of China’s publications are in 
chemistry, but Chinese scientists are also publishing strongly in physical 
and life sciences as well. China’s top five institutions producing scientific 
research, according to the index, are the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
Peking University, Tsinghua University, Nanjing University, and the Uni-
versity of Science and Technology of China.
Figure 1: Per cent of US Nature Index Score
Source: Author’s calculations from Nature Index (https://www.natureindex.com). Note that the number of journals 


















































Some Chinese firms have emerged as impressive high-tech players 
as well. The information and communication technology giant Huawei 
is among the world’s leaders in terms of total R&D spending, and it in-
vests twenty to thirty per cent of its R&D spending in more ambitious 
‘research and innovation’ projects. Two of China’s Internet companies 
— Tencent and Alibaba — now rank among the world’s top ten compa-
nies in terms of market capitalisation. More generally, Chinese Inter-
net firms have proven more adept at integrating the online and offline 
worlds, compared with their US counterparts, partly because China leads 
the world in the adoption of mobile payment technology. Other Chinese 
firms have proven extremely adept at ‘efficiency-based’ innovation — 
improving product design, production processes, and supply-chain man-
agement to lower costs and reduce time to market. 
China’s leaders are far from content with the progress to date. 
Launched in 2015, the ‘Made in China 2025’ (MIC2025) program aims to 
catapult China into next-generation manufacturing through the use of in-
telligent robots, wireless sensor networks, and integrated software pro-
cesses. It prioritises ten high-tech sectors in particular: 
•  next generation information technology
•  high-end computerised machines and robots
•  space and aviation
•  maritime equipment and high-tech ships
•  advanced railway transportation equipment
•  new energy and energy-saving vehicles
•  electrical equipment
•  agricultural machines
•  new materials
•  biopharmaceuticals and high-tech medical devices.
In 2017, China’s State Council launched a plan to make the country 
the ‘world’s primary artificial intelligence (AI) innovation centre’ by 2030. 
Towards this end, Baidu 
will focus on self-driv-
ing vehicles, Alibaba on 
smart cities, Tencent on 
health, and iFlytek on 
voice technology. For 
now, the US is still the 
world leader in AI: it 
has most of the world’s 
leading experts, special-
ised computing hard-
ware, and a good supply of raw data on which algorithms can be trained. 
Yet China is a formidable challenger. Extensive government support, cut-
throat domestic competition, and an astoundingly rich supply of data pro-
pel China’s AI sector. PricewaterhouseCoopers bullishly projects that AI 
will add US$15.7 trillion to the world economy by 2030, including US$7 
trillion in China and US$3.7 trillion in North America.7 
China’s rising profile in science and technology could powerfully 
boost the country’s military capabilities over time. The People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA) collaborates with China’s universities and civilian firms 
in areas that range from robotics to cutting edge materials. This invest-
ment in ‘military-civil fusion’ 军民融合 has developed rapidly. By March 
2016, China’s military was working with more than 1,000 civilian Chinese 
firms to develop and produce equipment for the armed forces.8 The AI 
race is seen as particularly important. The PLA now pursues not only ‘in-
formatisation’ 信息化 but also ‘intelligentisation’ 智能化. This is evident in 
the military’s work on a range of AI applications, including in the fields of 
intelligent and autonomous unmanned systems; war-gaming, simulation, 
and training; data fusion, information processing, and intelligence analy-
sis; and command and decision-making support.9 




















































For all of China’s progress in recent years, a range of problems continue to 
hold the country back. The Chinese government is not shy about ‘picking 
winners’, for example, pressuring firms to focus on specific technologies 
and favouring some firms over others. Huawei aside, however, China’s 
state-favoured firms generally have a poor track record when it comes 
to technological upgrading, at least in information technology. With easy 
access to finance and the government procurement market, some of these 
firms hesitate to shoulder the costs and risks of cutting-edge innovation. 
And when they try, their inefficiency makes it difficult for them to succeed. 
The telecommunications company ZTE, for example, which was briefly 
banned from buying US technology by the US Department of Commerce 
in 2018, generally relies on the government procurement market to stay 
afloat. (For more information on ZTE, see Chapter 2 ‘Talking (Up) Power’.) 
Another example is the computer firm Lenovo. Founded by members of 
the Chinese Academy of Science’s Institute of Computing Technology, the 
firm has relied on acquisitions rather than its own internal capabilities to 
compete in global markets.10 
Chinese firms also tend to lag behind their foreign counterparts in 
generating revenue from new products. In 2016, foreign firms operating 
in China generated on average twenty-one per cent of their revenue from 
new products. Domestic firms generated only thirteen per cent. And while 
some of China’s leading technology firms have become large and promi-
nent, China’s share of the world’s top one hundred companies (in terms of 
market capitalisation) barely changed between 2009 and 2018, rising from 
eleven to twelve per cent. US firms’ share in 2018 remained a remarkable 
fifty-four per cent. 
China’s tightening political controls are also a problem for its science 
and technology sector. In recent years, censorship of ideas and resources, 
and closer policing of political attitudes among university faculty mem-
bers have generated concern.11 At a meeting of China’s elite scientists in 
2016, one stated that Internet controls were imposing ‘very great losses’ on 
Chinese science.12 Despite this and other expressions of concern, China’s 
leaders have continued to tighten their control over the Internet, including 
the banning of non-licensed virtual private networks in March 2018.
On the positive side, in 2014 the government launched a much- 
needed effort to overhaul the national R&D funding system. Before that, 
the central government administered R&D funding through more than 
thirty different agencies, which supervised roughly one hundred different 
programs. The State Council announced that central government funding 
would be consolidated into five streams; these were all essentially in place 
by early 2017. Other reforms target the day-to-day challenges facing Chi-
nese scientists, including regulations surrounding project management 
and opportunities to do part-time work for companies. Even so, the sci-
entific community has not welcomed all the reforms. The State Council’s 
decision in 2018 to place the well-regarded National Natural Science Foun-
dation of China under the supervision of the Ministry of Science Technol-
ogy, for example, has generated concern that the former will enjoy less 
autonomy in funding decisions.13 
To be sure, one can point to China’s remarkable rise in the ‘Global In-
novation Index’ as evidence that the country is doing well overall. By 2018, 
Information and com-
munication technology 
giant Huawei is among 
the world’s leaders 
in terms of total R&D 
spending



















































China ranked eighteenth in the index, not far behind South Korea (twelfth) 
and Japan (thirteenth). Nonetheless, purely quantitative measures can be 
misleading. China still struggles to translate innovation inputs into inno-
vation outputs in an efficient way — something indices like this one can 
miss. In addition, while the number of patents granted within China has 
soared, the standards applied are lower than in developed countries. And 
while China-based inventors can point to an increasing number of patents 
in Europe and the United States as well, many of these belong to foreign 
multinationals that do R&D in China.14 
In short, China’s emergence as a techno-power is impressive in many 
regards, but the country continues to face a range of serious challenges. 
And a new challenge is now emerging: growing constraints on high-tech 
collaboration and commerce with other countries. 
Peeved Partners
China’s rise as a high-tech power stems in many ways from its extensive 
cooperation with the outside world. While the number of Chinese students 
going abroad has increased markedly in recent years, the number return-
ing has risen even faster: from thirty-one per cent of outbound students 
in 2007 to around eighty per cent today, with China’s booming tech in-
dustry an important attraction.15 Collaboration with foreign scientists has 
boomed as well: Chinese scientists and engineers published nearly 44,000 
articles with US collaborators alone in 2016, eclipsing traditional US part-
ners including the United Kingdom (25,858) and Germany (21,584).16 For-
eign R&D centres in China are also making an important contribution. In 
Beijing, for example, Microsoft Research Asia has trained an estimated 
5,000 Chinese AI researchers, including individuals who are now execu-
tives at leading Chinese Internet and tech firms including Baidu, Alibaba, 
Tencent, and Huawei.17 Some of China’s most successful firms, including 
Alibaba, have benefitted from extensive international financing. Chinese 
technology firms are themselves actively investing overseas, becoming im-
portant players in Silicon Valley and the like.
Despite the collaborations, cross-seeding, and partnerships, China’s 
high-tech policies and ambitions are now a source of serious tension with 
the developed world — particularly (but not only) the United States. The 
MIC2025 program has generated particular concern with its call for seventy 
per cent ‘self-sufficiency’ in core components and basic materials in prior-
ity high-tech sectors by 2025. This presents a clear challenge to traditional 
high-tech manufacturers including Japan, Germany, and South Korea. In the 
US, meanwhile, when the Office of the US Trade Representative released its 
report on China’s trade practices in March 2018, it mentioned MIC2025 an 
astounding 112 times. Trump’s first set of tariffs on Chinese exports, enacted 
shortly thereafter, targetted the sectors prioritised in MIC2025. 
A number of developed countries have also started tightening restric-
tions on Chinese high-tech investments. In 2018, for example, the US Con-
gress expanded the jurisdiction and funding of the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States. In addition, new legislation requires execu-
tive agencies to identify and control undefined ‘emerging and foundational 
technologies’, which could constrain US investments overseas. In Europe, 
Germany has taken a tougher line on Chinese investments, particularly in 
high-tech sectors, after a Chinese appliance maker acquired the German ro-
botics firm Kuka in 2016. With an eye on China, Germany and France are 
now pushing for tighter investment screening across the EU. Japan and the 
United Kingdom have tightened their screening processes as well.
ROBOCHOP: an interactive 




















































Worries about Chinese industrial espionage are also part of the story. 
In 2015, the US and China agreed that neither government would ‘con-
duct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, in-
cluding trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the 
intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial 
sectors’.18 The G20 subsequently endorsed this prohibition on commercial 
espionage, which was reflected in other bilateral agreements with China. 
China’s cyber-enabled theft of IP appeared to decline for a period of time, 
although military reforms and anti-corruption efforts likely played a part 
in this as well.19 In 2018, however, there was increasing evidence that Chi-
na was flouting these agreements, providing added justification for the 
Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese exports.20  
Worries about industrial espionage, and technology transfer more 
generally, are also chilling academic exchanges between China and the 
outside world. In February 2018, FBI Director Christopher Wray said Chi-
nese espionage posed a ‘whole-of-society threat’ and that ‘non-traditional 
collectors’ of intelligence, including professors, scientists, and students, 
were exploiting the open environment at US universities.21 The Trump ad-
ministration subsequently considered banning all Chinese students from 
US universities. Thus far it has only taken more limited measures, such as 
shortening the duration of visas for Chinese students in some high-tech 
Chinese students in some 
high-tech fields in the US have 
faced visa restrictions in 2018
Source: Rutgers Newark, Flickr
fields. In Australia, meanwhile, Defence officials have proposed an ex-
pansion of technology controls at universities, prompting a swift backlash 
from the higher education sector. 
China, of course, is capable of hitting back. China has responded to 
US tariff increases in 2018 with its own measures. It could also go further 
and treat the subsidiaries of leading US technology firms in China more 
roughly than it has so far, though this could play into the hands of those in 
the US government who favour economic ‘decoupling’ with China. China 
has also drafted its own export control law, which authorises retaliatory 
measures against any country that subjects China to discriminatory ex-
port control measures.
It remains unclear what the impact of these various tensions and 
measures will be. China has already built up considerable momentum in 
its quest to become a powerhouse of innovation. The US, meanwhile, has 
bungled its pressure campaign by acting unilaterally rather than in con-
cert with allies that share many of its concerns. More generally, the Trump 
administration’s apparent interest in decoupling with China, particularly 
by uprooting high-tech supply chains, will require sustained effort and 
collaboration with other countries. But it remains to be seen whether this 
will materialise.
What is clear is that China can no longer count on the level of interna-
tional exchange and collaboration it has enjoyed in the technology sphere 
in the past. China’s rise as a techno-power will continue, but Beijing could 
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IT IS WITH THESE WORDS that the late gynaecologist-turned- 
actor Haing Ngor, a survivor of the 
Khmer Rouge regime, describes that 
day in April 1975 when the victori-
ous revolutionaries forced the whole 
population of Phnom Penh out of the 
city. The Chinese tunes he heard were 
only the latest testament of a close 
relationship between China and Cam-
bodia that spanned several centuries. 
It is not a coincidence that one of the 
most influential sources of everyday 
life in the Angkorian empire is an ac-
count written by Zhou Daguan 周达观, 
a Chinese envoy who spent one year at 
the court of King Indravarman III at 
the end of the thirteenth century.2 Just 
five years before the events described 
by Haing Ngor, in March 1970, King 
Sihanouk — who had just been ousted 
in a coup d’état — was in Beijing when 
he decided to throw his weight behind 
a hitherto little-known Marxist group 
C A L L I N G  T H E  T U N E S  I N 
C A M B O D I A
Ivan Franceschini 
Then marching music began playing out of the loudspeakers. It reminded me of music I had 
heard on Radio Peking, very stylised and Chinese, with a heavy regular beat and cymbal-
and-gong flourishes finishing out the phrases … It was the ugliest music I had ever heard. 
Imagine, if you can, what it was like for us to trudge along the crowded boulevard under the 
hot sun while a piercing nasal voice sang ‘The Red Flag of the Revolution is Flying Over Lib-
erated Phnom Penh’ … It was all very discouraging. Forced to leave our homes, rifles firing 
over our heads and terrible music too.












































that he himself had previously deriso-
rily labelled ‘Khmer Rouge’. His en-
dorsement changed the course of Cam-
bodian history.3 Throughout the years 
of Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea 
(1975–1979), the Chinese government 
proved a staunch ally of the regime, 
helping to mould its political ideology 
and providing foreign aid and techni-
cal support.4 The relationship was so 
tight that when, at the end of 1978, Vi-
etnam invaded Cambodia to put an end 
to the Khmer Rouge, China went so far 
as to retaliate with a disastrous incur-
sion into Vietnamese territory.
Almost forty years after the Viet-
namese debacle, China continues to 
play a major role in steering Cambo-
dian politics. Beginning in mid-2017, 
with the national elections of July 
2018 in sight, Prime Minister Hun Sen 
launched a crackdown against polit-
ical adversaries, independent media, 
and civil society. While in the past he 
showed some restraint due to the po-
litical pressure coming from foreign 
donors and international criticism, 
nowadays he shrugs off widespread 
international condemnation by cit-
ing China’s unwavering support. For 
instance, after the dissolution of the 
main political opposition party, when 
the United States government an-
nounced the intention to cut funding 
for the 2018 elections and threatened 
sanctions, he boasted that China would 
make up for it and taunted that the US 
is ‘afraid that China is taking its seat’.5 
Garment factory in 
Cambodia
Source: André van der 
Stouwe, Flickr
China’s Foreign Ministry responded: 
‘China supports the Cambodian side’s 
efforts to protect political stability and 
achieve economic development, and 
believes the Cambodian government 
can lead the people to deal with do-
mestic and foreign challenges, and will 
smoothly hold elections next year’.6 
When Hun Sen’s ruling party predict-
ably obtained a landslide victory at 
those elections, securing all 125 seats 
in the national parliament, the Chinese 
authorities were among the first to 
send their congratulations.
As Sabina Lawreniuk has recently 
argued in the Made in China Journal, 
Cambodia shed any democratic cre-
dentials a long time ago; the Cambodi-
an authorities have a notorious track 
record of human rights violations and 
undemocratic behaviour reaching 
back well into the 1990s.7 While this is 
undoubtedly true, China’s role in this 
latest authoritarian turn in Cambodia 
still deserves scrutiny. China needs 
Cambodia in order to wield influence 
within ASEAN and affect the bloc’s 
stance on contentious issues such as 
disputes on the South China Sea.8 Bei-
jing’s rising influence in the country is 
conveyed through a massive amount 
of funding. According to data from the 
Cambodian government, in the first 
half of 2018, Chinese investment in 
the kingdom was worth US$5 billion 
— making China the biggest investor 
in the country.9 The stakes are so high 
that in September 2018, at a roundta-
ble meeting with Chinese business ex-
ecutives, Hun Sen personally offered to 
‘safeguard the interests of all Chinese 
firms in Cambodia’, while highlighting 
his government’s proposals for more 
concessional loans from China to build 
the kingdom’s infrastructure.10 
Investment in infrastructure is 
key to China’s involvement in South-
East Asia. Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) 一带一路 entails a mas-
sive injection of Chinese funding into 
infrastructural projects such as high-
ways, railways, and dams. To date, 
BRI’s signature project in Cambodia 
remains the Sihanoukville Special Eco-
nomic Zone (SSEZ), established by two 
state-backed companies in 2008, five 
years before the launch of BRI.11 In 
2017, the industrial park hosted more 
than one hundred firms and employed 
16,000 workers, with expansion plans 
calling for 300 companies and 100,000 
employees by 2020, a significant num-
ber if we consider that Cambodia’s 
entire garment, textile and footwear 













































The SSEZ comprises mostly Chi-
nese-owned garment and footwear 
factories with an almost entirely Cam-
bodian front-line workforce managed 
by Chinese managers. To make it more 
enticing to potential investors, compa-
nies in the SSEZ are exempted from 
worries about the threat of labour 
activism. While Cambodia nominally 
allows union pluralism, SSEZ factory 
owners have what Gavan Blau of the 
American Centre for International 
Labor Solidarity calls ‘a coordinated 
strategy of labour disempowerment 
and exploitation’.12 Not only do the fac-
tories hire workers on short-term con-
tracts of three to six months — a situa-
tion increasingly common throughout 
Cambodia’s garment sector — but 
owners regularly blacklist unruly 
workers who attempt to organise un-
ions or express discontent, circulating 
their photos and details to other man-
agers in the SSEZ. 
Beyond the SSEZ, Sihanoukville 
has recently attracted much media 
attention because of its Sinicisation. 
What until a couple of years ago was 
a sleepy town is now a bustling city 
full of construction sites described 
as ‘bursting with Chinese casinos, 
massage parlors, hotels, restaurants, 
Sihanoukville, 2018: bursting with Chinese construction
Source: Property & Construction Magazine, Flickr
and citizens’.13 Today, up to twenty 
per cent of the population is Chinese. 
While landowners and landlords have 
profited, many local people and busi-
ness owners unable to afford the ris-
ing rents and living costs have been 
pushed to the margins or forced to 
leave altogether.14 Faced with repeated 
complaints of money laundering, ille-
gal gambling, and human trafficking 
associated with the flood of Chinese 
money and workers, the Cambodian 
government launched a task force in 
February 2018 to address such prob-
lems.15 Meanwhile, similar concerns 
related to Chinese investment and 
tourism are growing in other parts of 
Cambodia, in particular in the tourist 
towns of Siem Reap and Kampot.16  
The Chinese melodies resonating 
in Cambodia today are a far cry from 
that ‘ugliest music’ that haunted Haing 
Ngor back in 1975. However, Beijing’s 
power to call the tune in Cambodia 
is predicated on continued financial 
strength and growth. It remains to be 
seen how China will cope with the cur-
rent economic downturn and the fall-
out from the ‘trade war’ with the US. 
As the Chinese leaders start once again 
to preach self-subsistence and look in-
ward to weather the storm, Cambodia 

















































I N FEBRUARY 2018, China’s e-com-merce giant Alibaba invested US$2 
billion in Lazada — a South-East Asian 
online shopping platform with a ma-
jor presence in Singapore, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. Already Lazada’s major 
shareholder (since 2016), Alibaba in-
stalled Lucy Peng, one of its cofound-
ers, as the company’s CEO. Alibaba’s 
spokesperson said this latest move was 
part of the giant’s effort to ‘accelerate 
e-commerce development in South-
East Asia and deepen Lazada’s integra-
tion into the Alibaba ecosystem’.1 That 
same month, its Alibaba Cloud opened 
a data centre in Indonesia. Whether 
this is an expansion of influence that 
consciously parallels China’s growing 
economic and geopolitical power, or 
simply clever business, is one question 
raised by Alibaba’s continued rise. 
Towards the end of 2017, The 
New York Times reported that Alibaba 
has a long lead over Amazon across 
South-East Asia. It has achieved this by 
building up both its hard infrastruc-
ture (such as transfer centres) and soft 
infrastructure (such as its online pay-
ment systems), and through cooperat-
ing with local businesses and govern-
ment agencies. For instance, Lazada 
contracts local post offices in Vietnam 
to take customer returns and give cash 
refunds. In Malaysia, customers can 
collect the goods they purchase on-
line from lockers at 7-Eleven stores. 
In the Philippines, Lazada uses petrol 
stations as transfer centres where de-
livery personnel pick up goods for cus-
B U Y I N G  P O W E R :  A L I B A B A  I N 

















































These new platforms included Ezbuy, 
SGshop, Oops.sg, and Peeka, which 
worked as purchasing agents, making 
money by charging local customers an 
intermediary fee. As online shopping 
became increasingly popular, local 
independent e-platforms (Lazada is 
one example) and transnational e-plat-
forms (such as Amazon) entered the 
market. Later Chinese e-commerce gi-
ant Alibaba bought into Lazada.
Chinese and Western media have 
widely reported on Alibaba’s business 
expansion in South-East Asia — a re-
gion with a population of more than 
630 million. Huxiu.com, a Chinese 
Internet media company, suggested 
that by investing in Lazada, Jack Ma’s 
ambition was to make it a popular 
e-platform like Taobao for the region. 
Lazada was founded by Rocket Inter-
net in Singapore in 2012, and has since 
grown to become the largest e-plat-
form across the whole region. Aliba-
ba tweaked Lazada’s algorithms and 
transplanted other business ideas and 
technologies after the takeover. It also 
initiated an online payment system 
similar to Alipay and built a more effi-
cient delivery system.3 
Alibaba’s influence in South-East 
Asia is reflected not only in its own ex-
panding business, but also in how local 
tomers. By contrast, Amazon confines 
its business to modern cities such as 
Singapore.2 
My interest in Alibaba and Laza-
da’s growth was piqued in 2017, when 
I sat through twenty minutes of adver-
tisements preceding the main feature 
at a cinema in Singapore. One adver-
tisement that was repeated three times 
caught my attention. The advertiser, 
LiveUp, is a membership program 
launched by Lazada that helps Singa-
porean customers buy good-quality 
products from China via Alibaba’s on-
line shopping platform Taobao. 
Subsequent interviews revealed 
the extent to which Chinese e-plat-
forms spurred the development of 
e-commerce in Singapore. The first 
people to become obsessed with on-
line shopping there were Chinese 
migrants, who began arriving in the 
mid-2000s. They were already familiar 
with Taobao, which had become the 
most popular e-platform in China just 
one year after its launch in 2003. Be-
cause Taobao only had a Chinese-lan-
guage version and did not provide 
transnational delivery services at that 
time, some local businesspeople estab-
lished e-platforms linking to Taobao, 
translating its web pages for non-Chi-
nese users, and organising shipping. 
e-commerce companies have modelled 
themselves on it. IT workers for com-
peting e-platforms in Singapore told 
me that they often imitated Taobao’s 
design: one said her job was to report 
on Taobao’s updates daily so her col-
leagues could copy them. Taobao had 
recently added a live-stream function, 
which triggered an explosive growth 
in the volume of transactions as it inte-
grated the ‘Internet celebrity economy’ 
网红经济 into e-commerce. On it, Chi-
nese Internet celebrities either opened 
their own e-shops or advertised those 
of others, wearing their clothes or ac-
cessories, or giving distinctive makeup 
or fashion tips. The interviewee said 
her company was planning a similar 
live stream that would feature Thai In-
ternet celebrities. 
A Singaporean government think 
tank has suggested that Singaporean 
e-commerce companies should ‘copy 
the Chinese e-commerce model first 
and innovate second’.4 The city-state 
government has reportedly urged Nan-
yang Technological University (NTU) to 
cooperate with Alibaba Group in fos-
tering local e-commerce talents.5 Alib-
aba also wants to take advantage of the 
country’s world-leading education sys-
tem and strong talent pool. On 3 Sep-
tember 2018, the company launched a 
postgraduate program with NTU: PhD 
students will study at both NTU cam-
pus and Alibaba’s research facilities in 
China. They will benefit from access to 
large data samples and business sce-
narios from Alibaba. In initiating this 
new program, the two parties seek to 
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identify and nurture the next genera-
tion of talents in computer science and 
information technology for the two 
countries.6 
Alibaba has the potential to con-
tribute to industrial and technological 
upgrading, infrastructure building and 
job provision in South-East Asia, just as 
it has in parts of China.7 At the same 
time, Alibaba, like other transnational 
corporations, has moved to South-East 
Asia in search of profit. And to maxim-
ise this profit, it will seek to sustain its 
monopoly power. 
Its suppression of local purchas-
ing agents in Singapore provides one 
indication of this power play. In late 
2017, Alibaba froze thousands of ac-
counts that Ezbuy had been using to 
place local customers’ orders on Tao-
bao. It accused Ezbuy of scalping, for 
which it threatened to penalise. In fact, 
these purchasing accounts had been in 
use for several years without Alibaba 
previously raising any objection.8 Ali-
baba’s attack on Ezbuy may well have 
been to clear the path for Lazada.9  
Jack Ma once mentioned that he 
saw Alibaba’s international business 
expansion as being in direct support of 
what is now called the Belt and Road 
Initiative — suggesting that there is in-
deed a conscious parallel with Beijing’s 
grand plans.10 The giant’s pursuit of 
the e-commerce market in South-East 
Asia has also provided an illuminat-
ing example of how Chinese business 
elites construct and manage their pow-
er within an increasingly China-led 
world economy. Regardless, Alibaba’s 
ambitions will indelibly shape the fu-
ture of the e-commerce industry in 
South-East Asia and beyond. 
Alibaba’s ambitions will shape the 
future of e-commerce in South-
East Asia

























































INTERNMENT AND INDOCTRINATION — 
XI’S ‘NEW ERA’ IN XINJIANG
Gerry Groot
ON 21 NOVEMBER 2018, Radio Free Asia announced 
that a court in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) had sentenced Abdughapar 
Abdurusul, a prominent Uyghur businessman and 
philanthropist, to death. His ‘crime’ was to have 
made an unsanctioned Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca 
rather than joining an officially sanctioned group. 
His wife and eldest son were also detained and 
dozens of his associates were taken into custody. 
Later, rumours spread that his wife had died in 
custody. No one knows what has happened to the 
couple’s other children.  























































Making the pilgrimage to Mecca is considered one of the Five Pillars of 
Islam, and the duty of every Muslim. To the Party-state, however, this ordi-
nary act counts as evidence of religious ‘extremism’. Aburusul’s wife, son 
and acquaintances were presumed guilty by association. Unfortunately, 
this is not an isolated case.
 On the pretence of eliminating ‘extremism’, the Party-state is attempt-
ing to stamp out religious practice and enforce assimilation on China’s 
Muslim minorities, including the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Hui. Its 
methods include ‘re-education’ within a large and rapidly expanding sys-
tem of so-called ‘vocational-education facilities’ and prisons, forcing ordi-
nary Uyghurs to house Han Chinese in their homes (and sometimes even 
their beds), and intensifying efforts to secularise Xinjiang society. 
According to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Ra-
cial Discrimination, which met in August, around one million Uyghurs and 
others have disappeared into these camps with no clarity about when they 
might be released. One Committee member, Gay McDougal, estimated the 
Power over religion: the Party-state is attempting to stamp out religious practice and enforce assimilation on 
China’s Muslim minorities, including the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Hui
Photo: Dan Sandoval, dansandoval.com
number at two million. Family members left behind are subject to intru-
sive and rising levels of surveillance. Children left behind have gone to the 
homes of relatives if they are lucky, or state orphanages. 
What is happening in Xinjiang represents a significant departure from 
previous policies of relative accommodation of religious and ethnic differ-
ences that have been a key part of United Front work in the Reform Era.
The Background
This slow-motion humanitarian disaster has long and complex roots. Ever 
since the eighteenth-century emperor Qianlong conquered the Silk Road 
lands to China’s north-west and called it Xinjiang 新疆 (New Frontier), 
sporadic rebellions have broken out against Beijing’s rule. At 1.6 million 
square kilometres, Xinjiang accounts for about one-sixth of China’s ter-
ritory, and its rich resources and strategic location mean Beijing has no 
intention of ever letting it go (it has borders with India, Pakistan, Afghani-
stan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Mongolia). Uyghurs, 
once the majority, now make up about forty-six per cent of the population, 
following decades of the state’s ‘encouragement’ of Han Chinese immigra-
tion. Ever since America launched its War on Terror in 2001, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has sought to link any unrest amongst China’s 
Muslim minorities with foreign radical Islamist movements, and some Uy-
ghurs have indeed gone abroad to fight in Syria. However, there is little 
if any evidence of such radical influence occurring within Xinjiang itself.
This provides background to the current claims of the CCP that it must 
take radical measures to counter the Three Evils: separatism, terrorism, 
and religious extremism. 
What is happening today has its more immediate genesis in June 2009, 
when violence at a factory in Guangdong province left two young Uyghur 
men dead at the hands of Han co-workers. This led to communal attacks 






















































hundred dead among both Han Chinese, the original targets of attacks, as 
well as Uyghurs, who died at the hands of Han mobs. 
These incidents left a legacy of bitterness on both sides. One of the 
solutions proposed by the CCP was to promote ‘inter-ethnic mingling’ 
交融, such as by rewarding intermarriage. Another was an even greater 
emphasis on Stability Maintenance 维稳, ramping up security across the 
province. Still, there was sporadic serious violence, both in Xinjiang and 
elsewhere in the following years. In October 2013, a Uyghur drove a car 
with his wife and mother towards Tiananmen gate, ploughing through 
crowds, killing two Filipino tourists, and injuring thirty-eight others. The 
East Turkestan Islamic Movement claimed responsibility for that terrorist 
attack. On 1 March 2014, a group of eight Uyghur men and women attacked 
passengers at Kunming Railway Station with knives, killing thirty-one and 
injuring another 140. Two months later, on 30 April, a combined knife 
attack and bombing at Urumqi Railway Station killed three and injured 
seventy-nine. That attack followed directly on the heels of a visit to the 
region by Xi Jinping, who was only recently installed as CCP General Secre-
tary; it was, therefore, particularly symbolic. The most dramatic case was 
in late 2015, when security forces cornered dozens of Uyghur men in the 
Tianshan Mountains. They had earlier attacked a coalmine killing dozens 
of Han-Chinese miners. Troops used flamethrowers on the attackers hid-
ing in a cave and shot those escaping. Only one attacker survived. 
In March 2017, Xi called for a ‘Great Wall of Steel’ 钢铁长城 to ‘safe-
guard national unity, ethnic solidarity and social stability’. In August the 
previous year, he had already appointed Chen Quanguo 陈全国 to the po-
sition of CCP Secretary of the XUAR. Chen came to Xinjiang from the Tibet 
Autonomous Region, where, as Party Secretary, he had developed a new 
model of intensive policing and ‘grid surveillance’ 网格化管理 involving 
‘convenience police stations’ 便民警务站. His other innovations included 
the ‘double-linked household management system’, by which different 
households were held responsible for each other’s actions as part of a 
broader Three-dimensional [Social Stability] Preventive Control System 
立体化社会治安防控体系. Chen’s watch over Tibet saw the effective elim-
ination of self-immolation protests, which impressed Xi. He then became 
the first Party Secretary to have served in both areas. Chen applied the 
methods of intensive policing and grid surveillance developed in Tibet to 
Xinjiang and its Muslim populations. Scholars such as Adrian Zenz and 
others have tracked the expansion of the XUAR as a security state using 
satellite photos as well as information gleaned from websites advertising 
jobs, and tenders for supplies and construction. These reveal a rapid ex-
pansion in the number of security personnel, such as Special Police Units, 
deployed in the region. In 2016, nearly 32,000 positions were advertised, 
many to fill the new convenience police stations.1  
While this Japanese-inspired method, so-called ‘zero distance service’ 
让服务零距离, is presented as convenient for citizens who need help, its 
main purpose is to facilitate surveillance and enable rapid response to any 
problems. A network of hundreds of thousands of cameras and sensors, 
aided by China’s increasingly sophisticated Artificial Intelligence capabil-
ities, aims to give security forces the power to identify and track every 
























































individual. Police also regularly subject Uyghurs and Kazakhs to random 
searches and investigate the apps and contacts on their phones. Police can 
also monitor households via QR codes attached next to the door of every 
home. At the slightest hint of any problem, suspects are taken away for 
interrogation or internment. 
The principle of preventive policing encourages officials to be suspi-
cious, hyper-vigilant, and proactive; they can be punished if any perceived 
laxity on their part later turns out to have enabled any sort of incident. 
Since 2017, security forces have been told to also be on the lookout for at 
least forty-eight suspicious signs alerting them to extremist tendencies by 
Muslims. An unauthorised Hajj, as in the case of Abdughapar Abdurusul, 
is an example of a suspicious act. Others can be as simple as owning a tent, 
praying, arguing with officials, or having ‘too many’ children. Culpable 
‘non-actions’ can include not drinking alcohol, not smoking, not shaving, 
or not allowing officials to take one’s DNA (see the table opposite for the 
full list).2 Not surprisingly, the number of detained citizens has grown rap-
idly since 2017 as authorities have continued and intensified their Strike 
Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism 严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项 
行动 (launched in 2014). 
Determining the number of detention centres and detainees has 
proved difficult. As noted, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Ra-
cial Discrimination assessed estimates of between one and two million 
detained. Such numbers are not surprising in light of the ease with which 
individuals can be seen to have committed an offence as well as pressure 
on local security forces to meet quotas of suspicious persons — as revealed 
by a guard at one prison.3  
The CCP, which originally refused to acknowledge even the existence 
of the camps, denies that the number of detainees is that high. But official 
Chinese statistics for 2017 reveal that arrests in Xinjiang accounted for 
twenty-one per cent of all arrests nationwide that year, despite the XUAR 
having only 1.5 per cent of the country’s population. This increase has 
coincided with Chen’s appointment. 
Owning a tent Telling others not to swear Speaking with someone who 
has travelled abroad
Owning welding equipment Telling others not to sin Having travelled abroad 
yourself
Owning extra food Eating breakfast before the sun 
comes up 
Merely knowing someone who 
has travelled abroad
Owning a compass Arguing with an official Publicly stating that China is 
inferior to some other country
Owning multiple knives Sending a petition that com-
plains about local officials 
Having too many children
Abstaining from alcohol Not allowing officials to sleep 
in your bed, eat your food, and 
live in your house 
Having a VPN
Abstaining from cigarettes Not having your government 
ID on your person 
Having WhatsApp
Wailing, publicly grieving, or 
otherwise acting sad when 
your parents die 
Not letting officials take your 
DNA 
Watching a video filmed 
abroad
Wearing a scarf in the presence 
of the Chinese flag 
Wearing a hijab (if you are 
under 45) 
Going to a mosque
Praying Fasting Listening to a religious lecture
Not letting officials scan your 
irises 
Not letting officials download 
everything you have on your 
phone 
Not making voice recordings to 
give to officials
Speaking your native language 
in school 
Speaking your native language 
in government work groups 
Speaking with someone abroad 
(via Skype, WeChat, etc.)
Wearing a shirt with Arabic 
lettered writing on it 
Having a full beard Wearing any clothes with 
religious iconography
Not attending mandatory 
propaganda classes 
Not attending mandatory 
flag-raising ceremonies 
Not attending public struggle 
sessions
Refusing to denounce your 
family members or yourself in 
these public struggle sessions 
Trying to kill yourself when 
detained by the police 
Trying to kill yourself when in 
the education camps
Performing a traditional 
funeral 
Inviting multiple families to 
your house without registering 
with the police department 
Being related to anyone who 
has done any of the above






















































The detention centres consist of a rapidly growing network of jails, 
pre-existing Re-education Through Labour 劳动教养 camps (official-
ly abolished in 2013, see the China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, 
Chapter 6 ‘The Sword of Discipline and the Dagger of Justice’, pp.262–283), 
and new and refurbished facilities. The latter include factories and old 
Party schools. Satellite imagery reveals the existence of scores of new de-
tention centres; Adrian Zenz’s research indicates that new facilities are be-
ing established at all levels from townships to cities — some 1,200 in all. By 
the end of 2018, there was conclusive evidence for the existence of almost 
two hundred large-scale detention centres, with some, such as the one at 
Dabancheng, having capacity for at least ten thousand people.4 
On 9 October 2018, the XUAR government issued an important set of 
regulations that retrospectively created a quasi-legal framework for the 
internments. Seven days later, Xinhua newsagency used an interview 
with Xinjiang Governor Shorhat Zakir to announce that: ‘… Xinjiang has 
launched a vocational education and training program according to the 
law. Its purpose is to get rid of the environment and soil that breeds ter-
rorism and religious extremism and stop violent terrorist activities from 
happening’.  
In the space of weeks, conscious of international concern about ‘con-
centration camps’ and human rights violations, the CCP went from deny-
ing that any such camps existed to justifying them as crucial for its fight 
against the Three Evils, and portraying them as centres for ‘vocational’ 
training, Mandarin language education, and instruction in law and citizen-
ship. This education, according to Zakir, addresses the ‘root causes’ of the 
region’s extremism problems. All this was dressed in the language of law 
and promoted as reflecting the will of ‘the People’. The same day, a televi-
sion report showed purportedly happy Uyghur recipients of this education 
in a camp in Hetian. No foreign reporters or scholars have been allowed 
access to any of the camps, nor interviews with any of those interned.
‘Liu Guang’, a Chinese guard who anonymously revealed the ‘trans-
formation through education’ at his camp described four supervisory cat-
egories: lenient, ordinary, strict, and enforced. The detainees are subject 
to rigorous controls, demands to ‘reform’ and regular assessments: those 
who ‘make progress’ are treated more leniently, and a ‘score’ of ninety-five 
out of one hundred means the possibility of a monthly visit from family 
members, although even those who have achieved perfect scores in Man-
darin remained incarcerated. Those who have failed to show contrition or 
learn Mandarin were sentenced to anything from five to thirty years in a 
detention centre. If there are not enough Uyghurs to fill local quotas, they 
haul in Han Chinese converts to Islam. Belying claims of being education 
facilities, guards in the zone of ‘enforced supervision’ are required to be 
fully armed, carry batons, and wear stab-proof vests.5 
The relatively few internees who have been released report brutal-
ity, abuse, mistreatment, overcrowding, poor sanitation, and inadequate 
food and water. In their extensive overview of the happenings in Xinjiang, 
Eradicating Ideological Viruses, Human Rights Watch reported the regular 
use of torture including, sleep deprivation, beatings, and suspension from 
the ceiling.6  
Testifying in Washington after her release, Mihrigul Tursun described 
not only being shaved and sat in a ‘tiger chair’ — a metal seat in which a 
prisoner’s hands and feet are shackled, unable to move’ — but also having 
a strange helmet with electrodes placed on her head, through which she 























































received electric shocks. She described being forced to take unidentified 
medications, and many of her female inmates ceased menstruating, pos-
sibly as a result. Tursun claimed that during her three months’ incarcera-
tion nine of her fellow inmates died.7 Among tenders unearthed by Radio 
Free Asia were some for the construction of crematoria. 
Many towns and villages in Xinjiang have lost a substantial propor-
tion of their Uyghur and Kazakh populations, including nearly all their 
working-age males, to the camps. Those left behind may be forced to house 
Han-Chinese officials and other ‘big sisters’ and ‘big brothers’. This is the 
third and seemingly most intensive such wave of ‘homestays’ since 2014 
under the slogan: ‘Visit the People, Benefit the People and Bring Together 
the Hearts of the People’ 访民情、惠民生、聚民心. The guests are tasked 
with personifying the care of the state for local people’s welfare, teach 
them Chinese culture and language, and watching out for any suspicious 
behaviour or attitudes. If necessary, they can test their assigned family’s 
attitudes by offering cigarettes, beer, and non-Halal items, including pork. 
Any indications of Islamic sensitivities must be reported. They specifically 
target children as sources of information regarding the family’s values and 
religiosity. Darren Byler’s fieldwork documents both the naiveté of some 
of these ‘new family members’ and the effectiveness of the Party-state’s 
penetration of private life.8  
The state is destroying the physical Islamic heritage of Xinjiang as 
well, demolishing mosques and tearing down signs at Halal restaurants. 
The remaining mosques have few worshippers as locals fear to be seen 
in them. Within schools, universities, government offices, and companies, 
separate eating facilities for Muslims have disappeared. 
The Party-state is also targetting the corps of Uyghur intellectuals and 
officials who once helped it to manage the province and train the ranks of 
their successors. One after another, once-trusted and respected Uyghurs 
and others, already a tiny minority in a Han-dominated system, have been 
sacked, arrested, detained, or disappeared. The reasons range from forced 
confessions from those already detained to the need to fill quotas to simple 
paranoia on the part of their Han colleagues. Queser Qeyum, the editor of 
a state-run magazine, committed suicide rather than be detained.9  
The terror unfolding in Xinjiang has had significant repercussions 
abroad. There is barely a Uyghur family in Australia or elsewhere left 
unaffected by the detentions and disappearances that have occurred in 
recent years. And because contact with family or others living overseas is 
also classed as suspicious, many expatriate Uyghurs are under considera-
ble stress. They fear that discussing the plight of their family back in China 
could make things worse for them and have repercussions for themselves. 
At the same time, they hope that raising the issue might result in more in-
formation becoming available on the missing or the release of those held. 
Xi Jinping’s Not-So-New ‘New Era’
While the crisis in Xinjiang only came to media attention outside of China 
in 2018, dramatic changes in religious and ethnic policy have been un-
derway for several years. Xi Jinping’s fear for the future of China, based 
on his understandings of the collapse of the Soviet Union, is probably the 
most important driver of these changes. Xi and other party leaders worry 
incessantly about the rise of ethno-national and religious consciousness 
that is outside of CCP control and that derives succour and inspiration 
from abroad. This latest drive against Islam coincides with the Party-state 
stepping up attempts to force Christians to sever relations with believers 
abroad and ‘Sinicise’ their services, architecture, and even their theology, 
as well as their encouragement of flag-raising ceremonies in Taoist tem-
ples (see Chapter 4 Forum ‘Raising the Flag: Loving Religion, Loving the 
State’, pp.117–120). But the crackdown in Xinjiang is by far the most ex-
tensive and brutal.
Current efforts to destroy the Islamic cultural base of Uyghur and 
Kazakh identity represent the end of long-standing debates within China 






















































minority theorists such as Ma Rong 马戎 advocated a moderate shift to-
wards discussing minorities as ethnic rather than national groups.10 They 
have clearly lost out to hard-line theorists such as Hu Lianhe 胡联合 and 
Hu Angang 胡鞍钢, who advocate the active suppression of ethnic elites 
such as Abdughapar Abdurusul and the scholar and moderate commen-
tator Ilham Tohti (sentenced to life imprisonment in 2009).11 According to 
the latter view, the existence of anyone of influence from within Uyghur 
and other minority communities, no matter how moderate their views, 
can pave the way for separatist movements, and, therefore, need to be 
stopped in their tracks. 
The apparent ascendancy of the hardliners signals the end of United 
Front policy in place since the beginning of the Reform Era in the late-
1970s. Until about 2014, tensions over Islamic traditions, such as Muslims 
insisting on Halal food in the workplace or observing Ramadan, would 
often have been sorted out by upholding respect for religious sensitivities. 
No more. In 2018, insisting on Halal food is grounds for arrest for religious 
extremism. 
Many towns and villages in Xinjiang have lost a substantial proportion of their Uyghur and Kazakh popula-
tions, including nearly all their working-age males, to the detention centres
Photo: Dan Sandoval, dansandoval.com
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has proclaimed that his rule sig-
nifies a ‘New Era’ 新时代 for China. It is certainly a new era for Xinjiang 
and United Front policy. It remains to be seen if forced secularisation and 
coercive assimilation have any better chance of succeeding in Xi’s era than 
when the CCP tried similar policies previously — as in the 1950s and dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The failure of those policies led to 
the post-Mao reforms that Xi seems intent on undoing. Even the advantag-
es of high-tech surveillance and security do not guarantee success — if suc-
cess is not simply defined as the creation of a prison state. And just as in 
those earlier periods, the human cost of the attempt will be enormous and 
last for generations. As for the surveillance and security systems, includ-
ing grid policing, some observers have suggested that this may be rolled 
out in other parts of China in the future. A New Era indeed. 
 Finally, as implied already, foreign governments are also indirectly 
involved in the happenings in Xinjiang, often by virtue of having Uyghurs 
as citizens or migrants, such as in Australia. Any government that pro-
claims the importance of human rights should be extremely concerned. 
In Australia, the government and politicians have been remarkably quiet 
despite growing press coverage of the scale and nature of the detentions. 
The most prominent voice criticising the CCP’s actions has been the Re-
publican, Marco Rubio in the United States, but despite growing anti-China 
sentiment, the Uyghur issue has yet to break through. Most disconcert-
ingly, it is the muted response from Muslim nations that is most surpris-
ing. Despite a growing awareness in such countries, only in Malaysia and 
Indonesia has protest been significant. Malaysia’s refusal in October to 
repatriate a group of Uyghurs, ‘Because they had done nothing wrong’,12 
stands out for its bluntness. We can only hope that all nations, Muslim and 
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ON THE MORNING of 20 August 2018, the priests of Tianshifu 
天师府, a Daoist temple in Longhushan 
龙虎山, Yingtan prefecture, Jiangxi 
province, carried out the first ever na-
tional flag-raising ceremony in their 
temple square. A vice-mayor of Ying-
tan presided over the ceremony. Also 
present were the local head of the Unit-
ed Front Work Department (UFWD) 
统一战线工作部, the abbot of Tianshifu 
(who happens to be a vice-chairman of 
the Political Consultative Conference of 
Yingtan Prefecture), local governmen-
tal officials responsible for religious 
affairs, and all Daoist clerics under the 
leadership of the Longhushan Daoist 
Association.1 In late September, when 
Xie Shengjin was doing fieldwork at 
Longhushan, several Tianshifu priests 
told him that they were glad to partici-
pate in this ceremony and felt proud to 
play a role in promoting patriotism.
Tianshifu is one of the most 
influential Daoist temples in China. 
Daoism has comprised two main 
schools since the late fourteenth 
century: Orthodox Unity (Zhengyi 
正一) and Complete Perfection 
(Quanzhen 全真). Priests of the 
Orthodox Unity school can marry 
and live a worldly life, while those of 
the Complete Perfection school are 
supposed to pursue an ascetic life in 
monasteries. Official records state that 
there are about 48,000 Daoist priests 
affiliated with temples nationwide 
(although this number does not take 
into consideration the many priests 
who are unaffiliated with a temple).2 
In the early 1990s, the state lifted a 
decades-long ban on the ordination 
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The Daoist priests of the Orthodox 
Unity school have been particularly 
willing participants in United Front 
efforts as, they have argued, doing 
so does not violate Daoist doctrine. 
Instead, it is a pragmatic concession 
to state power that allows them to 
perform rituals and thereby earn an 
income. Unlike the transcendental 
goals of other religions, such as 
enlightenment or entering heaven, 
many of these priests are materially 
focussed on this life. Furthermore, 
loyalty to the country is one of nine 
precepts prescribed by state-affiliated 
Daoist organisations and to which an 
officially ordained Daoist cleric should 
adhere (this precept evolved from an 
imperial-era requirement to be loyal to 
the emperor).3
Reports from Chinese media noted 
that beginning in August 2018 other 
of Orthodox Unity priests, but only 
for Tianshifu — the only institution 
in China to hold this right during the 
Ming and Qing dynasties (1368–1911). 
Followers of Daoism and, especially, 
Orthodox Unity priests, thus regard it 
as the home of Orthodox Unity.
The highly symbolic flag-raising 
ceremony intended to show ordinary 
followers of Daoism, as well as 
Orthodox Unity priests in general, that 
the Tianshifu priests were willing to do 
United Front work under the guidance 
of the UFWD, an organ of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), to which it 
reports directly. Among other things, 
the UFWD is tasked with uniting 
patriotic groups and individuals, 
especially elite figures, within 
religious communities. (See Chapter 4 
‘Internment and Indoctrination — Xi’s 
“New Era” in Xinjiang’, pp.98–111). 
Daoist priests of Tianshifu raising 
the national flag
Source: thepaper.cn
influential Daoist and Han Buddhist 
temples across China also raised the 
national flag on their grounds for 
the first time, including the world-
famous Shaolin temple.4 The State 
Administration for Religious Affairs 
国家宗教事务局 worked with the UFWD 
to arrange and promote these events. 
Chinese officials have advocated 
the principle of Sinicising religion 宗教
中国 since Xi Jinping emphasised it at 
the National Religious Work Conference 
in April 2016.5 The principle is that 
followers of all religions in China should 
identify their own interests with that 
of the state and refrain from harming 
the national interest (as it is defined by 
the CCP government). This reads as a 
clear warning to Tibetan Buddhists and 
Xinjiang Muslims in particular, not to 
embrace ‘splittism’ (that is, a challenge 
to the perceived territorial integrity of 
the PRC).
Since the early 1950s, when it 
imposed ‘socialist transformation’ 
on religious practice in China, 
the CCP has demanded that 
religious practitioners be ‘patriotic’ 
爱国, which has mainly meant 
accepting that there are no higher 
authorities than the CCP itself  —  such 
as the Dalai Lama or the Pope. Under 
the principle of Sinicising religion, 
religious practitioners must place 
their political identity as a Chinese 
citizen above their religious identity, 
embracing not only the Party’s rule, but 
also its appeals to nationalism. 
This is because nationalism is a 
fundamental tool used by the CCP to 
bolster the legitimacy of its regime. 
In the Mao era, the Party relied 
primarily on communist ideology to 
legitimise its rule. After the reform 
period began in 1978, it increasingly 
relied on its role in developing the 
Monks at a Shaolin temple 
































































economy and improving standards 
of living across the country. After the 
protests of 1989, when students and 
others began demanding democracy 
as well, the Party launched its Patriotic 
Education Campaign 爱国主义教育 
活动, directed at the whole of society; 
under Xi’s leadership nationalism 
has taken a more prominent place 
than ever. The recent slowdown of 
economic growth, along with growing 
awareness of social problems such as 
environmental pollution, food safety, 
and educational inequality, has raised 
the levels of dissatisfaction with the 
Party’s management of the country. 
The Party has seized upon nationalistic 
pride as a powerful tool to inspire and 
unite society and silence dissent. (See 
Chapter 2 ‘Talking (Up) Power’, pp.36–
49 and Chapter 10 Forum ‘Protecting 
Citizens Overseas: The Policy, the 
Power, and Now the Movie …’, pp.319–
324.) This is as true in the religious 
sphere as it is in lay society.
In Xinjiang and Tibet, the Party’s 
religious policies aim at preventing 
Islam and Tibetan Buddhism from 
becoming symbols that ‘splittists’ 
can use to mobilise forces intent on 
undermining its rule. There were no 
reports of flag-raising ceremonies in 
religious sites in Xinjiang or Tibet this 
year, and very few in Catholic and 
Protestant sites elsewhere, suggesting 
the Party may believe this is not the 
most effective way to engage with 
these communities.6 However, with 
Daoism and Han Buddhism — which 
have deep roots in Chinese culture — it 
seems the Party feels more confident 
about the positive role religion can 
play in realising the nationalist goals 
































































IN SEPTEMBER 2018, after several years of rapprochement, the Vatican 
signed a provisional agreement with 
the People’s Republic of China’s gov-
ernment to share authority in the ap-
pointment of Chinese Catholic bishops. 
For nearly all of the People’s Republic 
of China’s (PRC) history, the Catho-
lic Church in China has been divided 
into two: the state-affiliated Catholic 
Patriotic Church and an underground 
church that only recognises the au-
thority of the Vatican. Rome has not 
recognised bishops appointed by the 
Patriotic Church, and vice versa. One 
rare example of dual recognition was 
the 2012 consecration of Thaddeus 
Ma Daqin 马达钦 as coadjutor/aux-
iliary bishop in Shanghai. However, 
Ma quickly resigned from the Patri-
otic Church — he was placed under 
house arrest, while the Shanghai sem-
inary and diocesan publisher closed 
and local priests and nuns were sent 
to ‘re-education classes’ the following 
year.1  
While as of March 2019 the details 
of the new agreement were still yet to 
be revealed, it is expected that the Chi-
nese government, in consultation with 
local bishops and parishioners, will 
propose bishops to the Vatican for or-
dination. Pope Francis now recognises 
seven bishops appointed by the state. 
A brief statement from the Vatican an-
nouncing the agreement noted: ‘Pope 
Francis hopes that, with these deci-
sions, a new process may begin that 
will allow the wounds of the past to 
be overcome, leading to the full com-
munion of all Chinese Catholics’.2 This 
new arrangement would influence the 
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spiritual lives of the approximately 
twelve million Catholics in mainland 
China.
The Catholic Church’s history in 
China far predates that of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). While not 
the first Catholic missionary to China, 
the Jesuit Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) is 
among the most famous, and helped 
ensure a Jesuit presence in the Ming 
and Qing courts. The Jesuits were ac-
commodating of Chinese customs, in-
cluding Confucian rites such as those 
around ancestor worship — a position 
at odds with other denominations — 
including the Dominicans, who con-
sidered the Confucian rites paganistic 
and incompatable with Catholicism. 
After Pope Clement XI issued a papal 
bull in 1715 condemning the Confu-
cian rituals as incompatible with Ca-
tholicism, the emperor Kangxi banned 
the preaching of Catholicism. Jesuits, 
however, retained their special place 
in the court as artists, and technical 
and scientific advisors. Kangxi’s son 
and successor Yongzheng, who banned 
Catholicism altogether, still appreci-
ated the talent of Italian Jesuit artist 
Giuseppe Castiglione. Yongzheng’s 
son and successor Qianlong, had Jes-
uits design the famed Western Palaces 
Pope Francis and his advisors are seeking an accord with the CCP 
Source: Catholic Church England and Wales, Flickr
of his treasured summer palace, the 
Yuanmingyuan 圆明园 (Garden of Per-
fection and Light).
In 1842, after their victory in the 
first Opium War, and in addition to 
the trade concessions they forced on 
the Qing, France and Britain demand-
ed that the court legalise Christianity 
and grant missionaries the freedom 
to proselytise. In the second Opium 
War, the French and British burnt 
and sacked the Yuanmingyuan. The 
fallen columns and other ruins of the 
Jesuits’ Western Palace became, and 
remain today, a potent symbol for the 
imperialist humiliation of China in the 
nineteenth century; that those build-
ings were designed by Jesuits generally 
does not enter this narrative. 
When highly superstitious peas-
ant rebels began mobilising across 
north China to defend the Qing against 
the foreign enemy, calling themselves 
the Righteous and Harmonious Fists 
义和拳 — more commonly known as 
Boxers in English — they murdered 
Chinese Christians, and Protestant and 
Catholic missionaries, before laying 
siege to the foreign legations of Beijing 
in 1900. The Vatican and the Republic 
of China established diplomatic re-
lations in 1942, and missionaries re-
mained in China until 1951, when the 
new CCP government expelled them 
and established the Patriotic Church. 
This led to a rapid boost in numbers in 
Taiwan when the Nationalist govern-
ment escaped there, where the church 
still claims around 300,000 adherents, 
with a strong presence in certain in-
digenous communities. 
Following the September 2018 
announcement, Cardinal Joseph Zen 
Ze-kuin 陳日君, Bishop Emeritus of 
Hong Kong, argued, ‘The Chinese gov-
ernment will succeed in eliminating 
the underground church with the help 
of the Vatican. Now that it is strength-
ening its suppression of religions, how 
could you think this will lead to a good 
agreement?’3 Cardinal Zen later ques-
tioned whether newly recognised for-
mer underground bishops would have 
any autonomy once affiliated with the 
state church and doubted the Pope’s 
understanding of the CCP.4 Perhaps 
sensing that its only European diplo-
matic ally might be about to shift alle-
giances, in October the government in 
Taipei invited the Pope to visit Taiwan, 
but he is yet to accept.5
At the core of this issue is author-
ity: how can the Catholic Church cede 
to the atheist CCP its right to recognise 
and appoint bishops? The Party-state 










































ous ‘underground’ churches in recent 
years; in November 2018, it was re-
ported that four underground Catholic 
priests in Hebei had been arrested for 
refusing to join the Patriotic Church 
and put in custody for ‘indoctrina-
tion’.6  
Pope Francis and his advisors may 
be pragmatically seeking an accord 
with the CCP so as to express his care 
for all China’s Catholics and establish 
the church’s own legitimacy within 
the PRC’s borders. The current pontiff 
is not afraid of deviating from certain 
Vatican traditions and rapprochement 
with the CCP could be a small step in 
the Vatican’s centuries-long mission 
to spread Catholicism in China. Just as 
Matteo Ricci sought to make Catholi-
cism palatable to the Ming and empha-
sise its harmony with Chinese tradi-
tions, so, too the Vatican of today could 
be seeking to re-Sinicise itself in order, 





































FOR ANYONE WITH EVEN the slightest inclination 
towards feminism — that is, a belief in equal 
opportunity and rights for women and men — 2018 
was a year in which good news was very hard to 
find. 

































In April, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report entitled Only 
Men Need Apply: Gender Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,1 
which analysed over 36,000 job advertisements posted in China between 
2013 and 2018. Among their findings, nineteen per cent of national civil 
service jobs advertised in 2018 specified ‘men only’, ‘men preferred’ or 
‘suitable for men’, compared with just one that preferred women appli-
cants, at the National Bureau of Statistics, for a job requiring ‘long-term 
communication with villagers’. A whopping fifty-five per cent of jobs at 
the Ministry of Public Security in 2017 were for ‘men only’. Many adver-
tisements in both the state and private sectors required female appli-
cants to be married with children, or to satisfy requirements for height, 
weight, and other ‘pleasing’ attributes that had nothing to do with the 
job itself. A case study of e-commerce giant Alibaba revealed a post on 
the company’s official Weibo account aimed at prospective (presumably 
male) employees touting all the ‘beautiful girls’ and ‘goddesses’ who, as 
co-workers, would be: ‘smart and competent at work and charming and 
alluring in life. They are independent but not proud, sensitive but not 
melodramatic’. 
Gender discrimination: 
only men need apply
Photo: EenBergBarbera, 
Flickr
The HRW report concluded that: ‘These job ads reflect traditional and 
deeply discriminatory views: that women are less physically, intellectually 
and psychologically capable than men; that women are their families’ pri-
mary sources of child care and thus unable to be fully committed to their 
jobs or will eventually leave full-time paid employment to have a family; 
and that accommodating maternity leave is unacceptably inconvenient or 
costly for the company or agency’. Its key recommendations to the Chinese 
government included ending gender-specific job advertisements for civil 
servants, strengthening anti-discrimination laws in hiring, and proactive-
ly enforcing company compliance with those laws. 
 It is likely these recommendations fell on deaf ears. Throughout 
2018, the Chinese government continued to tighten its censorship of fem-
inist ideas and activism — including its attempt to crush China’s #MeToo 
movement, and the permanent closure of Weibo’s most prominent fem-
inist account, Feminist Voices, on International Women’s Day (8 March). 
The media reported on the opening of several New Era Women’s Schools, 
designed to help women prepare for domestic roles, by learning ‘how to 
dress, pour tea, and sit just so’ (with bellies held in and legs together!).2 
And then came revelations that the government was contemplating taxing 
childless couples and rewarding those that have two children3 — moves 
that would bring China’s population control into a new era indeed.
 Taking on all of these issues and more, Leta Hong Fincher’s second 
book on gender inequality in China, Betraying Big Brother: the Feminist 
Awakening in China, was released in September.4 While the subtitle sug-
gests some cause for optimism, the content reveals a pessimistic state of 
affairs resonant with the book’s Orwellian title. Hong Fincher’s depiction 
of a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that ‘aggressively perpetuates gen-
der norms and reduces women to their roles as dutiful wives, mothers 
and baby breeders in the home, in order to minimise social unrest and 
give birth to future generations of skilled workers’ leads her to conclude 
that: ‘China’s all-male rulers have decided that the systematic subjugation 
































battle for party survival becomes even more intense, the crackdown on 
feminism and women’s rights — indeed, on all of civil society — is likely to 
intensify.’ Not exactly music to any feminist’s ears.
Holding up Half the Sky?
There have been marked improvements in the socioeconomic status of 
Chinese women since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949, compared with a millennia-long history and culture that awarded 
economic and political power and social authority to males. During the 
Maoist era (1949–1976), agricultural collectivisation, the Great Leap For-
ward, and the Cultural Revolution brought millions of Chinese women into 
the productive sphere, where their labour was considered essential for 
socialist construction; the Party required them, quoting the slogan of the 
day, to ‘hold up half the sky’. The All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) 
中华全国妇女联合会 was established in 1949 to protect women’s rights 
and represent their interests. The Marriage Law, introduced in 1950, 
abolished arranged marriages, concubinage, and the purchasing of child 
brides, while the principle of gender equality was written into China’s 
Constitution in 1954, entitling women to ‘equal pay for equal work’. The 
Communist revolution didn’t work entirely in women’s favour during this 
period — they tended to suffer the double burden of working hard for the 
state while maintaining their traditional domestic duties. But there were 
steps in the right direction. 
In the post-Mao era, successive leaders, including Xi Jinping, have 
affirmed China’s commitment to ‘the basic national policy of equality 
between men and women’. Yet in 2018, China ranked as the most gen-
der-imbalanced country in the world, underpinned by a rising male sex 
ratio at birth from the mid-1980s onwards, when (illegal) pre-natal gen-
der tests and sex-selective abortion became widespread. The ratio peaked 
at 121.4 boys per hundred girls in 2004, compared with a global norm 
of 106:100. As a result, 
China’s working-age 
population in 2018 (de-
fined as 15–60 years 
for men, and 15–55 
for women) comprised 
480 million men 
and just 411 million 
women.5  
It’s pretty hard to 
hold up half the sky 
when you account for 
significantly less than half the working population. It’s even harder when 
gender discrimination in the workforce is as pervasive as it is in China 
today. Many economists expected that market-oriented reforms would 
prompt a reduction in gender discrimination — because discriminating 
against anyone is not an efficient thing to do — but that has not been the 
case. In urban China, despite a narrowing of the gender gap in educa-
tion in recent years, to the point where young urban Chinese women now 
‘out-educate’ their male contemporaries,6 there has been no narrowing of 
the gender gap in pay: instead, it has increased since the mid 1990s. Stud-
ies show that this is largely because of discrimination rather than differ-
ences in skills, talent, or occupational choices.7 In rural China, girls do not 
get as much education as boys, and the gap in earnings is even greater.8 
China’s integration into global markets has also reinforced gender 
inequality in the workplace. Women are more likely to work in low-wage 
export-oriented manufacturing sectors than in high-wage foreign firms 
and joint ventures. In the late 1990s, when a state-owned enterprise laid 
off workers in a bid to become more efficient, women were dispropor-
tionately affected. Those who became self-employed tended to find work 
in the least financially rewarding sectors, including as cleaners, cooks, 
nannies, or street peddlers — some of which have taken on gendered 
Women are more likely to work in low-wage export-orientated manu-
facturing sectors
































titles such as ‘cleaning aunty’ 保洁阿姨 and ‘cooking aunty’ 做饭阿姨 . 
These factors have exacerbated the earnings gap among low-income men 
and women in particular.9
Compounding these factors, female participation in the labour mar-
ket has fallen due to the growing pressure on women to look after the 
home and family.10 One study claims that the gender pay gap in urban 
China comes down to the fact that working women put in an average of 
thirty-six hours of housework a week versus eighteen for men.11 Married 
women and mothers face the most significant disadvantages in the labour 
market as a result (and having two children will only increase their bur-
den).
My own recent research, with Zhou Yixiao from Curtin University 
and Wang Meiyan from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, confirms 
just how problematic gender inequality in income has become.12 Using 
the Survey of Women’s Social Status (2010) — a survey jointly sponsored 
by the ACWF and China’s National Bureau of Statistics — we examine the 
factors that determine the annual earnings of around 16,000 individuals 
across the country. We find that gender is the most important contributor 
to inequality in earnings — above one’s father’s occupation and educa-
tion, hukou (urban residency) status at birth, and region of birth. Simply 
put, this means that being born a boy gives someone greater advantage 
than, for example, being the child of an educated professional, or being 
born with residency in the country’s richest cities. This suggests that gen-
der inequality is an even more intransigent a problem than the urban–
rural, regional, and socioeconomic divides that characterise China today.
Gender inequities are just as striking in the political realm. Dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s, women accounted for one third of Communist 
Party members; by 2017 only one in four Party members was female.13 
Not only are Party members more likely to be promoted and paid more: 
according to one team of economists, income-related rewards for Party 
members have risen over time — contradicting their expectations (again) 
that the reverse would be true because of market-oriented reforms.14 At 
the top, it is even worse: the Politburo of the Central Committee of the 
CCP, the twenty-five most powerful 
members of the Party, includes just 
one woman — Sun Chunlan 孙春
兰 — and has not had more than 
two at the same time since 1977.15 
The Politburo Standing Commit-
tee, which comprises the country’s 
seven most powerful people, has 
always been male only. According 
to Li Cheng of the Brookings Insti-
tution, on the eve of the Nineteenth 
Party Congress in 2017 there was not a single woman serving as a provin-
cial or municipal Party secretary — considered a pre-requisite for gaining 
a Politburo seat in the future. Li does not anticipate a more gender-bal-
anced power structure emerging in Chinese politics any time soon.
The circumstances described above help explain the deterioration 
in China’s global rankings for gender equality over the last decade. The 
World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index measures coun-
try-level gender gaps based on a range of indicators summarised in four 
sub-indexes: Economic Participation and Opportunity (including female-
to-male ratios in labour force participation and earnings); Educational At-
tainment (including ratios in literacy and school enrolment rates); Health 
and Survival (sex ratios at birth and female-to-male life expectancy); and 
Political Empowerment (including ratios of women to men in parliament 
and at ministerial level). Out of 144 countries in 2016, China ranked at 99 
overall — down from 63 a decade earlier. This placed it well below the 
Philippines (at number 7), as well as Mongolia (58), Vietnam (65), and 
Thailand, Bangladesh, and India, although notably above its neighbours 
Japan (111) and Korea (116). Given the fact that China has been moving 
up on so many other measures, including GDP, GDP per capita, and educa-
tional attainments overall, these gender trends are all the more worrying. 


































Women in Xi’s ‘New Era’ 
In his address to the Global Leaders Meeting on Gender Equali-
ty and Women’s Empowerment in September 2015, Xi Jinping put 
forward four propositions for promoting global gender equali-
ty: ‘ensuring that women share equally in the achievements of 
development’ 确保妇女平等分享发展成果, actively protecting 
women’s rights and interests, eliminating violence and ‘out-dated men-
talities and customs’ 落后观念和陈规旧俗 inhibiting women’s develop-
ment, and fostering a favourable international environment for gender 
equality.16 
But, there is little to suggest that Xi Jinping is pursuing his own prop-
ositions seriously within China, let alone globally. It was also in 2015 that 
at least ten Chinese women — including five now known as the Feminist 
Five17 — spent International Women’s Day in police custody for planning to 
protest against sexual harassment on public transport. The Feminist Five 
spent thirty-seven days in detention before being released on bail to await 
trial — meaning that they were subjected to surveillance, restrictions, and 
investigations for up to one year (and, it turns out, well beyond that). They 
had made global headlines in 2012 with their ‘Bald Sisters’ head-shaving 
campaign protesting against gender discrimination in university admis-
sions; their Occupy Men’s Toilets movement advocating for more female 
public toilets; and their protests against domestic violence, for which they 
dressed in wedding gowns splashed with red paint. (See the China Story 
Yearbook 2015: Pollution, Chapter 2 ‘The Fog of Law’, p.79 and Information 
Window ‘Feminist Five’, p.81.)
In a more recent example, in January 2018, Luo Xixi 罗茜茜, a Bei-
hang University alumna now resident in the US, posted on Weibo about 
the sexual harassment she had suffered years earlier from her PhD su-
pervisor Chen Xiaowu 陈小武.18 The post, which explicitly referenced the 
#MeToo movement, attracted more than four million views and tens of 
thousands of ‘likes’ and, by mid-January, the university had removed Chen 
from his teaching posts and placed 
him under investigation. Hundreds of 
other women quickly followed suit 
with their own grievances, calling 
for investigations into allegations of 
sexual abuse in spheres including ac-
ademia and the media. Rather than 
responding with promises to crack 
down on sexual harassment, the 
Chinese authorities instead blocked 
the terms ‘sexual harassment’ and 
‘#MeToo’ on Chinese online media plat-
forms — a ban that some got around 
by using the homophonous non-
sense phrase mitu 米兔, literally ‘rice bunny’ or its 
emoticon equivalent. 
Throughout 2018, China’s ‘rice bunny’ movement continued to mobi-
lise support in the face of ongoing efforts to suppress discussion of sexual 
harassment issues, suggesting that men far more powerful than univer-
sity professors feared they could be next in the firing line. For millions of 
women in China, according to the Financial Times, the movement ‘repre-
sents a defiant response to sexual harassment, gender inequality and the 
Chinese authorities’.19 Leta Hong Fincher, likewise, gives some cause for 
hope for the ‘emergence of a broader feminist awakening that is begin-
ning to transform women in cities across China’.20
However, the state has increased surveillance of feminist activists and 
continues to crackdown on activism, as Betraying Big Brother covers in ex-
cruciating detail. At the same time, President Xi has stepped up his campaign 
to ‘reinforce traditional family values’, urging ‘the people to integrate their 
personal family dreams with the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation’. 
Among the ‘Twelve Extracts from Xi’s speeches on Family, Family Educa-
tion and Family Tradition’ 习总书记谈注重家庭 、 家教 、 家风, published 
‘Rice bunny’ (米兔), pronounced ‘mi tu’, is the 
homophonous nonsense phrase given to the 
#MeToo campaign by Chinese social media users 
to avoid censorship
































on the All China Women’s Federation website in 2016 were calls for the 
‘creation of conditions for the healthy growth of the next generation’ and 
for people (presumably not men) to be ‘encouraged to fulfil their familial 
responsibilities and cultivate their conduct in the home to enhance the 
status of family-based old age care’ 引导人们自觉承担家庭责任、树立良
好家风，巩固家庭养老基础地位.21 
The ACWF had already propagated a similar message through its 
Most Beautiful Family Campaign 最美家庭, launched in 2015.22 One of the 
‘model families’ honoured by Xi Jinping under this campaign was that 
of Liu Ying — a woman celebrated for the fact that all six of her in-laws 
were happy with how she had treated them over the past three decades. 
(Her husband had been raised by foster parents after his birth parents 
divorced; both remarried).23 The Federation’s promotion of the ideal 
woman being one who pleases her in-laws has much stronger echoes of 
Confucian patriarchal values than of the female militia fighters and ‘iron 
women’ of Cultural Revolution propaganda — even if the reality of the 
Mao era never quite matched the image. 
The ACWF defined and propagated the disparaging term ‘leftover 
women’ 剩女 in 2007, for women who are still unmarried and childless in 
their late twenties. Hong Fincher has commented that: ‘… the peculiarity 
of a Women’s Federation that contributes to bolstering male supremacy 
is matched only by the ways that the country’s official Labor Federation 
often serves more to control than empower workers’.24 
 Universities are also incorporating Xi’s New Era values for women 
into their teaching agendas.25 One example of this is the New Era Wom-
en’s School at Zhenjiang College in Jiangsu province, established in March 
2018 in partnership with the ACWF. According to its head, the school is 
designed to help women compete in the job market, but also to prepare 
them for domestic roles because ‘Women’s family role is more impor-
tant now’. A number of similar schools have appeared since, including 
the Kunyu Women’s School — a partnership between Hebei University 
and the local ACWF branch. Human Rights Watch China Director Sophie 
Richardson is emphatic that ‘China’s state-run organisation on gender 
equality [ACWF] is promoting a damaging narrative about women’s sub-
servience in an attempt to fix social issues’.26
 One of the ‘social issues’ that supposedly needs fixing is that of the 
declining population, and the apparent failing of young couples to re-
spond to the Two-Child Policy introduced on 1 January 2016, by having a 
second child. The number of births actually declined from 17.86 million 
births in 2016 and is projected to fall below 15.23 million in 2018. In the 
China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, I explained why having more babies 
is not the best solution to China’s population challenges (including the 
rapidly ageing population that Xi Jinping seems to want Chinese women 
to stay at home and care for), nor its economic ones (including slowing 
GDP and labour force growth). Well-educated, ambitious women — no 
matter how many babies they choose to have — coupled with better child- 
and elderly-care facilities to free up women for productive employment 
would make far more sense. 
 But neither Xi Jinping nor many young Chinese women appear to 
see it this way. If You are the One is a Chinese dating show that provides 
(heavily scripted but still fascinating) insights into the machinations of 
modern-day matchmaking in China. In one particularly memorable epi-
sode from 2018, the one girl who still had her light on for the final male 
contestant was given an opportunity to ask one last question before decid-
ing whether to leave with him and win a romantic holiday to the Aegean 

































Sea, and possibly life happily ever after. She asked: ‘Once your wife has 
had her first baby, will you be able to support her so that she never has 
to return to work?’ He nervously pondered before replying: ‘I don’t think 
my earnings will be sufficient for that’. She abruptly turned off her light, 
and the young man was left alone. 
Pushing Boundaries
In 2017, Li Maizi 李麦子 (real 
name Li Tingting 李婷婷), one 
of the Feminist Five, wrote an 
International Women’s Day 
piece for The Guardian, in 
which she reflected on wheth-
er there was any hope for the 
Chinese feminist movement. 
She cited some signs of pro-
gress, including the ACWF 
newspaper China Women’s 
News urging Chinese media to 
stop using the term ‘leftover women’ in 2017, which Li called ‘a remarka-
ble shift that I believe can be credited to feminist activism’. Li concluded 
by stating that ‘The Beijing government continues to push back the bound-
aries of acceptable resistance to the point where there is little room left, 
but at least women’s issues are being discussed. That’s why there is hope 
for feminism in China.’27
In July 2018, Li posted a lengthy essay on WeChat, explaining how 
the #MeToo movement ‘illustrates the power of feminism’s challenge to 
the patriarchy’.28 On 31 October, Tu Youqin 徒有琴 a female student at the 
Central Conservatory of Music in Beijing, posted a song titled ‘Scumbag 
Men of the Celestial Empire’ on Sina Weibo. In this Chinese rendition of 
Still from Tu Youqin’s music video ‘Scumbag Men of the 
Celestial Empire’
Source: Sina Weibo
the famous ‘Cell Block Tango’ from the musical Chicago, Tu recounts the 
experiences of six (fictitious) women from across China, including one 
who is beaten by her husband with his saxophone, and another whose 
husband suffocates their third daughter for 2,000 yuan, paid by neigh-
bours who want a wife in the afterlife for their dead baby son. It doesn’t 
end well for any of the men, as those familiar with ‘Cell Block Tango’ will 
know — which may explain why the Weibo post lasted only one day be-
fore being removed. But at least these stories are being heard elsewhere 
in the world, including by more than 55,000 viewers on YouTube within 
the first week of the song’s release. China’s powerful men are clearly wor-
ried by such activism; the rest of the world is watching. And that is a sign 
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T HE STORY OF YANXI PALACE 延禧攻略 is a historical period drama 
that gained astonishing popularity in 
the northern summer of 2018 — with 
over 14.5 billion online views since 
its release on the streaming platform 
iQiyi. The story is set during the reign 
of the Qing emperor Qianlong (1735–
1796), a fictional tale of revenge about 
one of his concubines, Wei Yingluo 魏
璎珞, posthumously known as Empress 
Xiaoyichun 孝仪纯, and mother of the 
succeeding Emperor Jiaqing. 
This historical reimagining of 
court intrigue features seemingly au-
thentic, fabulous costumes and ele-
gant hair accessories; some of the craft 
skills that went into their making are 
listed as Intangible Cultural Heritage 
in Jiangsu province. The vivid por-
trayal of imperial life through fashion, 
makeup, and hairstyles distinguished 
the show from many other imperi-
al palace dramas that spend a huge 
amount of money on big-name stars 
but do not put as much effort into 
visual authenticity. 
The Story of Yanxi Palace had its 
critics. Feminists argued that the pro-
tagonist is not so much a female fight-
er against an unbalanced structure of 
gendered power as a dependent of the 
authority of the patriarchal system. 
Social liberals attacked the show for 
revelling in the brutality of patriarchal 
power politics, and for depicting the 
female body as capital in the struggle 
for power, as well as a means for ma-
nipulating power. 
Despite these criticisms, the fast-
paced, 70-episode serial was well re-
ceived by mainstream viewers. Its gen-






































re is one that is an eternal favourite 
with female viewers in China — power 
struggles within the imperial inner 
court. To ascend the power ladder of 
Qianlong’s inner court, concubines 
are depicted backstabbing each other 
and otherwise plotting to win the em-
peror’s favour. Only by approaching 
the political throne are the women 
empowered with any kind of authori-
ty. Yet the heroine Wei Yingluo is not 
a mere passive subject of the patriar-
chy. Her mindset is more modern in 
that she consciously negotiates with, 
and sometimes challenges the existing 
power structure. Her determination 
to seek revenge for her sister, who is 
raped by the emperor’s brother and 
later killed by the brother’s mother, 
results in her fighting those in power. 
In her revenge, she seizes every op-
portunity to undermine her enemies 
and sometimes even denounces their 
evil deeds to their face, despite their 
high-ranking positions.
Wei’s story deeply resonated with 
its predominantly female audience. 
She enters the court as a maid but 
eventually defeats all her enemies to 
become a high-ranking imperial con-
cubine. As evidenced on Weibo and 
other social media platforms, a large 
number of urban women who struggle 
for better work opportunities identi-
fied with her solo struggle to climb the 
socioeconomic ladder and negotiate 
a society structured around wealth-
based status and male power and 
privilege. Wei’s diligence and ultimate 
success encourages the serial’s female 
fans to pursue their dreams. 
Although the drama pits Wei 
against a powerful clique of evil-doers, 
she is not depicted as an inherently no-
Promotional poster for 
The Story of Yanxi Palace
Source: akane847, Flickr
ble moral figure like the empress, who 
is constrained by feminine virtues of 
self-sacrifice and disciplined silence. 
Wei, by contrast, is a hot-tempered 
woman who stands no nonsense. In 
the drama, virtues and ideals die along 
with the empress. Wei replaces them 
with a powerful sense of individual 
entitlement. 
The competition for survival in 
the inner court also has echoes for 
women in today’s competitive and 
insecure workplaces, which are gov-
erned by cut-throat capitalist values 
rather than so-called ‘traditional vir-
tues’, and many of which are guilty 
of practices that objectify the female 
body (see for example the opening par-
agraph of the ‘Girl Power’ chapter in 
this volume). Female viewers may find 
inspiration in Wei’s philosophy of life. 
Examples much quoted in social me-
dia include her lines: ‘People are kind 
in nature, but they should learn to de-
fend themselves’ 人心存良善，更应懂自
保; ‘Beat the snake where it hurts. To 
revenge on someone, the best way is 
to wrest what she wants the most’ 打
蛇得打七寸，想要报复一个人，最好的办
法，就是夺走她最想要的东西; ‘Confront 
soldiers with generals and stem water 
with earth. One needs to take whatev-
er measures are called for. If one lives 
under constant worry and fear, what 
a feeble life it is!’ 人生处世无非就是兵来
将挡，水来土掩，若是处处担忧，心怀恐
惧，那还活个什么劲啊. Wei’s continual 
triumphs clearly inspired the drama’s 
female audience, although one of the 
show’s key aspects — female-to-female 














































AUSTRALIA’S CHINA DEBATE IN 2018 
David Brophy
FOR SOME TIME NOW, Australia’s foreign policy 
establishment has contemplated how best to 
navigate the rivalry between the US and China, and 
debated whether or not Australia would one day 
have to choose between the two. Participants in 
this ‘old’ China debate might have disagreed on the 
timeline of China’s rise, or the likelihood of serious 
conflict between our defence partner and our 
trading partner, but there was a degree of consensus 
as to the parameters of the question. By the end of 
2017, though, a string of highly visible imbroglios 
had seen a ‘new’ China debate take centre stage: 
one side arguing that there was widespread Chinese 
Party-state interference in Australian affairs; the 
other accusing the first of sensationalism, even 
racism. Throughout 2018, some of the basic facts 
about China’s presence in, and intentions towards, 
Australia seemed up for grabs. The ‘China question’ 
had become a much more polarised, and polarising 
one.
Sydney’s Chinatown












































In this new landscape, conventional political lines have tended to blur. 
Hawkish narratives of Chinese expansionism occasionally draw support 
from those whose primary concern is with the parlous state of human 
rights in China. Those anxious to prevent a resurgence of anti-Chinese 
xenophobia sometimes find themselves taking the same side of a point as 
corporate actors, whose priority is to moderate criticism of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and get on with profiting from its vast economy. 
The government’s attack on (now retired) Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
senator Sam Dastyari in 2017 (see the China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, 
Chapter 8 ‘Making the World Safe (For China)’, pp.278–293) set a new prec-
edent in the instrumentalisation of China anxieties for domestic political 
gain. Yet despite the Liberal Party flirting with similar rhetoric at points 
in 2018, the debate has yet to take on an obviously partisan colouring, and 
divisions within Australia’s two major parties on the China question seem 
as pertinent as those that exist between them.
Former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull’s turn towards a more con-
frontational stance on China is commonly attributed to impetus from the 
Department of Defence and intelligence agencies. A classified inter-agency 
inquiry, led by one-time Beijing correspondent John Garnaut, was proba-
bly the source of some of the claims about Chinese Party-state interference 
in Australian affairs that filtered into the media in 2017.1 In 2018, without 
naming specific countries, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Director-General Duncan Lewis maintained that foreign interference was 
occurring ‘at unprecedented scale’ in Australia.2 A prominent source of 
specific warnings has been the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 
which in October published a study of security risks arising from collabo-
ration between university researchers and Chinese scientists affiliated to 
the People’s Liberation Army.3
On the other side of the think-tank divide, former foreign minister 
and NSW premier Bob Carr’s Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) 
at the University of Technology Sydney has issued reports stressing the 
benefits of engagement with China, and questioning sensational claims of 
Chinese interference.4 Former Australian ambassador to China, Stephen 
FitzGerald, and Linda Jakobson, who heads China Matters (a not-for-prof-
it entity dedicated to analysing policy perspectives on China’s rise), were 
similarly critical of Turnbull’s China diplomacy, arguing that business 
leaders and politicians should formulate a consistent ‘China narrative’ to 
guide Australian officialdom in a more China-centric world.5 In the corpo-
rate sphere, Fortescue Metals CEO Andrew Forrest made no secret of his 
desire to restore the pre-Turnbull status quo. At a dinner event in March 
he complained that the debate was ‘fuel[ing] distrust, paranoia and a loss 
of respect’.6 
Although some Chinese-Australian scholars have involved themselves 
in this discussion, ethnic Chinese community groups have made few pub-
lic interventions. The Australian Values Alliance, a small network of PRC 
dissidents, campaigns against Confucius Institutes and pro-PRC cultural 
activities, as do media organisations linked to the persecuted Falun Gong. 
Bodies aligned with Beijing, such as the Australian Council for the Peaceful 
Reunification of China, have tended to stay out of the fray. For its part, the 
Chinese embassy has limited its public commentary to warnings against 
adopting a ‘Cold War mentality’ towards the PRC.  
Mining power: there have been calls from the corporate sphere for Australia–China relations 
to go back to the pre-Turnbull status quo












































Loud Response to Silent Invasion
Australia’s ‘old’ China debate carried on in 2018. Defence analyst Hugh 
White’s late-2017 Quarterly Essay Without America reprised his by-now 
familiar critique of the view that Australia didn’t have to choose between 
China and the US, but this time with a more pessimistic prognosis: that 
the US’s relative decline in Asia was terminal, and Australia would simply 
have to accommodate to the new reality.7 (See also White’s chapter ‘China’s 
Power, the United States, and the Future of Australia’ in the China Story 
Yearbook 2017: Prosperity.) A series of American China specialists replied 
in the next issue, insisting that the US had the will, and policy know-how 
to preserve its dominance in Asia, but White stuck to his guns: ‘there is no 
sign, from their critiques of my essay, that the key people in Washington 
who would have to design and develop this new policy understand the 
nature or the scale of the task’. Turning to the ‘new’ China debate, White 
acknowledged that Chinese influence was ‘a very real problem’, but crit-
icised the government’s exploitation of the issue ‘to conjure threatening 
images of China in the hope of encouraging people to buy its argument 
that we can and must rely on America to shield us from it’.8  
For White, the long-term viability of this reliance on the US was still 
the question on which Australians should focus. But this question was 
soon to be sidelined by a book arguing that China’s rise was a threat not 
simply to Australia’s interests, but to its very sovereignty, leaving us no 
choice but to join the US in resisting it. Clive Hamilton’s Silent Invasion, 
released in February, painted a series of disparate issues surrounding Chi-
na’s role in Australia as part of a grand conspiracy by the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) to reduce Australia to vassal status. (An earlier subtitle 
for the book was How China is Turning Australia into a Puppet State.)9 The 
book made a splash as much for its claims — few of which were new — 
as for the narrative surrounding its publication. With multiple lawsuits 
before the courts from earlier ABC and Sydney Morning Herald ‘Chinese 
influence’ reportage, the legal team at Hamilton’s original publisher, Allen 
& Unwin, were cautious towards the book. Despite the absence of any ex-
plicit threats, Hamilton cried censorship, claiming that Allen & Unwin had 
been intimidated by Beijing, and he eventually took the Silent Invasion to 
the small independent publisher Hardie Grant. 
Best known for his commentary on climate change, Hamilton’s 
left-leaning sympathies were reflected in the book’s critique of corporate 
influence on Australian policy-making. But much of his rhetoric was drawn 
straight from the Cold War right, positioning Australia as a key battle-
ground in a ‘global war between democracy and the new totalitarianism’. 
In a style reminiscent of McCarthy-era attacks on scholars and China-hands 
who were scapegoated for the failure of US policy in post-war China, Silent 
Invasion thrust the question of loyalty to the centre of Australia’s China 
debate. Hugh White got off lightly as a ‘capitulationist’, in comparison to a 
lengthy denunciation of ‘Beijing Bob’ Carr and ACRI, ‘whose ultimate ob-
jective is to advance the CCP’s influence in Australian policy and political 
circles’. Hamilton fingered a ‘China club’ of policy advisers, among them 
ANU economist Peter Drysdale, who, in 2016, delivered ‘perhaps the most 
dangerous advice an Australian government has ever received’, by arguing 
that Australia should not discriminate against Chinese investment. Most of 
Australia’s China scholars could not be relied on for their analysis, Ham-
ilton argued, because they 
were ‘policing themselves so 
as to stay on the right side of 
the CCP’s legion of watchers’.
Silent Invasion received 
mostly critical reviews, start-
ing with my own in the Aus-
tralian Review of Books.10 
Then-race discrimination 
commissioner Tim Sout-
phommasane said that the 
book’s language ‘smacks of 
The Yellow Peril revisited’.11 
ALP heavyweights hit back 













































against claims that China was corrupting their party, with former prime 
minister Paul Keating deriding Hamilton as a ‘nincompoop’.12 The Chinese 
state media was similarly dismissive, publishing a photo of Silent Invasion 
sitting in a toilet bowl. Occupying more of a middle ground position, Si-
nologist Geremie R. Barmé endorsed Hamilton’s objectives, though not 
his execution, writing: ‘A book like Silent Invasion has been a long time 
coming; unfortunately, it happens to be this book’.13 A supportive Rory 
Medcalf, head of The Australian National University’s National Security 
College, went into bat against Hamilton’s critics, crediting him with doing 
Australia ‘a long-term service’.14 In The Australian, Paul Monk praised the 
book as ‘lucid and important’.15 
Silent Invasion divided progressive opinion, particularly inside the 
Australian Greens, a party that combines a critical stance on Beijing’s do-
mestic repression and foreign public diplomacy initiatives (such as the 
Confucius Institutes), with a strong anti-racist platform. David Shoebridge, 
a figure from the left of the NSW branch, was scheduled to launch Silent 
Invasion in the state parliament, but withdrew in the face of criticism 
from anti-racist activists.16 Into his place stepped his factional rival from 
the right, Justin Field, who, in launching the book, conveyed an endorse-
ment of it from Christine Milne, former federal parliamentary leader of 
the Greens.17 
At the other end of the political spectrum, the book required much 
less soul searching. Far-right nationalists in the Australia First Party wel-
comed Silent Invasion, while criticising the author’s pro-US proclivities. 
Conservative pundits who had long reviled Clive Hamilton for his ad-
vocacy on climate change now embraced his stance on China. On Sky 
News, Hamilton told Miranda Devine that Labor had been ‘to large meas-
ure captured by Chinese interests,’18 and cautioned Andrew Bolt of the 
‘significant proportion of the Chinese-Australian population that is very 
patriotic, not to Australia, but to the People’s Republic of China’. Bolt 
clicked his tongue. ‘Well, that could one day prove to be a most awkward 
dilemma for us’, he replied.19 
Australia’s Foreign Interference Laws
The debate surrounding Silent Invasion merged with that surrounding 
a package of new legislation, including an update to espionage offences, 
and a scheme to register individuals seeking to influence Australian pol-
itics on behalf of a foreign principal. Malcolm Turnbull announced these 
laws in late 2017, in the midst of a tense by-election campaign in Ben-
nelong in north Sydney, an electorate home to a sizable Chinese-Australi-
an community. In so doing he proclaimed in Chinese that ‘the Australian 
people have stood up,’ cribbing what he evidently believed to be a phrase 
from Mao Zedong’s speech at the end of the Chinese Civil War (a mistake 
on the part of his speech writer).
Hamilton and his Silent Invasion collaborator Alex Joske were among 
those who made submissions endorsing the draft laws.20 Critics of the 
legislation included lawyers and human rights activists worried about 
their implications for civil liberties, and charities such as Greenpeace that 
would be hit hard by new restrictions on foreign donations. A group of 
Australian China scholars weighed in with a joint submission arguing that 
the laws endangered intellectual freedom, and that exaggerated claims 
of Chinese influence had poisoned the political climate.21 The submis-
sion elicited an immediate response from a second group of scholars and 
commentators, insisting that the debate had remained within acceptable 
bounds, and that it was necessary to ‘normalise’ the new discourse on 
China.22
In June, Attorney-General Christian Porter responded to criticisms of 
the legislation with a second and final round of amendments, satisfying 
some, but by no means all, of the critics. Horse-trading at the Parliamen-
tary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security secured ALP support 
for the laws, but the minor parties and independents were unanimous in 
opposing them. The Greens pointed out that by only restricting foreign do-
nations, the laws would not prevent the type of donations (that is, from lo-












































Anxious to shepherd the laws through, Porter insisted that they were 
necessary to safeguard an upcoming round of by-elections, which, he 
implied, would otherwise be at risk from Chinese interference. Having 
invoked the spectre of electoral interference to pass the laws, the Attor-
ney-General then did the same to speed their implementation. With a fed-
eral election looming in 2019, Porter announced that new requirements 
to register a relationship with a foreign principal would take effect from 
10 December. On that day, the Attorney-General also acquired the pow-
er to issue a ‘transparency notice’, designating someone a foreign agent. 
The legislation thus gives considerable ammunition to those who hope to 
expose ‘agents of influence’ in Australian society, though it remains to be 
seen if, and how, its provisions will be enforced.
A Transpacific Partnership?
Scaremongering around Australia’s electoral system fed on a new-found 
sense of vulnerability in Western democracies, exemplified most striking-
ly in the outcry towards Russian interference in the US elections. On key 
occasions, Australian politicians, along with prominent visitors from the 
US, cited ‘Russiagate’ as part of the justification for a tough new approach 
to Beijing. In 2017, and again in 2018, Barack Obama’s chief of national 
security, James Clapper, visited Australia, and in his speeches he likened 
Australia–China relations in 2018: 
resetting the reset?
Photo: Vincent Xu, Flickr
China’s actions in Australia to Russia’s role in the 2016 American elections. 
Hilary Clinton drew similar comparisons on her Australian speaking tour 
in May.23 Not surprisingly, for some in Australia, Washington’s response to 
‘Russiagate’ therefore provided a guide in tackling Australia’s ‘Chinagate’. 
In a piece for Foreign Affairs in March, John Garnaut encouraged Austral-
ian intelligence agencies to ‘borrow from the playbook of Special Prosecu-
tor Robert Mueller and use the prosecution process as an opportunity to 
advance public education’.24 
The borrowing was not all one way. Australia’s new narrative of 
Chinese influence was, in turn, well received in defence and intelligence 
circles in the US. In late 2017, the Congressional Executive Committee on 
China (CECC) identified a ‘national crisis’ in Australia in its hearing on ‘Ex-
porting Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics’.25 Following the 
release of Silent Invasion, Clive Hamilton toured North America, where he 
met with intelligence agencies, testified at the CECC, and spoke to hawkish 
Washington think-tanks such as the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments. His message: ‘Russia is not the big threat, China is the big 
threat’.26  Although some China experts in the US were aware that Australi-
ans were divided on the issue, the prevailing message resounding through 
the US foreign policy community was that Beijing had ‘made deep inroads 
into local and national politics’ in Australia.27  
For ‘Chinagate’ believers, Washington’s interest in the Australian case 
was evidence of our important frontline role in resisting Chinese aggres-
sion.28 A more sceptical interpretation would situate this trans-Pacific 
exchange in Australia’s long history of sub-imperial lobbying — showing 
our relevance to Washington and thereby anchoring the US in our region. 
Shadow Minister for Defence Richard Marles spelled out the task in a 
speech he gave in Washington in May: to ‘demonstrate to them that we 
can help share the burden of strategic thought in the Indo-Pacific …’ so as 
to ‘retain the American presence we need in the East Asian Time Zone’.29  
One particularly irksome sign of America’s neglect of Australia had 












































China hawks were, therefore, looking forward to welcoming Trump’s 2017 
appointment to the position, Admiral Harry Harris from Pacific Command 
in Hawaii. The mood turned to disappointment in April 2018, when Harris 
was redirected to South Korea. The position remained vacant until Novem-
ber, when Trump installed long-term Republican insider Arthur B. Culva-
house Jr.
State Politics and the Chinese State
Few new stories about covert Chinese influence in Australia hit the head-
lines in 2018, though Beijing’s overt influence made itself felt on issues large 
and small. On the local level, a PRC vice-consul requested the removal of 
a Taiwanese flag from a work of public art in Rockhampton, sparking out-
rage.30 Meanwhile, a series of communications from Beijing ultimately led 
Australia to call off talks with Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party admin-
istration on a new free trade pact. 
For a while, it seemed that the political party taking claims of Chinese 
subversion most seriously was the Australian Greens. In Tasmania, the 
Greens first issued warnings that the 3,185-acre Cambria Green holiday re-
sort, a joint venture with a PRC company, was part of a CCP plot to secure ter-
ritory in Tasmania as a launching pad for its ambitions towards Antarctica.31 
(The Glamorgan Spring Bay Council voted narrowly to approve the develop-
ment in late November 2018.) The party also cited ‘extremely credible evi-
dence’ that Beijing intended to interfere in the forthcoming state elections, 
pointing the finger at Hobart council candidate Tang Yongbei, who had brief-
ly been a member of the Australian Council for the Peaceful Reunification 
of China and done volunteer work for the local PRC consulate. On this basis, 
critics insinuated that she was an operative for the CCP’s United Front office, 
although the only concrete evidence they cited of ‘interference’ was the fact 
that Tang encouraged non-citizen residents to enrol to vote — a right they 
enjoy in Tasmania. In the end, she received a paltry 1.12 per cent of the vote.
Similar anxieties involving Chinese 
investment emerged in Victoria in mid- 
November, when the Liberal Party attacked 
ALP Premier Daniel Andrews for signing a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with 
China to collaborate on its Belt and Road 
Initiative. Complaining that the MoU was 
signed without Canberra’s foreknowledge, 
critics cast particular suspicion on a Chinese- 
Australian advisor to Premier Andrews, who 
also served as a consultant for the Shenzhen 
Association of Australia. On election night, 
ALP stalwart and Australia China Business 
Council president John Brumby intimated 
that Chinese-Australian resentment at such slurs may have contributed to 
the huge swing against the Liberals in Melbourne’s eastern suburbs.
Resetting the Reset?
By the time he secured his new foreign interference laws, Malcolm 
Turnbull’s enthusiasm for decrying Chinese activities was cooling. In 
a speech that would be described as a ‘reset’ at the University of New 
South Wales in August, Turnbull highlighted the importance of scientific 
collaboration with the PRC (in which UNSW leads the country), and his 
own family connections to China.32 Beijing seemed to take the hint, and 
ended an eighteen-month long freeze on ministerial-level talks, paving 
the way for first the trade minister, and then the foreign minister, to visit 
China in November.
Turnbull’s carefully worded speech allowed for multiple interpreta-
tions, itself a sign that he was reverting to earlier norms and Australia’s 
traditionally more ambiguous rhetoric on China. ACRI saw in the speech 
a welcome turn away from the hostile posturing of previous months.33 
Concerns with Chinese investment 
in Australia increase — ALP Premier 
Daniel Andrews signs MoU to collab-














































Mandarin-speaking former prime minister Kevin Rudd, for his part, 
thought the PM had gone too far, accusing him of betraying Australian 
interests with a ‘grovelling mea culpa’ to Beijing.34 Meanwhile, Rory Med-
calf described it as a skilful articulation of the ‘new normal’ of heightened 
vigilance.35  
The deliberate multivalence of Turnbull’s speech allows us to only 
speculate as to his motives at this time. A Hoover Institute report claimed 
that Turnbull’s move to ease tensions was a product of pressure from Chi-
na and ‘powerful domestic lobbying groups’, but the PM’s calculations 
must have also extended to the triangular relationship with the US.36 Many 
believe that 2017’s anti-Chinese turn was to some degree a response to 
Donald Trump’s promise to put ‘America first’, and deprioritise US alli-
ances in Asia. Anxious to prevent any such retrenchment on the part of 
its ally and patron, Australia issued loud warnings about the growing Chi-
nese threat. By the middle of 2018, Washington was making similar noises: 
the FBI had identified China as a ‘whole of society threat’ to the US, and 
Vice-President Pence was rattling the sabre with bellicose rhetoric. At this 
point, Canberra may have felt that its own tough talk had served its pur-
pose, and Australia could tone it down. Alternatively, Turnbull may have 
decided that America was unlikely to follow through on its rhetoric, and 
Australia risked isolating itself in a region where everyone else was hedg-
ing between China and the US.
Pro-China supporters in 
Canberra
Source: Howard Poon, Flickr
Whatever the case, as 2018 drew to a close, Australia’s diplomatic 
balancing act looked as unstable as ever. Having deposed Malcolm Turn-
bull, one of incoming Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s first acts was to an-
nounce the ‘Pacific pivot’ — a package of infrastructure loans to Pacific 
nations, along with new defence collaborations — designed to thwart Chi-
nese influence on Australia’s ‘family’ in our own ‘backyard’. A few days 
later in Singapore, Morrison reprised the mantra that Australia would not 
take sides between China and the US, insisting that he was ‘getting on with 
business with China’.37 The following week, he announced that Australia 
would collaborate with the US to revive the Manus Island naval base in 
Papua New Guinea — a move with the obvious aim of obstructing Chinese 
encroachment in the Pacific.
Australia’s discourse on China was sliding back into a familiar rut, 
and the opposition ALP wasn’t offering anything by way of alternative. 
In a speech in October, party leader Bill Shorten said that Labor rejected 
‘strategic denial of others’ as a goal, but then claimed the Manus Island 
base as Labor’s own policy. Although it likes to position itself as being 
more Asia savvy than its Coalition rivals, the ALP’s vision for the future of 
the region is no less militaristic, calling for more US marines in Darwin, 
and US warships to dock in Western Australia.38
The political class’s bipartisan support for a military response to 
China’s rise puts paid to claims that Beijing’s political interference has 
eroded Australia’s long-standing commitment to Washington’s pre- 
eminence in Asia. But the deeper anxiety driving exaggerated claims 
about the current state of PRC influence in Australia is not without 
foundation: if US–China conflict intensifies, Beijing may well seek to 
exacerbate the contradictions between Australia’s pro-US posture and 
its dependence on Chinese trade, and exert pressure in new ways. Not-
withstanding the validity of some of the specific accusations, the recent 
preoccupation with domestic influence peddling has obscured the need 
for a more thorough discussion of Australia’s place in the world and its 
options. Should that situation persist, the Australian public may find it-
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WHEN TAIWAN’S President Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 came to power 
in a landslide election victory in Janu-
ary 2016, her supporters viewed her 
victory as expressing a truth about Tai-
wan being a progressive society. Tsai 
campaigned in support of indigenous 
reconciliation, same-sex marriage, and 
social equality. She had addressed her 
campaign rhetoric at Taiwan’s young 
people and spoken of economic oppor-
tunities in a globalised economy. Tsai’s 
win also went against the tide of right-
wing populism that has beset many 
democratic polities. For her supporters, 
especially young urban profession-
als, Tsai’s win signalled the indelible 
commitment within Taiwanese socie-
ty to social progress and to coming to 
terms with Taiwan’s authoritarian past 
through openness and dialogue.
In her first year, Tsai’s govern-
ment enacted policies that carried 
forward these progressive aspirations. 
These included an apology to Taiwan’s 
indigenous peoples for four hundred 
years of dispossession, and the estab-
lishment of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to examine the legacy of 
political violence in Taiwan under 
martial law from 1949 to 1987. Tsai’s 
government also enjoyed a strengthen-
ing economy in the first year, with GDP 
growth in 2017 at 2.8 per cent — dou-
ble the 2016 figure. 
But in 2018, despite the positive 
economic news and the implemen-
tation of some of the government’s 
social agenda, her government’s for-
tunes waned. Tsai Ing-wen’s personal 
approval rating, which was as high as 
seventy per cent in the months after 
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ruled in 2017 that the current laws 
were unlawful. Furthermore, with a 
DPP majority in the legislature, the gov-
ernment also pushed through deeply 
unpopular changes to Taiwan’s labour 
laws, loosening rules on working hours 
and holidays, and exposing itself to 
accusations of hypocrisy and complic-
ity with corporate interests. Perennial 
issues like energy policy and pension 
reform have also damaged the govern-
ment, as they did the previous govern-
ment of Ma Ying-jeou. For the urban 
supporters who carried Tsai to victo-
ry, especially in the north of Taiwan, 
these failures have proved particularly 
disaffecting. 
However, as the government’s 
standing has fallen in the polls, the op-
position KMT is yet to show that it has 
returned to a credible position at the 
national level. Its local election suc-
cesses were a corrective after its crush-
ing defeats in the local and municipal 
elections in 2014, and again at the 
presidential and legislative elections in 
2016, and despite Han Kuo-yu’s win in 
the south, it has no standout candidate 
for the 2020 presidential election and 
remains mired in internal division and 
low national polling numbers. 
The political disaffection with 
Tsai and the DPP could be put down 
her election, slipped to the low thirties 
in mid-2018, with disapproval rising 
into the fifties. The polling of her Dem-
ocratic Progressive Party (DPP) hovered 
around twenty per cent approval in 
2018 as well. Another major DPP figure, 
William Lai Ching-te 赖清德, elected to 
the mayorship of Tainan city with sev-
enty-two per cent of the vote in 2014, 
and then appointed Premier in 2017, 
has also seen his personal political sup-
port decline, with fifty-three per cent 
disapproval and only thirty-seven per 
cent approval. Lai is a likely future DPP 
presidential candidate.
Voters expressed their discontent 
in emphatic terms in the November 
2018 local elections for city and district 
councils, city mayorships, and other 
public offices. The DPP conceded con-
trol of much of Taiwan’s local and city 
governments, holding only six of the 
twenty-two county and city regions. 
The DPP lost the mayorship of Kao- 
hsuing for the first time in twenty years 
when their candidate Chen Chi-mai 
陳其邁 lost to the Kuomintang’s (KMT) 
Han Kuo-yu 韓國瑜. 
Part of the malaise is due to the 
Tsai government failing to follow 
through with its most progressive 
promise, to legalise same-sex marriage, 
after Taiwan’s constitutional court 
to normal mid-term blues for a gov-
ernment with a mixed record in any 
liberal democracy. Similarly, for the 
opposition KMT, coming back from the 
lows of 2016 could take another elec-
tion cycle.
But Taiwan is not, of course, a 
normal liberal democracy. An elector-
ate that swings between extremes of 
hope and disillusionment has become 
a perennial feature of Taiwanese pol-
itics in the democratic era, and this 
expresses deeper concerns in the elec-
torate about Taiwan’s uncertain place 
in the geopolitical order. 
Tectonic forces have been shift-
ing in the region. Under Xi Jinping, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 
asserted China’s global status and pow-
er through the Belt and Road Initiative, 
United Front work, and much else, 
testing politicians and policy-makers 
around the world. Until recently, the 
world had enthusiastically accepted 
the PRC as an emerging market, rising 
power, and driver of global economic 
growth. Xi Jinping’s ambitions for a 
‘New Era’ of Communist modernisa-
tion, however, tests many of the funda-
mental precepts of the global neolib-
eral order in which European and US 
political and corporate power have set 
out the rules. 
At the same time, the US, under 
Donald Trump, has revived its tradi-
tions of nativism and isolationism. It 
has undermined or upended many of 
the institutions, conventions, and re-
ceived truths about the world order 
that had welcomed China’s entry into 
the global economy in the first decades 
of reform.
Taiwan has long sat on the fault 
lines of US and Chinese power in the 
region. As both superpowers seek to 
Dwindling power: 
approval ratings for 
the Tsai government 
have dropped as a 
result of its failure to 
follow through with 
its promise to legalise 
same-sex marriages










































remake themselves, and remake the 
world order in the process, Taiwan has 
been shaken by the shifting ground. 
Beijing has ramped up efforts to 
limit Taiwan’s international space and 
standing. In retaliation for Taiwan’s 
election of a DPP president who open-
ly resists its political pressure, Beijing 
ended the so-called diplomatic truce 
with Taipei that prevailed under the 
previous KMT government, which had 
been more accommodating towards 
the mainland. Beijing has been pre-
vailing on Taiwan’s remaining diplo-
matic allies to officially recognise the 
People’s Republic. In 2018, El Salvador 
joined Burkina Faso and the Domini-
can Republic in switching recognition 
to the PRC, adding to Sao Tome and 
Principe and Panama, who switched 
in 2017. 
The Trump administration, mean-
while, has been notably supportive 
of Taiwan. The US Taiwan Travel Act, 
passed into law in 2018, encourages 
visits by senior US government figures 
to Taiwan. As a result, a stream of US 
politicians and government officials 
have been travelling to Taiwan and 
meeting with the president. In August, 
on her way to visit two diplomatic al-
lies in Latin America, Paraguay and 
Belize, Tsai enjoyed a two-day stop-
over in the US. She spent time in Los 
Angeles and then Houston, where she 
met members of one of America’s larg-
est overseas Taiwanese communities, 
and also toured NASA’s Johnson Space 
Center. Beijing protested to Washing-
ton that the visit was a breach of the 
one-China policy. The US State Depart-
ment spokesperson Heather Nauert 
said simply that the US policy on Tai-
wan had not changed and that ‘the 
United States remains committed to 
our US one-China policy based on the 
three joint communiqués under the 
Taiwan Relations Act’. She noted that 
Tsai’s stopover was ‘largely undertak-
en out of consideration for the safety 
and comfort of those travellers.’1  
Such incidents remind Taiwanese 
voters of their place as a proxy for US–
China relations. Beijing and the US are 
Trump administration support for Taiwan in 2018
Source: Adam Fagen, Flickr
engaged in a zero-sum game of photo 
opportunities, military manoeuvres, 
and hard policy over the Taiwan is-
sue. Around the world, politicians and 
policy-makers schedule visits and 
meetings that signal their own position 
on Taiwan, and, by implication, whose 
side they take between the US and 
China.
Taiwan’s status as a hapless pawn 
in the great power politics of the region 
is a long-standing theme in Taiwanese 
accounts of their political history. It 
informs the distinctive tone of much 
modern Taiwanese cultural and public 
discourse. Taiwanese artists, writers, 
and filmmakers have long captured 
the uniqueness of life in Taiwan with 
a bittersweet tone that expresses the 
sense of powerlessness in the face of 
greater forces. 
It also has the effect of vitiating 
their democratic politics. Recognising 
the power that Washington and Beijing 
have in determining Taiwan’s future 
diminishes the liberal democratic ideal 
of a sovereign people exercising their 
deliberative choices through elections 
and the policy-making of their chosen 
representatives. The poor polling for 
both the Tsai government and the op-
position KMT is a tacit acknowledge-
ment of the limits of executive power 
in Taiwan and the impossible balance 
that a Taiwanese president must 
strike between the democratic aspira-
tions of voters and the vicissitudes of 
geopolitics. 
President Tsai’s support is weak-
ening as she attempts this impossible 
balancing act. She joins all her demo-
cratically elected predecessors from 
both sides of politics — Ma Ying-jeou 
馬英九, Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁, and 
Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 — in a struggle 
against voter dissatisfaction and dis-
appointment that derives in good part 
from forces beyond her control. 
Geopolitics affects the changing 
fortunes of its politicians. But it also 
informs the dogged commitment of 
the Taiwanese to the ideal of democra-
cy, woven so thoroughly now into the 
fabric of Taiwanese identity, and the 
enduring hold on their imaginations of 
the distinctiveness of their island soci-
ety. While voters may be disaffected by 
Taiwan’s noisy and partisan politics, 
this sense of distinctiveness continues 
to shape their political aspirations and 
hopes for their island home. Beijing, 
for all its pressure and belligerence, 

























































































IN 2018, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stepped up efforts to 
isolate Taiwan and hinder its quest 
for international recognition. Three 
countries formerly maintaining full 
diplomatic relations with the Repub-
lic of China (ROC) — the Dominican 
Republic, Burkino Faso, and El Sal-
vador — broke these ties to establish 
them with the PRC, reducing Taiwan’s 
political allies to just seventeen world-
wide. Not just a matter of chequebook 
diplomacy, this represents a spike in 
Beijing’s application of ‘sharp power’ 
— a term coined in a National Endow-
ment for Democracy report in 2017, 
and discussed in detail in chapter 2 
of the report.1 Sharp power signifies 
influence that ‘pierces, penetrates, 
or perforates the political and infor-
mation environments in the targeted 
countries’, particularly that deployed 
by authoritarian regimes to enforce 
their objectives abroad.
In the case of Taiwan, China’s 
growing use of sharp power can be 
traced to the 2016 election of Tsai 
Ing-wen’s 蔡英文 Democratic Pro-
gressive Party (DPP) government. 
The DPP won both executive and leg-
islative power, crystallising popular 
dissatisfaction with the pro-China 
Kuomintang (KMT) government. At 
the same time, ‘third force’ minor 
parties rose to prominence, present-
ing alternatives to Taiwan’s two-party 
politics. In 2018, these parties, fuelled 
by young activists’ disillusionment 
with establishment politics, prepared 
for the November elections and the 
chance to embed the politics of ‘youth 
power’ into local political structures.
S H A R P  P O W E R ,  YO U T H  P OW E R , 
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The Sunflower Student Movement 
太陽花學運 of 2014, during which stu-
dents occupied the Legislative Yuan 
and forced the government to suspend 
the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agree-
ment, was a critical moment for Tai-
wan’s civil society. (see the China Story 
Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, Forum 
‘Occupy Taiwan’, pp.136–145). Activists 
proved they could effectively mobilise 
and deploy ‘people power’ outside ei-
ther of the two major parties. From 
this movement emerged what is now 
the third-largest parliamentary party: 
the New Power Party (NPP). The NPP 
— cofounded by heavy metal vocalist, 
former chair of Amnesty Internation-
al Taiwan, and independence activist 
Freddy Lim 林昶佐 — explicitly pre-
sented itself as the direct successor of 
the youth activist movement, heralding 
a new era of politics and youth power 
that sought to transform Taiwan’s gov-
ernment into one more responsive to 
the people’s needs and wishes. 
Since the 2016 elections, the NPP 
has distanced itself from the DPP, with 
which it once cooperated against their 
common enemy, the KMT. Throughout 
2018, the NPP broke with DPP plat-
forms in both parliament and public. 
While the DPP was Taiwan’s original 
opposition party, with roots in martial 
law-era activism, it has since become 
more moderate and no longer explicit-
ly advocates Taiwanese independence. 
On paper, the NPP’s reformist agenda 
and liberal-democratic values are sim-
ilar to those of the DPP. But the NPP 
attracts both independence advocates 
and social activists disillusioned by the 
DPP. The NPP advocates progressive 
democracy fused with localisation: 
rendering Taiwan a ‘normal’ sover-
eign country, reconciling with injustic-
es of an authoritarian past, and deep-
ening transparent and participatory 
democracy.
In early January 2018, five NPP 
legislators staged a hunger strike to 
protest the DPP’s proposed amend-
ments to the Labour Standards Act 
to remove protective stipulations re-
garding workers’ time off and rest pe-
riods. They accused the DPP of being 
beholden to business interests at the 
expense of its working base. The KMT 
stood with the NPP in criticising the 
governing DPP, disconcerting some of 
the NPP’s hardcore anti-KMT support-
ers. The NPP also criticised the DPP for 
inaction on marriage equality, after 
the Constitutional Court ruled current 
marriage laws invalid in 2017. The 
NPP nevertheless supported the DPP 
government’s proposed pension re-
forms, to the ire of KMT-aligned vested 
interests. The Party thus demonstrat-
ed an issue-based approach to policy, 
rather than falling into an anti-KMT 
coalition with the DPP. Willing to chal-
lenge both major parties on issues of 
national identity and social welfare, 
the NPP positioned itself as being more 
idealistic than the pragmatic DPP.
The district elections in Novem-
ber coincided with several referen-
dums following a revision of the 
Referendum Act that took effect in 
January. The new Act significantly re-
duced thresholds required to propose 
a national ballot and the minimum 
voter turnout for a valid referendum. 
The minimum voting age for referen-
dums was also lowered to eighteen. 
A referendum was first proposed by 
Thomas Liao Wen-I 廖文毅 during the 
1940s KMT era as a means of enacting 
Taiwanese self-determination, and 
further accompanied the rise of activ-
ism in the 1980s and democratisation 
in the 1990s.2 Rather than resolving 
the question of Taiwan’s sovereign-
ty, however, referendums largely be-
came tools of KMT–DPP electioneer-
ing. The majority have failed to secure 
minimum voter turnouts, thanks to 
the parties putting up simultaneous, 
New Power Party hunger strike outside the Presidential Office Building, Taipei, January 2018. Freddy Lim can 
be seen in the far left of the picture 























































competing proposals, as well as calls 
for boycotts.3 Importantly, this year’s 
referendums were not deployed by 
either major party but by activists as 
means of direct political participation. 
Approximately half of the proposed 
referendums aimed to resolve some 
aspect of marriage equality. Supported 
by the NPP, activist groupings and in-
dividuals from the major parties, civil 
society is revitalising referendums as a 
tool of democratisation.
The changes to Taiwan’s Referen-
dum Act have lowered barriers to 
popular political participation in an 
era of youth power. Following the Sun-
flower Movement, a young generation 
of activists working from both within 
parliament and through civil society 
organisations are reframing politics 
as the concern of every citizen and not 
just the stomping grounds of privileged 
families and established organisations. 
Where the KMT opposed same-sex 
marriage and the DPP faltered, the 
NPP championed the cause. 
So what exactly is new about 
the New Power Party? In a sense, the 
spiritual successor of the DPP, it repre-
sents a new generation of Taiwanese 
activists. Although the same-sex mar-
riage referendums were voted down 
and the DPP lost significant ground in 
the 2018 elections, the NPP neverthe-
less won 16 council seats. Part of the 
continuing processes of localisation 
and democratisation, the NPP articu-
lates ‘natural independence’ 天然獨, 
advocating for a generation of Taiwan-
ese young people who embrace local 
identity and want to realign politics 
with the grassroots. Working in tan-
dem with a generational shift towards 
Taiwan-centrism as the new socio-cul-
tural norm, new politics delegitimis-
es the political hegemony of the two 
parties, the DPP and its ‘pan-green’ al-
lies versus the KMT and its ‘pan-blue’ 
supporters. Advocates of this new pol-
itics assume the contest over national 
identity has already been decided, and 
that there is a need for new thinking in 
the political sphere. Whether the NPP 
can maintain its momentum and revo-
lutionise Taiwan’s political system yet 


























































CHINA’S POWER IN AFRICA:  
RHETORIC AND REALITY
Beyongo Mukete Dynamic 
XXXX
Source: XXXX
ON 3 SEPTEMBER 2018, President Xi Jinping 
习近平 delivered a short and rousing speech at 
the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit of 
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).1 
The speech focussed on the ‘common interests’ 
and ‘shared vision’ of China and Africa, and their 
mutual responsibility to champion peace and 
development through ‘brotherly’ cooperation, and 
‘win-win’ solutions.
African leaders and Xi Jinping pose for a group photo at the 2018 
Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

























































President Xi emphasised the roles played by Chinese firms and capital in 
solving Africa’s infrastructure and industrialisation problems. He also 
announced that China will provide African countries with US$60 billion 
between 2019 and 2021, in addition to $US60 billion promised during the 
Johannesburg FOCAC Summit in 2015, to address infrastructural, trade 
and investment, manufacturing, health, and education needs across the 
continent. 
After over four decades of unprecedented economic growth, China 
has gone from being a relatively minor economic and diplomatic player in 
Africa to the region’s largest trade and investment partner.2 The most com-
mon view outside of China (including in parts of Africa) is that China is a 
neo-coloniser or neo-imperialist, epitomised by headlines such as: ‘Chi-
na’s Ugly Exploitation of Africa — and Africans’ (from The Daily Beast),3 
‘How China has created a new slave empire in Africa’ (Daily Mail),4 and 
‘China in Africa — The new Imperialist?’ (The New Yorker).5
Neocolonial interpretations of China’s activities in Africa focus on 
how it uses money to ‘buy influence’ across the continent. However, Chi-
na uses another important tool to seek influence: the narrative of ‘com-
President Cyril Ramaphosa and 
Xi Jinping at 2018 Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation
Source: Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)
mon interest’ or ‘convergence of interests’. Exploring how China uses both 
money and rhetoric to seek influence in Africa can help us move beyond 
the neocolonial debate to a more nuanced understanding of Sino-African 
relations — with Zambia and Ethiopia being cases in point. And is Sino-Af-
rican relations all win-win, as China’s official rhetoric would have us be-
lieve?
Respect, Love, and Support
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long history in Africa. After 
World War II, growing movements for independence across the African 
continent were sometimes met by harsh anti-decolonisation policies from 
colonial masters, for example the French in Algeria. Young anti-colonial 
fighters found a friend in CCP chairman Mao Zedong 毛泽东, who had po-
sitioned China as the leader of the ‘Third World’.6 Mao provided military 
assistance in the form of intelligence, weapons, training, and finance to 
anti-colonial rebels in Algeria, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, 
and Zimbabwe. This gained him respect among many young African 
nationalists.7 
In May 1955, in a fiery anti-imperialist speech at the Bandung Con-
ference in Indonesia, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 told African and 
Asian leaders that industrialisation was the sine qua non for independence 
and stability.8 He said that acknowledging their ‘shared destiny’ through eco-
nomic and diplomatic cooperation would allow them to industrialise while 
endorsing the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. 
Under Mao, China provided financial and other material aid to a num-
ber of African countries including Zambia, Tanzania, and Guinea.9 China 
built the TanZam railway between 1970 and 1975 and established numerous 
‘Friendship’-branded projects in Zambia and Guinea.10 Beijing’s efforts paid 
off: in 1971, the People’s Republic of China gained its seat at the United Na-
























































The death of Mao in September 1976, and Zhou Enlai earlier that year, 
led to a gradual change in China’s domestic and foreign policies. After 
Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 assumed the leadership in 1978, he refocussed Chi-
na’s foreign policy away from ideology and towards the economic benefits 
of bilateral relationships. Premier Zhao Ziyang’s 赵紫阳 ten-nation tour in 
1982 set the basis for new China–Africa economic, diplomatic, and cultur-
al relations, taking in countries that shared similar ideologies to China, but 
also those that did not.11 
Domestically, between 1978 and 1994, the Chinese government in-
troduced reforms to improve the efficiency of its state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and established special economic zones (SEZs) in China’s coastal 
areas. It also created the Industrial and Commercial of Bank (ICBC) and 
the Export-Import Bank of China, charging them with supporting the 
Party-state’s policies on industry, foreign trade, diplomacy, and the econ-
omy. SOEs, SEZs, and state-owned banks all play a crucial role in China’s 
quest for influence in Africa in the twenty-first century. 
Deng’s reforms triggered a period of rapid economic growth in China, 
averaging over ten per cent per annum through to the early twenty-first 
century. As China’s economy grew, its consumption of natural resources 
also increased rapidly, making China the world’s largest net importer of 
petroleum and other liquid fuels by 2013. In addition, labour costs, which 
had previously given China its cost advantage over other developing coun-
tries, rose, forcing some Chinese companies to search for lower cost pro-
duction sites abroad. This culminated in the introduction of the ‘Go Global’ 
走出去战略 policy in early 2000, which encouraged Chinese companies to 
invest abroad, acquire strategic resources, and gain a foothold in over-
seas markets.12 With its rich endowments of natural resources, a youthful 
population, and a desperate need for finance to meet infrastructural chal-
lenges, Africa seemed the perfect choice for Chinese companies seeking to 
‘Go Global’. 
In 2000, at the first FOCAC summit in Beijing, president and Party 
chairman Jiang Zemin 江泽民 told four African heads of states and other 
participants that: ‘the Chinese people and the African people both treasure 
independence, love peace and long for development and they are both im-
portant forces for world peace and common development’.13 At the third 
FOCAC summit in 2006, Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, announced a 
raft of economic measures to achieve the ‘common interests’ outlined by 
Jiang, including US$15 billion for investment, industrialisation, and the 
construction of vital infrastructure in Africa by Chinese companies.14 
Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2018 Beijing summit blended the ‘common 
interest’ narrative with the usual monetary incentives. He spoke of a long 
history and a ‘shared future’ between the 1.3 billion Chinese and 1.2 bil-
lion Africans, stating: ‘We respect Africa, love Africa, and support Africa’.15 
With so much benevolence, what could possibly go wrong? 
The ‘China of Africa’: Chinese Capital and Ethio-
pian Economic Revival 
In 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
overthrew the Communist regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. The 
leader of EPRDF, Meles Zenawi, promoted a market-oriented economy; en-
acted new labour, industrial, and investment laws; and liberalised Ethio-

























































pia’s currency exchange regime. Zenawi’s goal was to transform Ethiopia’s 
agrarian economy into an industrial one. Ethiopia’s per capita GDP was 
just US$390 in 1991 — making it one of the poorest countries in the world 
at that time. The Ethiopian government followed China’s lead in making 
the state a key player in the country’s economy, while also relying on for-
eign direct investment as a source of capital and expertise.16 
In October 1995, facing criticism from the west over the EPRDF’s au-
thoritarian, anti-democratic policies, Meles Zenawi visited China ‘to learn 
from China’s practice of market-led socialism and agricultural develop-
ment’.17 Jiang Zemin reciprocated with a visit in May 1996. While Ethio-
pia was looking for capital, China sought diplomatic support and access to 
emerging African markets. Ai Ping 戴平, Chinese ambassador to Ethiopia 
from 2001–2004, noted in 2005 that: ‘[Ethiopia] plays a very unique and 
important role in both the sub-region [the Horn of Africa] and the con-
tinent as a whole’.18 Ethiopia also hosts the headquarters of the African 
Union, which plays a strategic role in African economic and foreign policy. 
Meles Zenawi said in 2006 at the FOCAC summit in Beijing, that contra-
ry to Western media views of China in Africa as ‘The Looting Machine.’19 
‘China is not looting Africa … [and the] Chinese transformation disproved 
the pessimistic attitude that ‘if you are poor once, you are likely to be poor 
forever’ .20 
Chinese shoe-manufacturing 
company Huajian’s factory 
in Ethiopia 
Source: UNIDO, Flickr
With Western democracies hesitant to invest in an increasingly au-
thoritarian Ethiopia, Chinese firms became key players in the develop-
ment of the country’s infrastructure, energy, and manufacturing.21 In 
2006, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced a plan to build six eco-
nomic zones in five African countries. Qiyuan, a privately owned Chinese 
steel-manufacturing company, expressed interest in building an SEZ in 
Dukem, Oromia state, thirty kilometres from Addis Ababa.22 
Despite financial challenges during its early years, the Eastern Indus-
trial Zone (EIZ), as it is now called, is considered one of Ethiopia’s economic 
success stories.23 In 2011, the giant Chinese shoe-manufacturing company, 
Huajian, which makes shoes for international brands such as Guess, Cal-
vin Klein, and Ivanka Trump, opened a factory in the EIZ. The company, 
in partnership with the China-Africa Development Fund, a private equity 
facility promoting Chinese investment in the continent, has promised to 
invest US$2 billion in Ethiopia before 2022.24 By 2017, according to Sher-
ry Zhang, the General Manager of Huajian, the company was employing 
4,200 Ethiopians.25 The EIZ is a good example of how Chinese capital can 
promote manufacturing in Ethiopia while allowing Chinese companies ac-
cess to cheap labour and land. 
China also finances key energy projects in Ethiopia. In 2006, the Ethi-
opian government signed a contract with Italian company Salini Impre-
gilo to build a 1,870 megawatt hydroelectric dam.26 Although the African 
Development Bank and the World Bank denied funding for the dam in the 
face of protests from environmental groups, the Ethiopian government 
viewed the project as crucial for addressing the country’s poor electric-
ity supply: the dam was projected to increase Ethiopia’s energy capacity 
by eighty-five per cent. The ICBC stepped up to provide US$400 million to 
complete the controversial project.27
China has built several other dams in Ethiopia, including the Tekeze 
hydroelectric dam and the Gibe II and IV dams. Because of these and other 
investments, Ethiopia is now a net electricity exporter, with the cheap-
























































US$250 million from electricity exports in 2019 — a figure projected to 
reach US$1 billion by 2023.28 
At the same time, these investments have exacerbated Ethiopia’s debt 
problems. China has reportedly lent over US$14.1 billion to Ethiopia since 
2000.29 In early 2018, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) raised Ethio-
pia’s debt distress level to ‘high’.30 In September 2018, reporters at Reuters 
quoted the Chinese mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa: ‘The in-
tensifying repayment risks from the Ethiopian government’s debt reach-
ing 59 per cent of GDP is worrying investors’.31 As the Financial Times put 
it in June 2018, even some Chinese diplomats in Addis Ababa agreed that 
China had loaned too much.32 
Yet Chinese capital has helped make Ethiopia one of Africa’s fastest 
growing economies, averaging more than eight per cent GDP growth in 
the last two decades, as well as a viable manufacturing hub for top for-
eign manufacturers. In May of 2018, Bloomberg published an article ti-
tled ‘Ethiopia Already Is the “China of Africa” ’, with the lede: ‘They share 
fast growth, a strong national history and a sense that the future will be 
great’.33 Unless, as the article points out, a debt crisis does not destroy the 
economy first.
Ethiopian officials, meanwhile, continued to lavish praise on China 
for its contribution to the country’s development. During a meeting with 
Xi Jinping in Beijing in September 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed called 
China ‘a reliable friend’ whose ‘precious assistance’ had been crucial to 
Ethiopia’s economic restructuring and development.34 
China in Zambia: Infrastructure for Resources?
Zambia gained independence from the United Kingdom in October 1964. 
A year later, it was among the first African countries to establish diplo-
matic ties with China. Seven months after that, in response to Zambia’s 
condemnation of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe), Ian Smith’s 
Rhodesian government cut 
Zambia’s access to the sea 
by blocking the Rhodesian 
railway line that connects 
Zambia to Beitbridge, South 
Africa, through Harare, Zim-
babwe.35 
This led Zambia’s first 
president, Kenneth Kaunda, 
and his Tanzanian counter-
part, Julius Nyerere, to welcome, in April 1967, Beijing’s offer to fund a 
US$405 million railway linking Zambia’s resource-rich Copperbelt to the 
Tanzanian seaport of Dar es Salaam.36 China agreed to build the 1,860km 
single-track line, now called the TanZam, Uhuru, or TAZARA Railway, 
completing the project in 1975. Chinese leaders today refer to the TAZARA 
as the foundation for a ‘new’ Sino-Zambian relations that put economics 
first.37
Poor management of its copper resources by successive governments 
combined with fluctuations in international copper prices, however, to 
make the country one of the poorest in the world by the mid-eighties. In 
1990, under the auspices of the World Bank and IMF, the Zambian gov-
ernment started privatising its loss-making state-owned copper mining 
companies, selling to mainly foreign multinational companies.38 A Chinese 
SOE, China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Company (CNMC), was the first to 
buy a copper mine — the Chambishi Copper Smelter — under the priva-
tisation scheme. The company bought the mine in 1998 for US$20 million 
through its subsidiary Non-Ferrous China Africa (NFCA).39 
According to China–Africa expert Christina Alves, NFCA approached 
the Zambian government in 2004 with the idea of building an SEZ within 
CNMC’s mining licence area in Chambishi.40 In 2006, China’s Ministry of 
Commerce approved NFCA’s bid to build the Zambia-China Economic & 

























































Trade Cooperation Zone — Zambia’s first Multi-Facility Economic Zone. 
This was also China’s first economic zone in Africa. Alves has argued: ‘The 
project emerged from converging interests on both sides: China’s interest 
in Zambia’s copper reservoirs and Lusaka’s desire to develop a manufac-
turing base around its mining sector’.41 Both Chinese and Zambian elites 
cite this project to support Beijing’s narrative of win-win partnerships.42 
In 2017, Zambia was Africa’s second-largest producer of copper, be-
hind the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite several Zambian gov-
ernments exploring ways to diversify the country’s economy, copper still 
accounted for sixty-three per cent of its foreign exchange earnings as of 
2017.43 Yet almost three out of four Zambians lived on less than US$3.20 a 
day.44 Zambia faces pressing social and economic problems, such as poor 
electricity supply, with the state-owned ZESCO (Zambia Electricity Supply 
Corporation) unable to provide full-time electricity supply to most parts of 
Zambia, including the capital, Lusaka.
In Zambia, as in Ethiopia, the Chinese government has stepped in to 
invest in energy production. In November 2015, the Zambian government 
initiated the construction of a 750 megawatt hydroelectric power station 
on the Kafue River in the southern Chikankata district, ninety kilometres 
from Lusaka.45 The Kafue Gorge Lower will become the country’s third 
Kafue Gorge Lower
Source: Nicola Saporiti, IFC
biggest hydropower station and will cost US$2 billion at its scheduled 2019 
completion. SINOZAM, the company building the hydropower station, is 
owned by the Chinese state-owned hydropower engineering and construc-
tion company Sinohydro. China Export-Import Bank and the ICBC will pro-
vide fifty per cent of the funding for the project through Sinohydro; ZESCO 
and CAD Fund are providing the rest. The Zambian government intends 
for the dam to help solve Zambia’s electricity problems, as well as generate 
foreign revenue through exports of electricity to neighbouring countries. 
Notwithstanding the positive contribution Chinese capital has had 
on Zambia’s economy, particularly in funding vital infrastructure, crit-
ics point to a mounting debt crisis, as in Ethiopia, on 3 September 2018, 
while the Zambian President, Edgar Lungu, was meeting with other Afri-
can heads of state and Xi Jinping at the Beijing FOCAC summit, the British 
newspaper Africa Confidential published a sensational story on the detri-
mental impact of Chinese loans on Zambia.46 According to the newspaper, 
the Zambian government spends US$500 million of the public budget fi-
nancing Chinese loans at the expense of much needed social and economic 
development programs. The article describes Chinese loans as a ‘cunning’ 
device used by Beijing to indebt poor countries and gain control over their 
strategic assets. It claims that China has used Zambia’s debt to gain owner-
ship of ZESCO and Zambia’s National Broadcasting Corporation. 
The article reflects widespread perceptions about China in Africa. 
But, as Deborah Bräutigam points out so clearly in her book Will China 
Feed Africa?, such media stories should be taken with ‘a grain of salt’. For 
example, this article claimed that over seventy-four per cent of Zambia’s 
debt is owed to China. However, Zambia’s Minister of Finance Margaret 
Manakatwe, stated in response to the article that Zambia’s total foreign 
debt accruing to China is actually less than one-quarter of the country’s to-
tal debt, adding that ‘The Zambian Government has not offered any state-
owned enterprise to any lender as collateral for any borrowing’.47 
In Beijing in March 2015, President Lungu told Xi Jinping that China’s 
























































Zambia’s independence as well as its economic and social development ... 
[has] won the hearts of the [Zambian] people’.48 But he didn’t speak for all 
hearts. 
Zambians are not just passive recipients of Chinese aid and invest-
ment. In 2005, after an explosion in a Chinese mine in Chambishi killed 
fifty-two Zambians, there were protests in 2006, and the Zambian gov-
ernment responded by strengthening its workplace safety and labour 
standards.49 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Zambia also step 
in where the government has failed. I have written in my doctoral thesis 
how, after unearthing evidence that NFCA and its subsidiary Chambishi 
Copper Smelter (as well as Western companies) were flouting Zambia’s en-
vironmental standards, environmental NGOs, Citizens for Better Environ-
ment, and the Zambia Institute for Environmental Management pushed 
both the Zambian government and Chinese companies to improve their 
environmental standards and regulations.50 The point is that Chinese (and 
other foreign) investment is certainly not always ‘win-win’ for all Zambia, 
but both the Zambian government and its citizens do have agency in deal-
ing with contentious issues as they arise.
Conclusion
The massive transformation that has occurred domestically in the past 
four decades, combined with Beijing’s decision to ‘Go Global’ since the 
turn of this millennium, have made China a global financer of foreign 
investment and infrastructure projects. In Africa, China has built roads, 
railways, bridges, dams, SEZs, and the African Union Headquarters to gain 
access to the region’s growing markets and vast energy and other resourc-
es, as well as to cement strong cultural and diplomatic relations. But it 
is not just about money. Both the journalistic and academic literature on 
Sino-African relations tends to overlook the appeal of China’s Africa nar-
rative of ‘common interest’, partnership’, and ‘friendship’. 
Beijing’s ability to marshal both narrative and financial resources to 
gain influence in Africa is yielding good results for China, at least in the 
case of Zambia and Ethiopia. Both Zambian and Ethiopian leaders have 
expressed ‘sincere gratitude’ for China’s contribution to their countries’ 
development. 
Serious questions remain, however, about the short-term and longer 
term consequences of these contributions, including the burden of debt 
and imbalances in trade. Some Chinese companies (and Western ones as 
well) stand accused, too, of poor treatment of workers and lax environ-
mental standards. Much will depend on how African governments evolve 
their own regulatory and legal institutions, and facilitate the agency of 
their citizens to address these problems. The case of Zambia gives some 
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BIG THINGS ARE happening in the tiny African nation of Djibouti. A 
poor country roughly the size of Bel-
gium, Djibouti sits on the Gulf of Aden 
— a critical corridor for international 
shipping and security operations in 
an important but unstable neighbour-
hood. With few other natural assets be-
sides its location, and twenty-three per 
cent of its population living in extreme 
poverty, Djibouti has turned to renting 
land to foreign armies of various flags 
to generate income. It hosts no less than 
eight foreign military forces — France, 
Italy, Japan, Germany, Spain, Saudi Ara-
bia, the United States, and China.
China’s establishment of its first 
overseas base in Djibouti in 2017 made 
international headlines. Djibouti has 
received billions of dollars in finance 
from China in recent years, fuelling 
concerns about ‘rogue aid’ (a term to 
describe non-transparent and self-
interested aid to the developing world)1 
and debt traps that could cripple 
Djibouti’s development. 
Similar concerns have been 
raised about China’s activities in the 
Pacific. In January 2018, Australia’s 
then minister for international 
development, Concetta Fierravanti-
Wells, ignited a diplomatic row when 
she criticised China for building 
‘white elephants’, ‘useless buildings’, 
and ‘roads to nowhere’ in the Pacific.2 
In April, rumours that China was in 
negotiations for a military base in 
Vanuatu prompted accusations that 
the true aim of Beijing’s largesse in the 
Pacific — more than USD$1.7 billion 
invested since 20063 — was to gain a 
military foothold in the region.
C H I N A’ S  B A S E  I N  D J I B O U T I : 


















































Yet alarmist narratives about 
‘rogue aid’, whether in the Pacific 
or Africa, ignore the geoeconomic 
underpinnings of China’s aid 
program. China is adept at converting 
development-minded investment 
dollars into geopolitical power and 
influence. While Western donors, 
whatever their underlying motivations, 
have traditionally adopted a language 
of altruism when speaking of aid, 
China’s leadership speaks of ‘equality 
and mutual benefit’ 平等互利 — a 
‘win-win’ philosophy that has been the 
bedrock of China’s foreign policy and 
aid agenda in Africa and elsewhere 
since the 1970s.4 
China’s base in Djibouti is a perfect 
example. It is a strategic launching pad 
for the ‘protection of distant seas’ 远海
护卫 — an official doctrine of China’s 
naval strategy from 2015. It describes 
the navy’s responsibility to secure access 
to vital seas lanes and protect Chinese 
citizens and investments abroad.5 The 
Djibouti base helps to safeguard US$1 
billion worth of Chinese exports to 
Europe and five million barrels of crude 
oil imports, most of which pass through 
the Gulf of Aden. It also supports 
China’s peacekeeping and counter-
piracy missions, and would enable the 
evacuation of any of the estimated one 
million Chinese living in the Middle East 
and Africa, should the need arise.6
On Djibouti’s side of the ledger, 
Chinese assistance is supporting its 
ambitions to become ‘the Singapore 
of Africa’.7 China’s lease for the base 
will earn Djibouti US$20 million per 
year over twenty years. Other forms of 
assistance not ostensibly tied to basing 
China’s first military 




rights also sweeten the deal. China has 
pledged an estimated US$14 billion for 
infrastructure development since 2015, 
including for railways, airports, and 
ports.8 Chinese firms are also building 
and financing the Djibouti International 
Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ) — set to be the 
largest in Africa.
Chinese grants finance projects 
including schools, hospitals, libraries, 
childcare centres, and sports facilities. 
Yet not all Chinese money flowing into 
Djibouti can be categorised as ‘aid’. 
What China pays for its Djibouti base 
is rent. China expects its investment in 
the DIFTZ to be profitable, particularly 
for its state-owned operator, China 
Merchants Group. As for Chinese 
infrastructure loans, some have been 
offered at concessional rates while 
others are commercial loans with more 
stringent conditions.9 
This combination of aid with 
more commercially oriented financing 
is a key feature of China’s geoeconomic 
playbook. China deliberately mixes aid, 
direct investment, service contracts, 
labour cooperation, and trade deals to 
maximise the viability and flexibility of 
its assistance. China is uniquely placed 
to deploy a wider range of economic 
tools because of its government’s 
ability to control outbound investment 
and direct its state-owned enterprises 
and development banks to cultivate 
strategic partners.
As China’s economic might grows, 
so too does its asymmetric power 
relationship with other countries. In 
just two years, Djibouti’s public debt 
has ballooned from fifty to eighty-
five per cent of GDP, and is expected 
to reach 87.5 per cent of GDP in 2018 





















































low-income economies.10 Chinese 
loans for an Ethiopia–Djibouti water 
pipeline and railway alone amount to 
half of Djibouti’s annual GDP. Despite 
warnings from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) that Djibouti will 
struggle to service its massive debts, 
the country continues to borrow from 
China. Other development banks and 
donors have been reluctant to finance 
Djibouti’s infrastructure needs. In 
2016, Chinese loans to Djibouti were 
about twice the combined value 
of loans from the World Bank, the 
African Development Bank, Arab 
countries, the European Union, and 
other funders.11
Djibouti’s President, Ismail Omar 
Guelleh, says warnings about debt 
traps do not change the practical 
realities of Djibouti’s economic 
calculation:
The IMF has dispatched no less 
than three missions to tell us not 
to sign with China under the pre-
text of excessive indebtedness. 
What did it offer us in exchange? 
Nothing. Between this allegedly 
virtuous nothing and the develop-
ment of vital infrastructures, my 
decision was quickly made.12 
Djibouti’s future is now more tied to 
China than to any other partner that 
operates a base in its territory. Debt 
could leave it beholden to China and 
compromise its ability to accommo-
date other foreign military bases. 
China’s promises of development as-
sistance may prove hollow, with only 
ten per cent of the US$14 billion it has 
pledged for infrastructure investment 
actually committed. But Djibouti has 
few choices. And that means in the 
win-win situation between Djibouti 
































































CHINA’S EXPANDING presence in Africa is a topic of great interest — 
and often consternation — in African 
and non-African countries alike. West-
ern news outlets in particular have 
spent considerable energy reporting 
on China’s increasing influence and 
power on the African continent, with 
commentators suggesting that China 
is playing a strategic game to displace 
Western hegemony.1 Chinese Pres-
ident Xi Jinping’s flagship Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) has become more 
concrete and expanded rapidly in re-
cent years — now including projects in 
71 countries and investments totalling 
more than US$210 billion.2 At the same 
time, reporting on China in Africa 
has increasingly taken a more urgent 
C H I N E S E  E N G A G E M E N T  I N 
A F R I C A :  F R A G M E N T E D  P O W E R 
A N D  G H A N A I A N  G O L D
Nicholas Loubere 
tone, replete with dire warnings of 
debt-trap development and new colo-
nialism with Chinese characteristics.3 
The dominant narrative in foreign 
media depicts China’s presence in Af-
rica (and, by implication, elsewhere) 
as ominous — a vision that sociologist 
Ching Kwan Lee has termed ‘the spec-
tre of global China’.4 
This narrative presupposes a 
monolithic China unwaveringly push-
ing forward a unified and coherent 
global strategy and accords with other 
common views of the all-encompass-
ing, top-down power of the Chinese 
Party-state. While this narrative may 
be useful for selling newspapers, and 
is rooted in the undeniable fact that 































































on the world stage, it fails to capture 
the complex behaviour and history 
of ‘global China’. Historically, China’s 
global presence has been a bottom-up 
and spontaneous affair, characterised 
by waves of migration sparked by 
economic opportunity abroad (gold 
mining, for example) or disturbanc-
es at home (the violence of the nine-
teenth-century Taiping Rebellion for 
instance), and facilitated by networks 
at the village or town level. This has re-
sulted in Chinese communities world-
wide that have tended to pursue their 
own interests, rather than those of 
‘China’ writ large. 
Even where Chinese people and 
industries have moved into Africa to-
day in conjunction with the goals of 
the Chinese state, they generally fit this 
mould rather than one of a coherent 
and centrally directed engagement. 
Studies on Chinese communities in Af-
rica have often found that ‘the Chinese 
in Africa’ are far from a united group 
that takes direct orders from their 
government. Instead, most of China’s 
involvement with African economies 
and peoples is shaped by fragmented 
and divergent groups of Chinese peo-
ple, many being small-scale entrepre-
neurs, who have little communication 
with each other, and even less with 
representatives of the Chinese govern-
ment. They are also operating in a vast 
and highly diverse continent, making 
it virtually impossible to generalise 
about their experiences or the out-
comes of their activities.5 
An illustrative example of the 
diversified, spontaneous, and uncoor-
dinated Chinese involvement in Afri-
ca is the ongoing gold rush in Ghana. 
Starting from around 2006, between 
50,000 and 70,000 residents of a single, 
officially designated ‘poverty-stricken 
county’ 贫困县 in the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region began migrating 
to rural Ghana to engage in alluvial 
gold mining.6 These fortune seekers 
have no connection to, or sanction 
from, the Chinese government, even 
at the local level. Rather, this mass mi-
gration is an outgrowth of the primary 
local vocation — the unceasing search 
for alluvial gold mining opportunities 
locally in Guangxi, elsewhere in China, 
and, when there is no gold to be had 
closer to home, globally. While many 
of the migrants are poor, they pool 
resources and borrow capital — from 
both formal and informal sources — 
to buy airfares and finance the other 
expenses related to their quests for 
gold. The county’s history of engaging 
in alluvial gold mining is long enough 
that it has now become both part of the 
local identity, and an important aspect 
of the local economy. There are two 
factories producing technologically 
advanced dredging equipment in the 
county. These machines are purchased 
by local miners and shipped to Ghana 
and elsewhere in the world.7 
The arrival of tens of thousands 
of Chinese nationals on tourist visas 
mining for gold — despite laws passed 
in 2006 specifying that only Ghana-
ians are permitted to engage in this 
activity — has fundamentally trans-
formed local economic and political 
conditions in some parts of Ghana, and 
back in China as well. Like gold rushes 
throughout history, this event has pro-
duced boomtowns with new markets, 
and shifted local constellations of pow-
er. Some of the Chinese miners have 
become extremely rich. They employ 
both Chinese and Ghanaian workers, 
and sell gold to local middlemen who 
transfer funds directly to accounts 
back in China. Successful miners gen-
erally form partnerships with local 
entrepreneurs, tribal leaders, and gov-
ernment officials once they arrive in 
Ghana and identify a potentially lucra-
tive mining location. They have then 
funnelled money (often corruptly) into 
local pockets, both reinforcing existing 
power structures, and shifting power 
and influence to people who previ-
ously had none.8 Successful miners 
and their families have been able to 
invest in businesses and real estate in 
first-tier cities and become part of the 
emerging cohort of wealthy Chinese 
urbanites. 
The gold rush has also caused new 
fractures and fissures within Ghana’s 
society and high politics. Tensions have 
arisen between individual Ghanaian 
and Chinese people, as well as between 
Accra, the Ghanaian capital, and Bei-
jing. The introduction of new technol-
ogy to scale up the extraction of gold 
has resulted in a host of deleterious 
environmental impacts — rendering 
fields barren, contaminating drinking 
water, and ultimately destroying the 
livelihoods of many poor and margin-
China’s official strategy in Ghana is being 
undermined by the gold rush 































































al Ghanaians. This has resulted in sig-
nificant backlash against the miners, 
including armed conflict leading to in-
juries and even death.9 It has also elic-
ited a formal government response, 
with former president Mahama form-
ing a taskforce of military and police 
officers to raid mining camps and de-
port illegal miners in 2013. Since then, 
there has been a series of attempts to 
push the Chinese miners out of the 
country through arrests, deportations, 
and the destruction of equipment. In 
early 2017, the Ghanaian government 
imposed a full moratorium on alluvial 
mining for both foreigners and locals; 
this was still in place in 2018.10  
The gold rush has undermined 
China’s official strategy in Ghana, 
which centres around large invest-
ments in formally approved projects. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese miners de-
mand official assistance whenever 
there is a crackdown, forcing Chinese 
officials to walk a tightrope: assist-
ing their citizens while urging them 
to stop engaging in illegal behaviour 
that damages the image of China 
in Africa.11 
Ultimately, the Chinese gold rush 
in Ghana, like so many stories of China 
in Africa, does not fit the narrative of 
a powerful monolithic Chinese state. It 
is, instead, the story of dispersed and 
fragmented power relations charac-
terised by relatively marginal groups 
engaging with each other in spaces 
marked by postcolonial geographies, 
neoliberal globalisation, and new mo-
bilities — all under the spectre of an 
increasingly global China.
The ongoing gold rush 
in Ghana is a major 
drawcard for Chinese 
miners looking to get rich 
quick






























































TOWARDS A ‘WORLD CLASS’  
MILITARY: REFORMING THE PLA  
UNDER XI JINPING
Zhang Jian
ON 1 AUGUST 2018, the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) celebrated its ninety-first birthday. From 
its humble beginnings as a peasant army, the PLA 
has become one of the most powerful armed forces 
in the world. Under Xi Jinping’s 习近平 watch, the 
Chinese military has greatly accelerated the drive 
towards modernisation that started under Deng 
Xiaoping 邓小平 in 1978. In 2016, the PLA embarked 
on the most sweeping and radical military reforms 
in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Three years on, it is a good time to take stock of both 
the PLA’s achievements and the challenges it faces 
in its transformation to a ‘world class’ military.
Aircraft carrier Liaoning on display in the maritime parade con-
ducted by the People’s Liberation Army Navy in the South China 
Sea on the morning of 12 April 2018



























































In early March 2018, at the annual assembly of the National People’s Con-
gress (NPC), China announced that its defence budget would increase by 
8.1 per cent, taking total defence spending in 2018 to 1.1 trillion yuan 
(US$175 billion) — second only to the United States, which would spend 
US$692 billion in the 2018 fiscal year. Despite China’s weakening econom-
ic growth, this was the largest increase in three years, following a rise of 
7.5 per cent in 2016 and seven per cent in 2017. In his report to the NPC, 
Premier Li Keqiang 李克强 stated that ‘faced with profound changes in the 
national security environment, we must treat the Party’s goal of building 
stronger armed forces for the New Era as our guide’ and ‘stick to the Chi-
nese path in strengthening our armed forces’ so as to ‘firmly and resolv-
edly safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests’.1 
The NPC meeting also approved the establishment of a new Minis-
try of Veterans Affairs (MVA) amid an overall downsizing of the Central 
Government, which saw the number of ministerial-level bodies being cut 
by eight and vice-ministerial level ones by seven. This overhaul of the 
Central Government not only sought to improve administrative efficien-
cy, but also reflected shifting policy priorities. For example, in contrast 
to the establishment of new agencies such as the MVA, the once powerful 
National Health and Family Planning Commission was dismantled due to 
A still from a 2018 recruitment video from the PLA: the main slogan reads ‘I am a Chinese soldier’
Source: YouTube
the relaxation of China’s population control 
policy. According to China’s official Xinhua 
News Agency, the creation of the MVA was 
intended to ‘protect the legitimate rights 
and interests of military personnel and 
their families’ and ‘make military service 
an occupation that enjoys public respect’.2 
Being a member of the PLA was a socially 
privileged occupation during the Maoist 
era, when its soldiers not only enjoyed high 
social esteem as Party-advocated role models for society, but also had ac-
cess to preferential welfare benefits and post-service career opportunities 
that were not available to the ordinary people. However, this changed in 
the post-Mao reform era. With the marketisation of the Chinese economy 
providing many new opportunities for social advancement and wealth 
creation, not only has the social status of military personnel declined sig-
nificantly, but also the re-employment of demobilised military personnel 
has become an increasingly challenging social problem, making military 
service a much less esteemed occupation than before. The creation of the 
MVA reflects the Chinese government’s unprecedented effort to reverse 
the trend.
On 12 April, President Xi Jinping personally presided over a massive 
Chinese naval parade held in the South China Sea — the largest display 
of naval power in the history of the PRC. The parade involved 48 modern 
surface and underwater warships; 76 advanced military aircrafts; more 
than 10,000 troops; and China’s first aircraft carrier battle group, the Li-
aoning. Xi delivered a speech after the parade, declaring that ‘in the course 
of the struggle for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we have 
never had such a pressing need to build a strong navy’.3 Official Chinese 
media reported that more than half of the modern warships displayed in 
the parade had come into service since 2012, when Xi first became Party 
chairman and state president. 




























































The PLA has been engaged in a sustained modernisation program for 
more than three decades. Since Xi came to power, however, the pace and 
scope of military modernisation has intensified and broadened substan-
tially. Seeing a ‘strong military dream’ 强军梦 as an indispensable part of 
his ‘China Dream’ 中国梦 of national rejuvenation, Xi has made strength-
ening China’s military power a top policy priority. 
‘A New Historical Starting Point’
On 24 November 2015, at a three-day Central Military Commission (CMC) 
working conference on military reform, Xi announced the most radical 
and comprehensive reform program of the PLA since 1949, asserting that 
‘with China currently being at the crucial stage of progressing from a large 
country to a strong power, the building of national defence and the mili-
tary is at a new historical starting point’.4  
Following Xi’s announcement, on 1 January 2016, the CMC released its 
‘Opinion on Deepening National Defence and Military Reform’《关于深化
国防和军队改革的意见》.  It stated that the new reform program sought to 
remove the ‘institutional obstacles, structural contradictions and policy 
problems’ that had thwarted the development of China’s national defence 
and military power. Central to the reform is modernising the PLA’s organ-
isational structure to ‘further unleash its combat effectiveness’. 
The agenda for reform in the Opinion covered almost every aspect 
of PLA affairs, including: the military leadership system; joint operations 
command structure; the scale, structure, and composition of the military 
forces; military training, education, and recruitment; policy; integration of 
civilian and military defence R&D and industry; restructuring the People’s 
Armed Police; and the military legal system. The Opinion demanded that, 
by 2020, the PLA should make ‘breakthrough progress’ in restructuring 
its leadership system and joint operations command system, and achieve 
‘significant progress’ in optimising the scale and structure of its forces, 
improving its system of policy-making, and deepening civil–military 
integration. 
The fundamental goal of the reform program, as stated in the CMC’s 
Opinion, is to build a strong national defence and a powerful military, 
compatible with China’s international status and national security and de-
velopment interests, so as to provide ‘rock-solid power guarantee’ for the 
‘realisation of the two centenary goals5 and the China Dream of the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’.6 Inspecting a military parade on 30 
July 2017 — the day before the PLA’s ninetieth anniversary — Xi declared 
that: ‘Today, we are closer to the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chi-
nese nation than any other time in history, and we need to build a strong 
people’s military more than any other time in history’.7 
The importance of military modernisation was further highlighted 
in Xi’s Nineteenth Party Congress report in 2017, in which he devoted 
a full section to the subject of military reform and national defence 
modernisation. Urging that the military ‘must be up to shouldering the 
missions and tasks of the New Era entrusted to them by the Party and 
the people’, Xi announced that the PLA should complete mechanisation 
and make major progress in informationisation by 2020, achieve basic 
completion of the modernisation of the national defence and armed forces 
by 2035, and be ‘fully transformed’ into a ‘world-class’ military by the 
middle of the twenty-first century.8 
To Fight and Win 
The reforms implemented under Xi Jinping have achieved fundamental, 
even revolutionary, changes to systems in place for nearly seven decades. 
Most significant of these has been the complete overhaul of the PLA’s 
leadership system at the top level. Under what was dubbed ‘above-the-
neck’ 脖子以上 reform, four previously powerful, colossal CMC General 



























































ment, General Logistics Department, and General Armaments Department 
— were dissolved and replaced by fifteen smaller but more functionally 
specific departments, commissions, and offices. 
The restructuring concentrates power in the CMC itself and, in par-
ticular, its chairman — Xi himself. The powerful and clumsy departments 
had previously run PLA affairs in an increasingly and, to the top brass, 
unacceptably autonomous manner. Under the new arrangement, the CMC 
and its chairman take more direct charge of PLA affairs. The dissolved 
departments were also largely army-dominated institutions unsuitable for 
guiding modern joint operations. This is most clearly illustrated by the re-
placement of the General Staff Department, which was primarily an army 
institution, with a new CMC Joint Staff Department 联合参谋部, which 
consists of staff from all services. 
The second major radical change is the establishment of a two-level 
joint combat operation command system befitting the needs of modern 
warfare. At the regional level, five new joint Theatre Commands (TCs) re-
place seven Military Regions (MRs). The Central, Northern, Eastern, South-
ern, and Western TCs will command joint combat operations during war-
time in their geographic areas. There are two critical differences between 
the new TCs and the old MRs. First, while the MRs were largely in charge of 
army units, with little authority over other services, the TCs enjoy absolute 
operational command over all services within their jurisdictions. Second, 
whereas the MRs had wide-ranging administrative responsibilities includ-
ing military training and force development, the TCs’s sole responsibility 
is to command joint operations in combat, leaving force building and oth-
er administrative duties to the respective services. 
At the central level, a new CMC Joint Operations Command Centre 
now acts as the highest commanding authority of the PLA operations, both 
at war and during peacetime. Xi himself holds the position of the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Joint Operations Command Centre, supported by 
the newly established Joint Staff Department. 
The reforms have also fundamentally changed the roles of individ-
ual PLA services. The services are now essentially administrative, focus-
sing on peacetime force development, training, and capability building. 
In 2018, the PLA had a new command and control system defined by the 
principle of ‘the Central Military Commission in charge of overall military 
affairs, Theatre Commands in charge of wartime joint operations, and ser-
vices in charge of force development’ 军委管总, 战区主战, 军种主建.
Lean and Powerful 
In addition to the radical restructuring discussed above, the last three 
years have seen significant changes made to the scale and structure of the 
Chinese military. The goal is to transform the PLA from a military of quan-
tity to one of quality, and from a manpower-intensive to a technology- 
intensive military. 
These changes move the PLA further away from the ‘Big Army’ 大陆军 
mentality inherited from the Maoist era, which has been dominant since 
1949. The establishment of a separate PLA Army headquarters brings the 
Army into equal status with other services. The Second Artillery Corps 
(China’s missile and nuclear force), meanwhile, has risen to the status of 
China’s military leadership
Source: Annual  



























































an independent service — the PLA Rocket Force — which stands alongside 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. A new Strategic Support Force (with a ser-
vice-equivalent status, though not formally a separate service) provides 
integrated cyberspace, space, and electronic-magnetic warfare support 
for joint operations. Finally, the newly established Joint Logistics Support 
Force will provide efficient, central coordination covering the previously 
fragmented service and military region-based logistical support systems. 
The PLA has also demobilised 300,000 personnel since 2016 — reduc-
ing the number of troops and personnel from 2.3 million to two million 
— mostly from the ground forces. In 2018, for the first time since 1949, 
the army’s share in the PLA has dropped below fifty per cent, while those 
of the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force have expanded. This reflects the 
CMC’s assessment of China’s changing security environment; the increas-
ing importance of the maritime, space, and cyber domains in (possible) 
future wars; and the need to defend China’s expanding overseas interests. 
China’s last Defence White Paper, in 2015, called on the PLA to aban-
don its ‘traditional mentality’ of attaching more importance to land than 
sea, noting that ‘great importance has to be attached to managing the seas 
and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests’. It stated explic-
itly that ‘in line with the evolving form of war and national security situa-
tion’, China would focus on preparing to win ‘informationised local wars’ 
and ‘maritime military struggles’.9 
The reduction in forces also reduces the proportion of non-combat 
personnel through the amalgamation and dissolution of various adminis-
trative agencies, military arts and cultural units, and educational institu-
tions. Significantly, the reform also demands that by the end of 2018 the 
PLA should stop all so-called ‘Paid for Services’ 有偿服务 provided to the 
general public. The PLA entered into the business sector when China’s eco-
nomic reforms started in 1978, in part driven by the low defence budget 
at the time. However, in 1998, under then Chinese leader, Jiang Zemin 江
泽民, the military was banned from most of its business activities, due to 
grave concerns of rampant corruption associated with those activities. 
However, military-run institutions such as hospitals, schools, hotels, pub-
lishing-houses, and cultural and sports units, have been allowed to contin-
ue to provide some fifteen types of Paid for Services to the general public. 
The latest reforms push for a complete divesture of the PLA from any of 
these remaining commercial activities, with the dual aims of focussing the 
military’s attention on improving its fighting capability and preventing 
corruption. 
Still under Party Command 
While improving the PLA’s combat capability for contemporary warfare 
has been a top priority over the last three years, for Xi Jinping, strengthen-
ing the Party’s and his own personal control over the military is an equal, 
if not more important agenda. The Party (not the state) has commanded 
the military since the Red Army days. (The Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Red Army was founded in 1927; the ‘Red Army’ was formally renamed 
the People’s Liberation Army in 1948 during the Party-led war to liberate 
the country from the ‘anti-revolution’ nationalist government.) Moderni-
sation and reform have not changed this fact: the PLA’s first and foremost 
mission is to serve the interests of the Party. The latest military reforms 
under Xi take this to a whole new level.
In his report to the Nineteenth Party Congress, beyond talking about 
building the PLA into a world-class military, Xi also stressed the impor-
tance of strengthening the Party’s work within the PLA. He instructed the 
PLA to carry out a political education program focussed on ‘passing on 
Still from a 2018 
PLA recruitment 
promotional video: 
the slogan reads 
‘Join the army 
and protect the 
country, prepare to 




























































the red gene’ 传承红色基因. In June 2018, the CMC released the ‘Guideline 
on Implementing the Program of Passing on Red Gene’, describing it as a 
‘strategic task’ for the New Era. The Guideline asserted that the education 
program should focus on ‘forcefully building [the PLA’s] absolute loyalty 
with regard to safeguarding the Core of the Party [Xi Jinping] and obeying 
the Party’s commands’.10
The reforms since 2016 have substantially strengthened Xi’s personal 
control over the military by placing unprecedented emphasis on the CMC 
Chairman Responsibility System 军委主席负责制. The system has been in 
place since 1982, when Deng Xiaoping held the position, and has been en-
forced to various degrees under different leaders since then. In particu-
lar, under Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, senior military leaders such 
as former deputy CMC chairmen Guo Boxiong 郭伯雄 and Xu Caihou 徐
才厚 enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, largely making the position of 
CMC chairman that of nominal Commander-in-Chief. Since 2016, Xi Jin-
ping has emphatically enforced the Chairman’s Responsibility System as a 
central element of the reform, giving himself direct control over military 
affairs. 
Xi Jinping reviews a naval parade in the South China Sea, April 2018
Source: Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China
Writing in the PLA Daily in 2016, Lieutenant General Fan Xiaojun 
范骁骏, who would become Political Commissar of the Northern Thea-
tre Command in 2017, asserted that for the PLA, the unreserved imple-
mentation of the CMC Chairman’s Responsibility System represented the 
‘greatest loyalty, the most pressing political task and most unbending iron 
discipline’.11 In February 2018, the CMC distributed ‘A Reader on the CMC 
Chairman Responsibility System’ to the whole PLA, asking all members, 
and especially the senior military leaders, to deepen their awareness of 
the System and implement it unswervingly. 
The reforms have also introduced other new institutional measures 
to strengthen the Party’s control over the military. These include the ele-
vation of the status of the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission 军委纪
律检查委员会. The chief of the Commission is now a member of the pow-
erful CMC, with a status higher than that of the service chiefs and heads of 
most CMC departments. The move was intended to strengthen the Party’s 
ability to combat rampant corruption within the military. In late 2017, the 
Commission’s investigations led to the removal of two of the most senior 
PLA officers from their positions (Fang Fenghui 房峰辉, founding chief of 
the CMC’s Joint Staff Department, and Zhang Yang 张阳, founding chief of 
the CMC’s Political Work Department 军委政治工作部), due to corruption 
charges. Zhang reportedly committed suicide during the investigation. 
Challenges Ahead 
Three years after Xi’s announcement of the most radical military reform 
program in the PRC’s history, the PLA has undergone a revolutionary trans-
formation. Given the nature, scale, and speed of the changes, it is not sur-
prising that by the middle of 2017 Xi praised the reforms for taking ‘his-
torical steps’, making a ‘historical breakthrough’; and achieving ‘historical 
accomplishments’.12 Xi’s personal involvement and firm resolve in the pro-



























































The PLA still must overcome enormous hurdles to become a truly 
world class military on par with that of the United States. Despite dec-
ades of efforts to modernise, it still substantially lags behind its US coun-
terpart in military technology, combat capabilities, overseas reach, and 
military alliance networks, among other things. The PLA has not engaged 
in a major conflict since the Sino-Vietnam border war in 1979, and lacks 
experience of modern joint operations in combat. While the organisation-
al changes are impressive, the efficacy and effectiveness of the new PLA 
Command and Control system remains untested. 
But China’s current military power matters less than its potential for 
growth and the country’s ambitions. For one thing, while the US current-
ly outspends China on defence by a big margin, Australia’s 2016 Defence 
White Paper forecast that by 2035, China would be the world’s biggest 
spender on defence. Whether or not this comes to pass, the modernisation 
of the military is sure to remain a top priority for the Chinese leadership 
for decades to come. This is because, for the Chinese leadership under Xi, 
a strong military is not just a means to ensure China’s rise, but an end in 
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IN AUGUST 2018, China’s out-ward-looking press, including the 
Global Times and the China Daily, 
wanted the world to know all about 
one Chinese artist, Shu Yong 舒勇, 
whose Belt and Road Initiative-themed 
travelling exhibition Global Tour of 
Golden Bridge on Silk Road opened 
that month in Florence. It may be 
true, as the website of the Galerie Urs 
Meile (Beijing-Lucerne) proclaims, 
that Shu, who has long cultivated the 
image of the maverick, ‘stirs up trou-
ble’ by ‘playing games with the gov-
ernment, enterprises and the media’. 
These days, however, Shu appears to 
be painting a straight Party line. The 
China Daily quoted him saying of his 
installation Golden Bridge on Silk Road 
that it ‘symbolizes our hope for joint 
cooperation within the framework of 
the Initiative, the creation of a global 
community with a common destiny 
and shared interests’.1 
S O F T  P O W E R ,  H A R D  T I M E S
Linda Jaivin 








































Shu Yong at the Imperial City of Beijing 
gallery. Ai was then enough of a perso-
na grata to have been invited to help 
design the stadium for the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics (the ‘Birds Nest’). By the fol-
lowing year, the two artists’ paths had 
diverged. Ai created a monumental 
installation of children’s backpacks in 
Munich to commemorate the earth-
quake victims, while Shu celebrated 
the People’s Republic of China’s sixti-
eth anniversary with the performance 
piece Ten Thousand People in Red Dress 
Sing the National Anthem 一万多人身
着红衣高唱国歌. Ai’s persona switched 
to non grata, while the long-haired Shu 
became the artist-rebel even a Com-
munist Party could love. 
Another Chinese artist, Ai Weiwei 
艾未未, was making the news in August 
as well, when Beijing authorities de-
molished his studio, without warning, 
while he was in Germany. The lease 
had expired, and re-development of 
the entire district was on the cards. Yet 
the failure to give notice, resulting in 
damage to work that was stored there, 
fits a pattern of official harassment di-
rected at the artist since he began his 
unwelcome investigations into the cor-
ruption-related deaths of some 5,000 
children in the 2008 Sichuan earth-
quake.  
In 2007, Ai Weiwei and Shu Yong 
had, in fact, been collaborators, with 
Ai curating a series of exhibitions by 
Ai Weiwei’s Snake Ceiling, an installation of children’s backpacks to commemorate the 
Sichuan earthquake victims
Source: Alvin Tse, Flickr
The Party-state would dearly like 
everyone else to love Shu more, and 
Ai Weiwei less. Yet if you Google Shu 
Yong’s Florence opening in English, 
only a tiny handful of links appear: 
one to the Global Times and another, 
somewhat mysteriously, to the Chi-
nese-language site of Macau’s Wynne 
casino. Searching the news for Ai Wei-
wei’s studio demolition, by contrast, 
produces more than a dozen pages of 
links to reports and videos in inter-
national media, art and architectural 
journals, and the webpages of human 
rights organisations such as PEN. Con-
sidered together with ongoing simmer-
ing controversies around the world 
about Confucius Institutes on univer-
sity campuses and United Front activ-
ities in general, it sometimes seemed 
that in 2018, Chinese cultural soft pow-
er could not catch a break. 
But beyond the headlines, China 
was using its culture in myriad ways to 
woo the world — from staging impres-
sive exhibitions of imperial artefacts 
in Saudi Arabia and Salem, Massachu-
setts, and crowd-pleasing folk art from 
Hebei in Brussels, to festivals and cele-
brations such as Mexico City’s Beijing 
Cultural and Creative Week in June. 
David Shambaugh of the Brook-
ings Institution has estimated China’s 
official ‘public diplomacy’ budget 
(which includes educational, media, 
and other investments as well as cul-
tural programs) to be about US$10 
billion a year  — about five times that 
of the US. And yet despite this massive 
spending, and even despite Trump — 
the first American president to appal 
the country’s allies as much as its en-
emies, the Soft Power 30 index in 2018 
ranked the US at number 4 and China 
at 27 — down 2 places from the year 
before.2  
In his contribution to the 2018 
Soft Power 30 Report, Zhang Yiwu 
张颐武, of Peking University, suggests 
that China would be better off focus-
ing its soft power efforts on develop-
ing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, where the market for cul-
tural products is less ‘saturated’ than 
in the US and Europe, for example. 
He also questions the prioritisation 
of ‘classical and elite’ cultural forms 
in official promotions. Noting the role 
that pop culture plays in American and 
South Korean soft power, China ought 
also, he says, do more to promote its 
pop and even celebrity culture over-
seas.3 
Chinese television shows and dra-
mas, including the Story of Yanxi Pal-







































Story of Yanxi Palace’, pp.149–151), are 
indeed growing audiences in places as 
diverse as Pakistan and Tanzania. The 
Chinese–American coproduction The 
Meg, starring Chinese actress Li Bing-
bing 李冰冰, meanwhile, topped the US 
box office on its opening weekend in 
August. Hollywood, historically on the 
job for American soft power, is itself 
now moonlighting for China. 
Crazy Rich Asians is another sto-
ry: condemned by a China Daily op-
ed writer Phillip J. Cunningham as ‘a 
white-bread film that follows tired old 
Western tropes’, and ‘exploration of 
crazy money [that] makes money look 
good’, Cunningham extols the made-
in-China production and summer hit 
Hello Mr Billionaire. Despite having ‘a 
ridiculously convoluted plot riddled 
with holes big enough to drive a high-
speed train through’, he asserts it is 
‘edgier’, and that it ‘feels real and sings 
free’.4
The new super-ministry for Cul-
ture and Tourism, created in early 
2018, did not appear to approve of 
many artists ‘singing free’. It contin-
ued to ramp up censorship and con-
trols over all aspects of Chinese art, 
pop culture, and intellectual life, on 
and offline, with a fresh push against 
‘vulgar’ 粗俗 content, politically sensi-
tive themes and celebrity culture. Re-
sponding to a letter from eight elderly 
artist-educators, including 99-year-old 
Mao portraitist Zhou Lingzhao 周令钊, 
meanwhile, supreme leader Xi Jinping 
习近平 reminded China’s art acade-
mies of their mission to produce artists 
Crazy Rich Asians
Source: Gamer Geek, Flickr
devoted to the ‘building of socialism’. 
How that plays out for the Chinese art 
world remains to be seen. But a heav-
ily censored, and politically directed 
culture that is strongly nationalistic 
and inadequately self-reflexive is un-
likely to advance China’s powers of 
cultural attraction. 
China also scored a soft power 
own goal when the officially spon-
sored, nationally broadcast 2018 
Spring Festival Gala featured a skit 
starring a Chinese actress in black-
face and padded posterior and an Af-
rican man in a monkey costume. As 
Andrew McCormick of Columbia Uni-
versity pointed out in The Diplomat,5 
it’s hardly the first time ‘that China 
had offended along racial lines’. After 
critical reports appeared in Kenyan 
media, a Chinese embassy spokesper-
son in Nairobi complained that the 
Kenyans were simply following the 
lead of the scandalised Western press: 
‘Kenyan people should have their own 
judgement’. This tone-deaf response 
only ensured that the controversy sim-
mered on. 
Chinese officialdom may be con-
founded and even angered by how 
China’s internal cultural affairs, from 
the knocking down of an artist’s studio 
to a tactless skit on television, can af-
fect their nation’s ability to project cul-
tural soft power. Yet, as the US Council 
on Foreign Relations observed more 
generally in its February report ‘Chi-
na’s Big Bet on Soft Power’, ‘Ultimate-
ly, China’s tightening authoritarian 
political system is the biggest obstacle 
to the positive image the country and 
government yearn for’.6 Money can’t 



























































IN MAY 2018, I participated in the Young Sinologist Program 青年汉学
家研修计划 in Chongqing. On the last 
morning of the university exchange 
portion of the program, my lecturer 
sat me down in front of his computer 
to watch the recently released nine-
ty-minute documentary Amazing 
China 厉害了我的国 (see Chapter 2 
‘Talking (Up) Power’, pp.36–49). Sitting 
through the film’s relentless praise of 
the technological advances, scientific 
and industrial development, military 
modernisation, and success at alleviat-
ing poverty that has happened under 
Xi Jinping 习近平, what really struck 
me was its enthusiasm for the coun-
try’s cultural industry. I had attended a 
lecture on China’s cultural industry at 
the Young Sinologist Program in Xi’an 
the year before, and this deepened my 
curiosity about the cultural industry’s 
role in China’s growing soft power ini-
tiatives. Amazing China introduces the 
topic with an excerpt from Xi’s speech 
at the Nineteenth National Congress of 
the Communist Party of China in Oc-
tober 2017: ‘Cultural confidence is the 
most basic, the most profound, and the 
most enduring force of a nation and a 
people’s development’. 
The Young Sinologist Program 
put that cultural confidence on dis-
play. In Dunhuang and Chongqing, we 
were treated to two historical spec-
taculars directed by Wang Chaoge 
王潮歌, co-director with Zhang Yimou 
张艺谋 of the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games opening ceremony. Wang’s 
large-scale multimedia performances 
in custom-built arenas, as well as a sep-
arate show on a similar scale about the 
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Three Kingdoms period (220–280 AD), 
were simultaneously mesmerising and 
mawkish. Their jaw-dropping audio-
visuals and stagecraft reflected the 
cultural confidence of which Xi spoke. 
The shows were designed to impress 
both domestic audiences and interna-
tional guests with their technological 
ingenuity. On a subtler level, they offer 
a rereading of China’s past that harmo-
nises with the CCP’s goals, emphasising 
qualities of redemption and resilience. 
The abundance of bright lights and 
deft choreography in these shows is 
an effective way of turning elements 
of China’s history and culture into a 
marketable product to bolster patriotic 
pride at home and foster admiration 
internationally — what is commonly 
called soft power. 
Even when Chinese soft power ef-
forts appear kitsch or ham-fisted (look 
up ‘This is China in Rap’ for an exam-
ple), they reveal much about how the 
Party wants China to be understood 
abroad. The three-week Young Sinol-
ogist Program itself is part of China’s 
soft power drive and a manifestation 
of Chinese cultural confidence. The 
Ministry of Culture of the People’s Re-
public of China and the Chinese Acad-
emy of Social Sciences launched the 
program in 2014. By 2018, the number 
of participating cities had grown to 
include Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, 
Xi’an, and Guangdong, and this list will 
expand again in 2019; well over a hun-
dred scholars attend each year. Each 
city hosts the Young Sinologist Program 
once a year, with participants staying 
in and around that metropolis. The 
programs I attended comprised a mix 
of lectures, field trips, excursions to lo-
cal historical sites, and some tourism, 
with organisers seemingly given scope 
to tailor the schedule to take advantage 
of local expertise and facilities. 
Of the twenty-five participants 
at each event, I was the only Austral-
ian (and one of few participants with 
English as a first language). Russia and 
India provided the largest number of 
attendees, and the former Soviet re-
publics were also well represented in 
these all-expenses-paid extravaganzas, 
which a small army of support staff 
ensures run smoothly. The Young Si-
nologist Program focusses its partici-
pants’ attention on the awe-inspiring 
spectacle of China’s transformation: its 
rise to global economic, military, and 
political prominence as both the proud 
heir to an ancient civilisation and the 
harbinger of high-tech modernity. The 
participants themselves become part 
of the show. An ever-present media 
team captures images of nearly every 
activity and prepares profiles of par-
ticipants that are broadcast across nu-
merous digital platforms. The smiling 
faces and glowing endorsements of 
these foreign friends create an image 
of an attractive China that is meant to 
be envied by the rest of the world. Par-
ticipants are exposed to the spectacle 
of modern China and, in turn, become 
part of this very spectacle, intended for 
domestic consumption.
The programs I attended began 
with three days of lectures by local ac-
ademics and Party figures. Weekends 
featured field trips: the Terracotta 
Warriors in Xi’an, a Three Gorges boat 
cruise in Chongqing. In Xi’an, they 
divided us into groups depending on 
our interests. My group spent a week 
visiting a range of government offices, 
factories, and start-up incubators at 
Xi’an’s high-tech district. The program 
was less flexible in Chongqing, where 
all participants were assigned a profes-
sor at a local university to work with. 
Ostensibly, we were to research a topic 
that we supplied to our hosts prior to 
coming. However, in Chongqing some 
of my colleagues reported that their 
professors encouraged them to choose 
a new topic — the Belt and Road Ini-
tiative, for example. From Xi’an, we 
attended the Second Silk Road Cultur-
al Expo in Dunhuang, where we met 
the Minister for Culture, Luo Shugang 
雒树刚. In Chongqing we were required 
to perform in a closing gala — the 
women participants were assigned to 
recite Mao Zedong’s 1936 poem ‘Snow’ 
沁园春·雪. Upon returning home, all 
participants were to write a research 
report of at least 3,000 words that would 
be published in an edited volume. The 
China Social Sciences Press published 
the essays of the 2016 programs in 
Beijing and Shanghai, with these 
Scene from Wang Chaoge’s Encore  
Dunhuang《又见敦煌》








































presented to 2017 participants and 
available to purchase online (at the 
time of printing, my September 2017 
contribution still had not been print-
ed, ostensibly due to sensitive topics 
such as religion, which I wrote about).
What does the Young Sinologist 
Program tell us about power in China? 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
is not just attempting to impress 
participants with the sparkling techno-
modernity of urban China. It wants to 
inculcate burgeoning leaders in the 
field of China studies with politically 
orthodox views of history and the 
dominant Han culture — these are the 
ideological foundation for the approved 
narrative of China’s rich past and 
inevitable rise. It is a demonstration 
of cultural confidence at work, and an 
attempt to draw young foreigners into 
China’s sphere of influence, including 
through the establishment of guanxi 
关系 networks (social networks and 
influential relationships that facilitate 
business and other dealings), linking 
them closely with trusted Chinese 
academics and officials: the CCP binds 
foreigner to foreigner, and foreigner 
to China. The Young Sinology Program 
is the latest chapter in a long history 
of foreigners being treated with 
A terracotta warrior under repair 
Photo: Paul J. Farrelly
hospitality and presented with an 
airbrushed picture of Chinese society 
and history.
Despite the all-encompassing na-
ture of the Young Sinologist Program, 
in which work, study, and play are all 
organised by the Chinese hosts, there 
remain limited opportunities for par-
ticipants to access alternate narra-
tives. It is possible to experience this 
program in such a way as to derive a 
more nuanced, critical, and polyphon-
ic reading of China. The program pro-
vides young scholars with the type of 
access to local academics and govern-
ment officials that is necessary for a 
robust engagement with China. While 
these conversations may only some-
times seem to push the boundaries of 
the Party line, ultimately they are best 
taken as interpretations of the ortho-
dox point of view on a particular topic; 
it necessary to go deeper and augment 
official views with sources that are 
not beholden to Party thought. Meet-
ing with these academics and officials 
provides an intimate experience of 
how China generates and projects soft 
power, including through expressions 
of cultural confidence. While many 
of the young scholars were cautious 
about offending their hosts, some en-
gaged critically with the ideas present-
ed and appraised the Program (and 
China’s soft power efforts more gener-
ally) in an open and wide-ranging way. 
Where the Chinese state directly ap-
propriates the images and expertise of 
these young scholars to further its ide-
ological agenda, this may have the ad-
verse effect of leading those scholars to 
question the Party-state’s seemingly al-
truistic motives in inviting them there 
in the first place. It certainly alerts 
them to the need, when assessing the 
CCP’s narratives of ‘amazing China’, to 
distinguish between what is present-
ed as real and reality itself. Becoming 
part of the spectacle of power is a les-
son in how that power is constructed 
and useful in learning how to produc-



































































ON 5 MAY 2018, the bicentenary of Karl Marx’s birth, a bronze stat-
ue of the philosopher was unveiled 
at his birthplace, Trier, in south-west 
Germany. The Chinese government 
had funded the statue; Wu Weishan 
吴为山, head of the National Art Muse-
um of China 中国美术馆, designed it. 
Wu is the sculptor behind the bronze 
statues of ghoulish refugees lining 
the entrance to Nanjing’s Massacre 
Memorial Hall 南京大屠杀遇难同胞 
纪念馆, as well as the giant Confu-
cius that was installed at Tiananmen 
Square in January 2011 to torrents of 
public ridicule, and subsequently re-
moved overnight in April 2011 without 
explanation. Wu is flexible: Confucian 
one minute, Marxist the next. Wu’s 
Marx at Trier symbolises a renewal of 
state Marxism under Xi Jinping 习近平, 
and its promotion overseas — in this 
case, with the collaboration of the Tri-
er city council. 
After debate and consultation 
with the community, Trier’s city coun-
cil approved the Chinese statue by 
forty-two to eleven votes in March 
2017. Andreas Ludwig of the Christian 
Democratic Union, who voted for the 
statue, explained why it passed, and 
the reason had nothing to do with ide-
ology — ‘150,000 Chinese tourists visit 
Trier every year, and there could be 
many more’, he said. Reiner Marz of 
the Greens was among those opposed 
to the statue. To accept the gift, he said, 
‘would be to honour the donor, and the 
Chinese Communist Party is not worth 
the honour’.1 Other councillors, along 
with many in the community, were 
concerned that Wu’s proposed 6.3-me-




































tre statue would overpower Sime-
onstiftplatz, Trier’s medieval town 
square. They preferred a life-sized ren-
dition of an early, humanist Marx, on 
Brückenstraße — a narrow street that 
houses his birthplace.2 
What was unveiled in May 
represented a slight compromise: a 
5.5-metre Marx in the old town square, 
in Wu Weishan’s original design. ‘In 
measuring a philosopher’s value’, Wu 
declared at the unveiling ceremony, 
‘we must ultimately look at how history 
has judged him, and [this statue] of 
Marx in mid-stride signifies that his 
thought is constantly developing’.3  
German dignitaries downplayed 
concerns about Marx’s historical lega-
cy. They ignored a petition from PEN, 
the international writers association 
defending freedom of expression, to de-
fer the unveiling until the poet Liu Xia 
刘霞 — the widow of the Nobel Peace 
Laureate Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波, who died 
in custody in 2017 — was released from 
house arrest in Beijing and allowed to 
seek medical treatment in Germany.4 
(She arrived in Germany two months 
later.) Malu Dreyer, premier of the 
state of Rhineland-Palatinate, which 
encompasses Trier, thanked China 
for the ‘gesture of friendship’. She de-
clared that the statue created a ‘space 
for exchange and interaction’. Trier’s 
mayor Wolfram Leibe stated that ‘our 
democracy is about engaging in public 
discussion, and that is exactly what is 
happening here’.5
In China, however, the statue was 
a grace note during a year in which the 
Wu Weishan at the 
unveiling of the Karl 
Marx statue
Source: news.cn
Party-state put renewed emphasis on 
Marxism — or rather, on a Marxism 
tailored to augment Xi Jinping Thought 
on Socialism with Chinese Charac-
teristics in the New Era 习近平新时代 
中国特色社会主义思想, now the gov-
erning ideology of the Party-state. His-
torians of intellectual thought Timothy 
Cheek and David Ownby describe Xi’s 
Marxist revival as being bereft of any 
of emancipatory impulse; it is mere-
ly an attempt to re-inculcate Leninist 
self-regulation within the Party after 
decades of atrophy and ill-discipline. 
At the same time, it draws the German 
thinker into a nationalistic historical 
narrative of ‘redemption from humil-
iation by foreign powers’, and claims 
the Chinese Communist Party, after the 
apparent failure of Marxism in Russia 
and Eastern Europe, to be the true cus-
todian of Marxism in the twenty-first 
century.6 
On the China Central Television 
(CCTV) talk show Voice 开讲啦, Wu 
Weishan lied that the Germans had 
‘said all along that [my statue] was 
exactly what they had envisaged’ for 
Trier; he even implied that the feder-
al Bundestag had approved it directly. 
He then launched into a patriotic rave 
about his Nanjing massacre statues, 
declaring that as well as telling ‘Chi-
nese stories’ of greatness — as epito-
mised in his Marx statue — it is also 
important to ‘tell the world our stories 
of national humiliation’ 国耻.7  
For the bicentenary celebrations 
of Marx in Beijing, Xi Jinping urged 
Party cadres gathered at the Great 
Hall of the People to ‘keep studying 
and implementing Marxism, continue 
drawing upon its scientific wisdom 
and theoretical power … [to] uphold 
and develop Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics in the New Era, and to 
ensure that the ship of the Great Reju-
venation of the Chinese People moves 
correctly forward against the waves’.8 
At Peking University the same week, Xi 
historicised his ‘New Era’ as the latest 
stage in China’s rejuvenation, which 
had begun with the May Fourth Move-
ment in 1919, led by students of Peking 
University.9 
Many of these students were 
influenced by Li Dazhao 李大钊 — a 
former university librarian and co-
founder of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Li, who was hanged by a Bei-
jing warlord government in 1927, 
is celebrated as an early martyr for 
communism, and the statue of Li 
at Peking University continues to 
inspire Marxist student activists. 



































clashed with authorities, for decry-
ing what they perceive as a decline 
of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist gov-
ernance in Xi Jinping’s China, and for 
their public solidarity with factory 
workers in Shenzhen.
In July, workers at the Shenzhen 
Jasic Technology company were ar-
rested after protesting their dismissal 
by the company. Initially, with back-
ing from the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 中华全国
总工会, they had attempted to form 
an independent labour union, gain-
ing nearly one hundred applicants 
from a labour force of about 1,000. 
But their efforts were blocked when 
ACFTU withdrew its support, and the 
Jasic management created a separate 
union body stacked with candidates 
who were not elected by the workers. 
Thirty Jasic workers were detained 
on 27 July for ‘picking quarrels and 
causing trouble’ 寻衅滋事.10
Surveillance cameras at 
Li Dazhao’s statue, Peking 
University, December 2018
Photo: William Sima 
In early August, the Jasic 
Workers Solidarity Group 佳士
工人声援团 was formed, consist-
ing primarily of Marxist university 
students, operating from an over-
seas-registered website and Twitter 
account. Throughout August, students 
flocked to Shenzhen to join the work-
ers’ ongoing protests. In an event they 
dubbed the ‘24 August Violent Clean-
up Incident’ 8.24 暴力清场事件, dozens 
were arrested in a police raid at their 
hideout in Huizhou, near Shenzhen.11 
Marxist student chapters at Peking 
University, Renmin University, Nanjing 
University, and other centres of high-
er education continued to face crack-
downs over the following months. 
‘Do our authorities even have the 
face to stand in front of Li Dazhao’s 
statue?’, asked the Jasic Workers’ Sol-
idarity Group, after the university re-
fused to release surveillance footage 
that might have shown Zhang Shengye 
张圣业 — a Marxist student activist — 
being dragged into a car on 11 Novem-
ber. They compared the university’s 
obfuscation to that of Hu Shi 胡适 — 
the pro-Nationalist (Kuomintang) pres-
ident of Peking University during the 
Chinese civil war. After the rape of a fe-
male student by two American marines 
in December 1946, Hu, worried that the 
incident would add fuel to anti-Ameri-
can left-wing protests, had declared it 
‘a matter for the courts to decide’. A US 
Navy court infamously acquitted the 
marines.12 
Visiting the university in late 2018, 
I found that of all the numerous statues 
of famous figures that dot the campus 
— including Miguel de Cervantes, and 
Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, who was Peking 
University’s president in the 1920s 
and 30s — only Li Dazhao’s was over-
looked by a surveillance camera. The 
camera had been installed some time 
soon after my arrival in early Novem-
ber, and was still there when I left in 
mid-December. On 2 December, the Ja-
sic Workers Solidarity Group marked 
one hundred days since the 24 August 
Clean-up. University activists and cit-
izens, along with dozens of staff and 
students from Cornell University — 
the university had severed a research 
exchange program with Renmin Uni-
versity in protest against the crack-
downs — sent in videos and group 
photographs in expression of solidari-
ty. As of the time of writing, a total of 
thirty-two Jasic workers and their 
Marxist student supporters remained 
in detention.13 This is the reality of 





















































THE ANTHROPOMORPHIC CITY —  
POWER AND PLANNING
Carolyn Cartier
THE NOTION THAT A CITY is powerful relies on 
some kind of anthropomorphism. A city is not a 
thing itself that constitutes and wields power. It lies 
on a map, inert and lifeless, staring back at us and 
rhetorically imploring, am I important? How big is 
my dot? Capital cities are always more important on 
the map: they get the star, like Beijing. Yet in a recent 
Party announcement about leading places in China, 
Beijing did not feature at all. Only three appeared 
— Shenzhen, Shanghai Pudong, and Xiongan 雄安 — 
and one of these, Xiongan, in Hebei province, is only 
just planned. (See the China Story Yearbook 2017: 
Prosperity, Chapter 6 ‘Magic Cities, Future Dreams 
— Urban Contradictions’, pp.188–205.) Nevertheless, 
in April 2018 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
Central Committee and State Council issued a joint 
announcement ‘in the name of Comrade Xi Jinping 
as the core’ to confirm its leading importance, 
affirming that ‘Xi Jinping has personally planned, 
personally decided, and personal promoted’ the 
construction of Xiongan as ‘a national model for 
promoting high-quality development’.1
Xiongan panorama 




















































Xiongan is the latest planned city in China to be symbolically attached to 
the prevailing paramount leader. The founding of the city of Shenzhen, 
which includes the first and most successful special economic zone (SEZ), 
is directly linked to Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, who led reform and opening up 
after 1978. When China opened up to the world economy, it was a selective 
opening up: SEZs were established in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, 
followed by a select group of coastal cities and coastal regions. Shenzhen 
led the way, catalysed by capital flows from Hong Kong. The role of Shen-
zhen is so significant in anchoring the reform economy that it is difficult to 
imagine the path of China’s export-oriented industrialisation without it. A 
decade later, in 1990, Deng Xiaoping envisioned the Pudong New Area — a 
new economic district for Shanghai. He practically apologised to the peo-
ple of Shanghai for making them wait ten years to rebuild it. Now, Pudong 
includes the national financial district, marked by Shanghai Tower — the 
tallest building in China. Shanghai Pudong developed as a central govern-




The Party narrative of Xiongan foregrounds its significance as if re-
prising the reform model of Shanghai Pudong and Shenzhen: ‘It is anoth-
er new administrative area of national significance after the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone and the Shanghai Pudong New Area. It is a mil-
lennial plan and a national event’.2 Shanghai Pudong and Shenzhen are 
just two of more than 500 new urban areas in China and one hundred ur-
ban administrative divisions with populations of larger than one million. 
But they are national projects that link to the world economy. Comparing 
Xiongan with Pudong and Shenzhen implies that Xiongan will also play a 
similarly significant local–global role for the Beijing region.
Recent announcements about Xiongan reveal how the Party-state con-
structs, in both discursive and material ways, dynamic places of power in 
relation to Party leadership. Likening Xiongan to Shanghai Pudong and 
Shenzhen signals to the world China’s commitment to continuing econom-
ic growth. Its heralding of Xi’s leadership places Xiongan at the leading 
edge of Party-state commitments. Much more than a technocratic project, 
the location of Xiongan and its planned characteristics symbolise new ide-
as about the future of cities in China. The location of Xiongan in north 
China, south-west of Beijing in Hebei province, demonstrates commit-
ment to redressing uneven development among the coastal regions. It also 
demonstrates the power of exclusion by ignoring two prominent cities of 
the reform era at the level of Beijing and Shanghai in the urban system 
— Chongqing and Tianjin. The narrative of Xiongan pointedly belongs to 
the New Era of Xi Jinping thought that was formally incorporated into the 
Party Constitution at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 2017. 
The Hebei Xiongan Outline Plan
Following the lead of the English-language Xinhua report of 21 April, ‘Chi-
na Publishes Master Plan for Xiongan New Area’, various international 




















































quoted the publication 
of the master plan.3 The 
international news cy-
cle typically follows the 
lead of China’s state me-
dia — but the headline 
was incorrect. The Chi-
nese government did not 
release the ‘master plan’ 
总体规划 for Xiongan; it 
released the ‘outline plan’ 规划刚要. The outline plan constitutes a 
report on the project’s scale and scope including strategic rationale, 
guiding ideology in the terms of Party thought, and construction and 
development objectives. It serves as the foundation on which master 
plans are to be based, which will necessarily appear incrementally be-
cause the Xiongan area, at 2,000km2, covering three counties, exceeds 
the scope of any single master plan. 
The Hebei Xiongan New Area Outline Plan 河北雄安新区规划纲要 
is attributed to the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Collaborative Development 
Leading Group Office. It is not a normal planning office but a spe-
cially formed group with select membership ‘under the Party Central 
Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core’. The foreword to the 
Outline Plan states that Xiongan will become ‘a national model for 
promoting high quality development in a new era’, whose implemen-
tation, ‘by the middle of the century, will become a significant part of 
the world-class Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei city cluster, effectively perform-
ing Beijing’s non-capital functions and providing a Chinese solution 
to “big city malaise” ’. It will become a relocation site for education, 
health, and government institutions whose activities do not require 
them to be in the centre of Beijing. Xiongan is to be, in this sense, a 
‘spillover’ city that will contribute to rebalancing settlement in the 
capital region. 
Xiongan: a new growth pole for China
Source: Ma Xuejing/China Daily
The Outline Plan is interesting because, in ten chapters, it narrates 
principles and values of modernisation and development for the New Era 
— a vision much broader than the construction of Xiongan itself. It be-
gins with general requirements for a city in accordance with the renewed 
vision of Socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the New Era, the city 
will represent the shift from the stage of high-speed growth to the stage 
of high-quality development. Stylistically, the Outline Plan resembles the 
historical practice of seeking to discern ‘logic’ and ‘order’ or 理 through 
the ‘investigation of things’ 格物 in order to ‘extend knowledge’ or 致知. 
For instance, the process depends on identifying and selecting from best 
practices in urban environmental management worldwide to adapt them 
for implementation in Xiongan. The new city will adopt ‘modern informa-
tion and environmental protection technologies for a green low-carbon, 
smart and efficient, environmentally friendly, and livable environment 
with high-quality public services’. Xiongan will thus become ‘an innova-
tive development demonstration zone’ that models new standards for na-
tional high-quality urban development in the New Era.
The Outline Plan treats Xiongan as a key part of the Beijing–Tianjin 
region — the Jing-Jin-Ji region. Chapter One of the Outline Plan envisions 
Xiongan as the ‘Beijing city sub-center’ that will become a ‘new model 
for optimizing development in densely populated areas’. It introduces the 
‘two wings of Hebei’, in which Xiongan is only the southern wing in the 
larger transformation of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei capital region. It also 
covers project-specific construction for the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics 
in Zhangbei in the province’s north-west, bordering Zhangjiakou — a his-
toric prefecture-level city known as the gateway to both Mongolia and 
Beijing.  
Like all general Party-state documents, the Xiongan Outline Plan re-
fers to theory and policy endorsed by multiple Party offices and govern-
ment ministries. Borrowing language and principles from the New-type 
Urbanisation Plan (2014–2020), it emphasises improvement of the ‘peo-




















































tional Civilised City program; and refers to ‘Belt and Road’ construction. It 
also introduces the notion of ‘Xiongan quality’.
Each chapter of the Xiongan Outline Plan articulates multiple goals. 
Chapter Two calls for construction of ‘new urban-rural relations’, which 
will implement goals of the ‘New-type Urbanisation Plan’ and protect 
arable land. Chapter Three combines Chinese heritage design with low-
rise development to incorporate the protection of ancient monuments, 
revolutionary sites, and local culture in towns and villages. Chapter 
Four commits to the restoration of the Baiyangdian wetland (See the 
China Story Yearbook 2017: Prosperity, Chapter 6 ‘Magic Cities, Future 
Dreams — Urban Contradictions’, pp.193–195) and its establishment 
as a national park. Chapter Five specifies development of a high-tech-
nology digital city with 5G-network commercialisation for informa-
tion security technology and a ‘self-controllable cyberspace security 
industry’. Chapter Six outlines standards for social services including 
education, health, and housing, with an emphasis on urban–rural in-
tegrated services and affordable housing. Chapter Seven describes an 
integrated transport network including ‘four vertical and two horizon-
tal’ high-speed railways that will connect Xiongan to Beijing and Tian-
jin in addition to Shijiazuang (the capital of Hebei province), as well as 
seven new expressways. (The Xiongan link to the new Beijing Daxing 
International Airport, or ‘second’ Beijing airport, is projected to open 
in 2019.) Chapter Eight mandates the construction of a green low-car-
bon city, and integrated water management infrastructure for the wa-
ter-short capital region. It also covers the social credit system and its 
‘big data’ platform for ‘a full-time, global, integrated network security 
decision-making system’, incorporating advances in artificial intel-
ligence. Chapter Nine, on ‘building a modern urban security system’, 
draws on the ‘overall national security concept’ for disaster prevention, 
integrating standards for ‘peacetime and warfare’ including air defence, 
with details of disaster shelters and evacuation routes on the ground. 
It incorporates water and energy security in addition to drug and food 
security. Chapter Ten outlines commitment to strengthening planning 
implementation, supervision, and evaluation of Party and government 
work, as well as fiscal reforms and the establishment of individual in-
come tax. It concludes with a focus on coordinated development for the 
unprecedented trans-territorial group of three administrative jurisdic-
tions — Hebei, Beijing, and Tianjin, or Jing-Jin-Ji.
Land and Plan: Reverse!
Despite the official narrative comparing Xiongan with Shanghai Pudong 
and Shenzhen, realities of Xiongan point to fundamental differences, 
beginning with their basic dimensions. Pudong and Shenzhen began on 
relatively small sites and grew by extension through changes to the ad-
ministrative divisions. Before 2009, Pudong district was 533km2, includ-





















































ing the area of Liujiazui — the site of the high-rise financial district. In 
2009, the central government approved the merger of Nanhui — a for-
mer county on Pudong’s southern boundary — more than doubling Pu-
dong’s size to 1,210km2. Greater Pudong, which includes Shanghai Pudong 
International Airport and Shanghai Disneyland, constructed during the 
mid-2010s, is about two-thirds the size of Xiongan (2,000km2). The Shenzhen 
Xiongan project map
Source: Xinhua
SEZ, which was opened in 1980, also expanded in stages. ‘Shenzhen’ names 
both the prefectural city and the SEZ within it, which tends to generate con-
fusion between the two. Before 2010, the Shenzhen SEZ was only 396km2. 
The area of the SEZ expanded nearly five times to 1,953km2 in 2010 alone. 
That year, on 1 July, an official ceremony marked its expansion, attended 
by Guangdong provincial and central government leaders.4 It now covers 
an area about the same size as that allocated to Xiongan, but was, for three 
decades, significantly smaller.
There are many reasons why Shanghai Pudong and Shenzhen devel-
oped in stages. One is the administrative division reform ‘changing counties 
to cities’ that the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced in 1983. The reform 
reclassified rural counties as urban jurisdictions, which allowed cities to 
lease land for real estate development. Marketisation of land leaseholds in 
China started in the second half of the 1980s in Shenzhen, but the emerging 
market became subject to negotiation — that is, local governments negotiat-
ed directly with investors at below-market rates. The ensuing urban devel-
opment is called land-based urbanisation because land became the major 
source of capital in the process. Fortunes were made in the moment when 
land was released from state control for urban construction.
In contrast, the central government’s approach to Xiongan establish-
es in advance its final size through the amalgamation of three counties 
— Xiongxian, Rongchen, and Anxin— to form Xiongan New Area. It is 
only categorically analogous to the Pudong New Area, the first New Area 
新区, in the Chinese system of administrative divisions. New Areas are a 
special category of the administrative division at the national level — they 
receive economic development support from the central government — 
typically financial transfers, to realise their targetted goals. 
So, why is Xiongan so big? By marking out Xiongan’s total area in 
advance, the state has effectively asserted its power to control and su-
pervise the development process, including the disposition of land. After 
many years of land grabs and ‘negotiated’ land transfers in China, the na-




















































In Xiongan, the state may control and assign land use rather than allow 
it to be marketised for leasing and real estate development. This would 
allow revival of the system of land allocation, which would accord with 
the rhetoric of Xi Jinping’s New Era and the comeback of socialist-style 
central planning.5 Unlike Pudong, which is a district located in a larger 
city, the size of Xiongan indicates a new city. If public housing and the 
state sector become dominant in Xiongan, combined with environmental 
sustainability and data systems security, Xiongan will become the show-
case for a twenty-first century ‘green’ stability city for new Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics 中国特色社会主义. 
City as Metonym — and Antonym — of Power 
The ideological language of socialism for the New Era also characterises 
portrayals of Xiongan. The attachment of Xi to Xiongan is the latest itera-
tion in a long history of Chinese leaders standing at the forefront of sym-
bolic national construction projects. Outstanding historical examples are 
Mao’s 1959 ‘Ten Great Buildings’ 十大建筑 that commemorated the tenth 
anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, which included the Great 
Hall of the People; Beijing Railway Station; and the Three Gorges Dam, first 
China’s most prom-





proposed by Sun Yat-sen 孙中山 in 1919, formally launched by Deng Xiaop-
ing in 1992 (but also considered by Mao).
Party history credits Deng with the successful development of Shen-
zhen, and Jiang Zemin with the growth of Shanghai Pudong. Shenzhen 
represents market reform in the 1980s, while Pudong represents the re-
building of Shanghai in the 1990s — China under reform opened from 
south to north. During the Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 era (2002–2012), the leader-
ship promoted projects in Tianjin — notably, the development of a ‘new 
Manhattan’ financial centre at Yujiapu, located in the Tianjin Binhai New 
Area. Binhai, the second official New Area, at 2,270km2, is larger than 
Xiongan by close to 300km2. As the Hu Jintao era was drawing to a close, 
Tianjin boasted the highest GDP growth rate among province-level admin-
istrative divisions (which include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chong-
qing). Yet its stimulus-financed construction boom has turned the Tianjin 
financial district into one of China’s most prominent ‘ghost towns’. During 
the building boom, Tianjin’s GDP rose but its debts mounted as floor space 
in the new built environment remained vacant. Now, Tianjin is the most 
heavily indebted city government in China.6
A so-called ghost town in China is not an abandoned or moribund 
urban area (as the name might suggest), but, rather, the result of a city 
government constructing ‘pre-demand’ infrastructure. Yet true financial 
centres — like those in London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, New York, and Sydney 
— are highly localised; they are not the result of a ‘build it and they will 
come’ mentality.
A related problem for Tianjin has been its unsustainable GDP 
growth. Throughout the 2000s, Tianjin recorded high GDP growth, and 
from 2010–2012 it had the highest growth among province-level admin-
istrative divisions. In apparent response to losing its place in the rank-
ings, Tianjin subsequently inflated — and later downgraded — its 2016 
GDP statistics, reporting at the end of 2017 that it was one-third lower 
than originally reported. Official announcement of the discovery fol-




















































of Tianjin, Huang Xingguo 黄兴国, to twelve years’ imprisonment on 
corruption charges in 2017.7 Between 2012 and 2017, Tianjin went from 
the top of the GDP growth chart to the bottom — registering just 1.9 per 
cent in the first quarter of 2018. Now, in the new mode of promoting 
transparency in statistical reporting, Tianjin has become an official site 
of experimentation for finding solutions to local government debt.
Returning to Xiongan, the capacity to change the space of three 
counties to establish a massive ‘new area’ lies in the political power 
to order and control the construction of a new urban-economic core 
— adding a large dot to the map. The official discourse about Xiongan, 
by including Shenzhen and Shanghai Pudong, but not Tianjin, also rep-
resents the Party-state’s power over the narrative: not only about what 
places will be upheld as models but also whose leadership warrants 
continuing accolade. Tianjin is not the only major city left off the list 
of exemplars. Chongqing, in western China, is also absent. Where cities 
equate with positive Party leadership and enduring authority, Chong-
qing, like Tianjin, cannot feature with Shanghai Pudong and Shenzhen, 
because its past, under the leadership of Bo Xilai 薄熙来, ended in 
ignominy. (See the China Story Yearbook 2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse, 
Chapter 10 ‘Red Eclipse’, pp.266–285.) 
What unites the histories of these cities in China is not their ambi-
tions, nor their successes and failings. Instead, what unites them is how 
the Party leadership has represented their changing conditions in rela-
tion to its own assessments of the future and reassessments of the past. 
In The Burning Forest, Simon Leys identifies ‘the falsification of the past, 
and the alteration of reality’8 through dynamic political narratives that 
contribute to framing how power intensifies and ‘moves’ through myr-
iad contexts, whether statistical mis/representations, grand plans, exhi-
bitions, or revisionist accounts. One prominent material realisation of 
power in contemporary China is the city in the image of the Party-state.
This dynamic, and its relationship to how leaders’ roles in urban 
development are portrayed, was well illustrated in 2018 in exhibitions 
devoted to the fortieth anniversary of reform mounted in museums in 
Beijing and Shenzhen. Unprecedentedly, they highlighted the role of Xi 
Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun 习仲勋 — governor of Guangdong from 
1979–1981 — in the establishment of Shenzhen. At the National Muse-
um of Art in Beijing, the exhibit Spring Tide at the Pearl River: A National 
Exhibition of Works of Fine Art to Commemorate the 40th Anniversary of 
Reform and Opening Up 大潮起珠江——庆祝改革开放40周年全国美术作
品展, which opened in July, foregrounds photographs of Xi Jinping and 
Xi Zhongxun.9
The new Shekou Museum of China’s Reform and Opening in Shen-
zhen went one step further. It closed unexpectedly for ‘upgrading’ in June 
and reopened in August, having replaced a bas relief sculpture featuring 
Deng Xiaoping with a quotation by Xi Jinping. Uniformly, the honour and 
acclaim for central government initiatives credits the paramount leader 
or chairman of the CCP — the one under whose authority the project was 
initiated. Altering the official history of Shenzhen to credit Xi’s father is 
one thing; but the replacement of Deng’s image with Xi’s rhetoric is a star-
tling departure from what is normative Party practice — as if reframing 
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HARBIN. NOVEMBER 2017. Sergio Canavero and Ren Xiaoping 任晓
平 announced that the world’s first hu-
man head transplant was ‘imminent’. 
They had just completed an eight-
een-hour rehearsal on two human ca-
davers, and now claimed to be ready 
for the real deal: the transplant of a 
human head from a living person with 
a degenerative disease onto a healthy, 
but brain-dead, donor body.1 
Ren — a US-educated Chinese 
orthopaedic surgeon, was part of the 
team that performed the first hand 
transplant in Louisville in 1999. 
Canavero, an Italian, and former neu-
rosurgeon at the university of Turin, is 
the more controversial, maverick per-
sona of the team. In addition to many 
respected scientific publications, he 
published Immortal: Why CONSCIOUS-
NESS is NOT in the BRAIN, which seeks 
to prove the existence of an eternal 
soul on the basis of near death experi-
ence, as well as two guides on seducing 
women. He also drops flippant refer-
ences to Stalin or the Nazi doctor Josef 
Mengele. 
P O W E R  OV E R  L I F E  A N D 
D E AT H
Natalie Köhle 











































Ren and Canavero see the head 
transplant, formally known as cepha-
losomatic anastomosis, as the logical 
next step in the trajectory of trans-
plant surgery. They regard as their in-
tellectual ancestors the Soviet surgeon 
Vladimir Demikhov, who on a number 
of occasions experimented with graft-
ing the head and limbs of one dog onto 
another host dog in the 1950s, and 
the American Robert White, who per-
formed monkey head transplants in 
the 1970s — and became the target of 
massive criticism by animal rightists 
and ethicists. 
The consensus in the scientific 
community is that such an operation is 
still light years ahead of current skills 
and capabilities, and not backed up by 
sufficient, peer-reviewed research. Its 
success would hinge on the surgeons’ 
ability to connect the spinal cords of 
two different bodies, joining millions 
of nerves that are responsible for mo-
tor function and sensation. It would 
also depend on the unproven capacity 
of the human brain to adjust to — and 
gain control over — a new body and a 
new nervous system without suffering 
debilitating pain or going mad.2 
So far, Ren and Canavero have 
transplanted the heads of numerous 
lab mice and one monkey, and they 
have also severed and subsequently 
mended the spinal cords of several 
dogs. Amazingly, some of the mice and 
dogs regained motor functions to some 
extent. Yet neuroscientists have yet to 
succeed in mending injured or severed 
spinal cords within a singular human 
Sergio Canavero
Source: 诗凯 陆, Flickr
One of Demikhov’s two-headed dogs
Source: Commons Wikimedia
body, and Canavero and Ren have not 
proven that it is possible to preserve 
the mobility of a primate following a 
head transplant. 
That said, Emeritus Professor 
of Neurosurgery at UCLA and edi-
tor-in-chief of Surgical Neurology In-
ternational (SNI) James I. Ausman re-
ferred to Canavero and Ren’s project 
as a ‘quantum leap in Medical Science’, 
and praised them for having done ‘a 
superb job of establishing the foun-
dation for this operation to proceed’ 
in a curious editorial for SNI.3 SNI is 
also the journal that features an en-
tire section on ‘Head and Spinal Cord 
Transplantation’, in which most of the 
research on head transplant surgery, 
including the report on the recent trial 
run on two human cadavers, is pub-
lished — edited by Canavero and Ren!
A recent issue of the American 
Journal of Bioethics — Neuroscience 
(AJOB Neuroscience), devoted entire-
ly to a discussion of the project, was 
unanimously critical of it.4 Arthur 
Kaplan, head of medical ethics at the 
New York University medical school, 
expressed the general consensus of 
Western bio- and neuro-ethicists when 
he stated that the proposed head trans-
plant was ‘both rotten scientifically 
and lousy ethically’.5 It poses daunting 
questions pertaining to personal iden-
tity including the legal definition of a 
person. 
Ren and Canavero’s project hinges 
on the assumption that a person is de-
fined by his (or her) brain. Research on 
the enteric nervous system (ENS) and 
the microbiome has brought this cer-
ebro-centric view of personhood into 
question. The ENS is the second-largest 
nervous system in the body — often de-
scribed as a ‘second brain’ in the gut. 
The microbiome is an ecological com-
Sketch from Canavero and Ren’s Nov 2017 Cadaveric Rehearsal
Source: Ren Xiaoping, Li Ming, Zhao Xin, Liu Zehan, Ren Shuai, Zhang Yafang, Zhang Shide, Sergio Canavero, ‘First 









































munity of microorganisms including 
bacteria, fungi, and viruses that live 
inside the human organism, with a 
composition that is unique to each per-
son. Recent research suggests that the 
ENS and the microbiome may be signif-
icantly responsible for an individual’s 
personality traits.6 Hence the hybrid to 
emerge from the head transplant could 
end up with competing personalities. 
They will also inherit the donor body’s 
gestures and movements, as well as 
most of his or her diseases.7 
Bioethicists have posed other 
questions as well. Some are relatively 
academic: if the recipient of the body 
transplant was married prior to the op-
eration, would their spouse be break-
ing the marriage contract by having 
sex with them?8 Other observations are 
more practical: if the hybrid person 
subsequently has children, they would 
genetically be the children of the body 
donor. If the body donor  previously 
had children, or other prior civil or 
contractual obligations or criminal li-
abilities, new legal definitions would 
need to be worked out to ascertain that 
the hybrid would not be accountable 
for them. 
An added concern is posed by the 
historical lack of transparency regard-
ing the sourcing of organ donors — 
and, by implication, donor cadavers — 
in China, the country that has hosted, 
funded, and authorised Canavero and 
Ren’s research toward the world’s first 
head transplant. China has a history 
of harvesting organs from condemned 
prisoners. Considerable reforms have 
been achieved since the state rolled 
out a nationwide voluntary organ do-
nation system in 2013, and officially 
prohibited the use of organs from ex-
ecuted criminals in 2015. Noting that 
transplant patients need to take immu-
nosuppressant drugs for life, a Wash-
ington Post investigation concluded 
that China’s consumption ‘of immuno-
suppressants is roughly in line with the 
number of transplants of voluntarily 
donated organs it says it carries out’.9 
Allegations of prisoners continuing to 
be eligible for ‘voluntary’ organ dona-
tion persist. But former deputy health 
minister Huang Jiefu 黄洁夫 — an Aus-
tralian-trained renal transplant sur-
geon and honorary professor at Sydney 
University’s medical school from 2008–
2014, now in charge of the national 
commission overseeing the overhaul of 
the country’s organ donation system — 
insists that there is zero tolerance for 
such practices now, admitting that they 
may still continue to be carried out ille-
gally here and there.10
It is clear that Canavero and Ren 
could not carry out their research in 
Europe or the United States; the pro-
ject would simply never get past a bio-
ethics committee. They have respond-
ed to the criticism of their venture in 
AJOB Neuroscience, pointing out that 
their project is merely a final point in 
the trajectory of transplant surgery. 
While transplant surgeons Joseph 
Murray and Christiaan Barnard, who 
performed the world’s first kidney and 
heart transplants in 1954 and 1967 
respectively, were subject to similar 
onslaughts of ethical and scientific 
criticism, the procedures pioneered 
by them are fairly standard today. 
Canavero and Ren further note the his-
torically and culturally situated nature 
of Judaeo-Christian bioethics, claiming 
that there is a ‘cognitive riff’ between 
Western ethics and ‘pragmatic’ Chi-
nese philosophy, or even ‘[t]he Chinese 
mind, which is problem-solving and 
speculation (and schoolyard squab-
ble) averse’.11 In Canavero’s words: 
‘Western bioethicists needed to stop 
patronising the world’.12 Adding that 
their ‘experimentation has been copi-
ous’ but that they have chosen to only 
make it available to relevant Chinese 
authorities, instead of sharing it with 
the international scientific communi-
ty: ‘Since the West stubbornly refuses 
to look at the facts, there is no point 
in sharing innovative technology with 
other foreign parties’.13 
Ren and Canavero’s portrayal of 
China as a country free of the shackles 
of ethical traditions that would ham-
per scientific enquiry betrays their 
ignorance. For one, there is no lack of 
material for constructing arguments 
against human head transplants in 
China’s philosophical and religious tra-
ditions, and there are Chinese ethicists 
who have applied themselves to that 
task.14 Moreover, the ethical guidelines 
that are in place in China, do not — at 
least on paper — differ substantial-
ly from international conventions.15 
Indeed, Ren and Canavero’s project 
has also met with scepticism and ob-
jections from within China, voiced by 
medical ethicists at Peking University, 
and even Huang Jiefu himself.16 
And yet, it is undeniable that in 
its bid for global leadership in biomed-
ical research, China has kept crossing 
contentious lines: on 24 January 2018, 
the Nonhuman Primate Research 
Facility of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences Institute of Neuro-
sciences, Shanghai, reported having 
cloned two macaque monkeys, using 









































Dolly the sheep. These monkeys are 
the first primates ever to be cloned, 
and signify a breakthrough in a tech-
nical barrier that brings humanity yet 
one step closer to the possibility of hu-
man clones.17 On 26 November 2018, 
American-trained Chinese scientist 
He Jiankui 贺建奎 shocked the world 
by revealing that he was responsible 
for the birth of the world’s first gene- 
edited babies in Shenzhen — twin girls 
whose DNA he modified with a tool 
called CRISPR-Cas9 in order to make 
them resistant to HIV.18 Shortly after, 
on 23 January 2019, the Institute of 
Neuroscience of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, Shanghai reported 
the birth of five CRISPR gene-edited 
macaque monkey clones — an ethical 
minefield combining the cloning of 
nonhuman primates with the applica-
tion of CRISPR technology, creating a 
cohort of genetically altered monkeys 
with identical DNA to be used in labo-
ratory research.
Considered dangerous for hu-
mans, CRISPR-Cas9 is also the tool that 
allows editing out the genes of pigs that 
trigger immune response in humans 
and to inactivate porcine endogenous 
viruses (PERVs) in the pig genome. 
These edits pave the way for so-called 
xenotransplants — that is, pig organs 
transplanted into human organisms. 
On 10 August 2017, scientists working 
for the Cambridge biotech start-up 
eGenesis (cofounded in 2015 by George 
Church — Harvard Medical School 
Professor and Core Faculty Member 
of Harvard’s Wyss Institute for Biolog-
ically Inspired Engineering — and his 
former doctoral student Yang Luhan 
杨璐菡) reported the birth of 37 PERV-
free baby pigs in China. They belong to 
Dolly the sheep
Source: Commons Wikimedia
a breed of miniature pigs with organs 
just the right size for transplanting 
into human recipients.19 China is al-
ready home to the world’s biggest pig 
cloning farms, which are associated 
with a national xenotransplantation 
project involving ten research units 
and is funded by the central govern-
ment. According to an informant to 
the South China Morning Post who 
wishes to remain anonymous, China is 
producing about 1,000 cloned piglets a 
year, with trials of pig organ implanta-
tion into primates ongoing. Xenotrans-
plant scientists are presently waiting 
for the green light to commence clin-
ical trials on transplanting pig organs 
into humans.20
In view of all this, it appears that 
Canavero and Ren were not far off the 
Dolly the sheep
Source: Commons Wikimedia
mark in contending that ‘[t]he People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) is committed 
to achieving superpower status on all 
levels, including biomedical research. 
Chinese scientists are already leading 
in the field of gene editing, and the PRC 
is set to overtake the US as the fore-
most transplant country in the world 
by 2020; it also plans the first pig or-
gan transplants by that date’.21 What 
we are seeing in China right now is the 
implementation of a global science, an 
early intimation of the challenges and 
possibilities for the future of humani-
ty writ large. Bioethicists and medical 
doctors in China and the West would 
do well to collaborate in developing 
a shared ethical framework to set the 
parameters in which future experi-




























































IN THE SUMMER OF 2018, the movie Dying to Survive 我不是药神 
stormed China’s domestic box office 
and sparked public discussion about 
the accessibility of medical treatment 
in China. The movie, which some film 
critics called ‘China’s Dallas Buyers’ 
Club’, is based on the true story of a 
leukemia patient smuggling in cheap 
anti-cancer drugs from India to help 
impoverished fellow patients who 
could not afford the expensive med-
ication offered by Chinese hospitals. 
In the film, the smuggler is a divorced 
seller of Indian health supplements 
who does not have cancer himself. 
Within two weeks of opening in July, it 
had already become one of the highest 
grossing films in the history of Chinese 
cinema. The story resonated with Chi-
nese people as it depicted how quickly 
even a middle-income family could be 
dragged into poverty by medical bills, 
and how being struck by illness and 
poverty at the same time can be dev-
astating. 
The timing of the movie’s release 
coincided with a series of actions by 
the Chinese government to lower the 
price of cancer drugs. It removed the 
tariff on imported cancer medication 
on 1 May 2018 and reduced the VAT 
(value-added tax) from seventeen per 
cent to three per cent. (The majority 
of anti-cancer drugs on the Chinese 
market are manufactured by US and 
European pharmaceutical companies.) 
Shortly after the movie’s premiere, the 
newly established Chinese National 
Medical Insurance Bureau summoned 
representatives from ten foreign and 
eight domestic pharmaceutical com-
TO WA R D S  A  H E A LT H I E R  










































In recent years, the Chinese govern-
ment has made public health a central 
policy priority. At the Nineteenth Na-
tional Congress of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP), President Xi Jinping 
习近平 announced the Healthy China 
initiative, which aspires to provide full 
life-cycle health services to Chinese 
people, promote healthy lifestyles, 
and modernise hospital management 
(including making all public hospitals 
non-profit by 2020). As Xi said at the 
2016 National Health Conference held 
in Beijing in August 2016, ‘Prosperity 
for all is impossible without health for 
all’ 没有全民健康，就没有全面小康. 
Indeed, good population health is the 
prerequisite for development, as poor 
health hinders both individual and na-
tional development by reducing pro-
ductivity, and inequity in health status 
and accessibility of health services 
may lead to social frictions and unrest. 
Along with economic indices such 
as GDP and GNP, population health is 
an important indication of a country’s 
level of development. In the past four 
decades, much improvement has been 
made in China’s population health. 
Data from the World Bank and the 
UN released in 2018 shows that aver-
panies to discuss cutting the prices of 
cancer drugs, many of which were too 
expensive to be covered by national 
medical insurance. On 18 July 2018, 
about two weeks after the movie’s re-
lease, Premier Li Keqiang 李克强 or-
dered the government to speed up the 
price cuts. To the excitement of many 
cancer patients, in October 2018, the 
Chinese National Medical Insurance 
Bureau announced, following suc-
cessful price negotiations with both 
foreign and domestic pharmaceutical 
companies, that national medical in-
surance will cover another seventeen 
anti-cancer drugs.
Promotional poster for Dying to Survive, 2018 
Source: Ali ghafarpoor, Flickr
age life expectancy in China increased 
from 65.5 years in 1978 to 76.3 years in 
2016,1 while the national infant mor-
tality rate (IMR) declined from 55 per 
1,000 live births in 1977 to eight per 
1,000 live births in 2017.2 (In Japan, by 
way of comparison, life expectancy in 
2016 was 84.2 years and the IMR was 
two per 1,000 live births in 2017; while 
in Nigeria, life expectancy was 55.2 in 
2016 and IMR was 65 per 1,000 live 
births in 2017.) 
However, within China there are 
still large urban–rural disparities in 
health outcomes and access to health 
services. In 2015, the rural IMR in Chi-
na was 9.6 per 1,000 live births, more 
than twice as high as the urban IMR 
of 4.7. The rural population lags be-
hind their urban counterparts from an 
epidemiological perspective as well. 
The urban population today mainly 
suffers from degenerative diseases 
and lifestyle-related diseases includ-
ing strokes, heart failure, and cancer, 
while the rural population, particular-
ly in western China, still suffers from 
infectious and parasitic diseases, as 
well as respiratory and digestive ail-
ments that can be prevented through 
better sanitary conditions and diet.3  
The inequality in health is rooted 
in unbalanced regional development 
and inequality in people’s socioeco-
nomic status. Poverty and limited ac-
cess to public health resources are 
inextricably linked to poor health 
outcomes, due to crowded living con-
ditions, malnutrition, lack of access 
to clean water and sanitation, and 
vulnerability to extremes of tempera-
ture and weather. The poor are often 
exposed to greater risks from their 
living and working environments too, 
as they usually have limited options in 
life. Worse still, once the poor become 
ill, the high cost of medical treatment 
can prevent them from getting proper 
treatment and achieving full recovery. 
The loss of potential earnings from 
taking time off work, and even losing 
employment due to illness, can destroy 
the savings of even a moderately well-
off family. 
Historical Background
Public health service and welfare are 
important factors that influence pop-
ulation health. When the People’s Re-
public of China was founded in 1949, 
people living in rural areas had scarce 
access to medical resources. In 1951, 
the central government encouraged 
health workers and epidemic pre-








































vide basic healthcare to local villag-
ers. By 1957, according to the World 
Health Organisation, there were some 
200,000 village doctors in China. 
In 1968, two years into the Cul-
tural Revolution, Chairman Mao Ze-
dong 毛泽东 introduced the Barefoot 
Doctors 赤脚医生 program, which 
provided several months of minimal 
medical training at county-level hos-
pitals to 1.5 million healthcare work-
ers who were originally second school 
graduates or farmers with some med-
ical knowledge. As part of the Rural 
Co-operative Medical Scheme (RCMS) 
农村合作医疗计划, funding for bare-
foot doctors’ wages, medicines, and 
medical instruments came from the 
commune’s collective welfare fund, 
as well as local famers’ contributions 
(about 0.5 to two per cent of their an-
nual income). 
The barefoot doctors provided 
basic medical care and education 
about disease prevention to the ap-
proximately eighty-two per cent of the 
Chinese population that lived in rural 
areas at that time. The system mod-
elled a practical approach to primary 
healthcare for other low-income coun-
tries in the world. According to data 
from the World Bank, China’s average 
life expectancy increased from 43.7 
years in 1950 to 66.4 years in 1979.4 
Both the RCMS and the system of 
barefoot doctors collapsed with the 
economic and administrative reforms 
implemented in the agricultural sec-
tor in China in the 1980s, including the 
end of the commune system. But in the 
meantime, the government did not im-
plement any new rural medical insur-
ance schemes to replace the RCMS and 
barefoot doctors system.
From the 1990s into the early 
2000s, the majority of people living in 
rural areas (96.3 per cent in 1993 and 
87.32 per cent in 19985) were not cov-
ered by any form of national health in-
surance scheme, and were responsible 
for all their healthcare costs. At around 
the same time, the drastic decreases in 
government subsidies for the public 
health sector and subsequent marketi-
sation of public health facilities turned 
them into profit-seeking entities. The 
government began to allow drug prices 
to be set above cost, approving hospi-
tals and other health facilities to earn 
a fifteen per cent profit margin to help 
their financial survival.6 The cost of 
medical treatment started to rise dis-
proportionally to income gains, and 
rural families with patients were neg-
atively affected, some even dragged 
back into poverty by medical bills. 
To address these and numerous 
other issues, in 2002 the government 
initiated the New Rural Co-operative 
Medical Scheme (NRCMS) 新型农村合
作医疗. It improved medical insurance 
coverage in the rural population: by 
2015, 670 million, or 98.8 per cent of 
the rural population were covered by 
the NRCMS.7 However, the absence of 
a national health insurance scheme in 
the rural sector from the 1990s to the 
early 2000s continues to have a pro-
found influence on rural population 
health outcomes. 
Realities
Though the NRCMS has been estab-
lished to reduce the financial burden 
of medical cost for the rural popula-
tion, great disparities persist in the dis-
tribution of medical resources and ac-
cess to healthcare between urban and 
rural populations in China. According 
to the National Bureau of Statistics, 
the number of hospital beds per 1,000 
people in the rural areas was 1.35 in 
2017 — far below the national average 
of 5.72. In the remote areas, there may 
be only one or two doctors to serve a 
community of thousands, and in some 
counties, half of the villages have no 
doctors at all. 
Many village doctors today are 
original barefoot doctors or their off-
spring. They typically work in small, 
shabby, and poorly equipped clinics, 
and spend hours hiking, sometimes 
over mountain paths, to make home 
visits. Some supplement their fees 
through pharmaceutical sales, or 
moonlight selling groceries, for exam-
ple, to make ends meet. Although the 
A propaganda poster 
for Mao’s Barefoot 
Doctors program: 
‘Wholeheartedly 













































central government has subsidised the 
salaries of village doctors since 2016, 
but the funds are administered by 
local governments and doctors from 
many places have complained that the 
local governments do not always pass 
on the funds, tying up the process of 
applying for them in red tape. Data 
from the National Health and Family 
Planning Commission shows that the 
number of village doctors has contin-
ued to decline since 2011.8 
The population of village doctors 
is also rapidly ageing. Few medical stu-
dents are drawn to the rural medical 
workforce with its harsh working con-
ditions and low salaries. With the rap-
id ageing of China’s rural population 
and rising demand for medical care, 
the dwindling number of village doc-
tors will share a much heavier burden 
in the foreseeable future. 
In the past, the government had 
the power to assign graduates to work 
in remote areas, but that is no longer 
the case. Instead, from 2010, the Min-
istry of Health initiated a scholarship 
program to fund the education of 
around 6,000 medical students nation-
wide each year on the condition that 
they agree to work in clinics in remote 
rural areas after graduation. 
The unbalanced distribution of 
medical resources also places extra 
Village doctor in Guizhou
Source: Taj Chom, Flickr
burdens on the town hospitals. Rural 
patients who cannot be cured in their 
small village clinics (which provide 
very basic medical care) may have to 
travel for hours or even days to get to 
the nearest hospital. In many cities and 
towns across the nation, it is extreme-
ly difficult to get an appointment with 
hospital doctors — queues are long, 
and even patients with more serious 
problems can wait for days or months 
for a hospital bed to become available, 
so that they can be admitted as an in-
patient. Many doctors in these large 
hospitals are overwhelmed by their 
heavy workloads; many have to work 
sixty to eighty hours each week. These 
pressures, felt by both sides, has led to 
a nationwide deterioration of doctor– 
patient relationships, and the past dec-
ade has seen frequent reports of vio-
lence against doctors. The problems 
caused by a weak rural healthcare 
system are spilling over into the urban 
sector to become a potential threat to 
China’s overall public health system. 
Policy-makers are beginning 
to act to address this crisis. Poverty 
eradication and population health 
improvement were mentioned as two 
important goals for national devel-
opment at the Nineteenth National 
Congress of the CCP. In recent years, 
President Xi Jinping made clear the 
intention to eliminate poverty in China 
by 2020 and to ensure equity in access 
to healthcare can be basically achieved 
by 2030. The Health China 2030 initia-
tive proposed in 2016 set 17 goals, 169 
targets, and named 231 initial indica-
tors in public health as milestones to 
be achieved in 2030. It is the first me-
dium- and long-term national strate-
gic plan in the health sector since the 
country’s founding in 1949.
Eliminating Poverty: The Prerequi-
site to Health
Forty years ago, over 80 per cent of 
China’s population, then 770 million, 
lived under the national poverty line. 
In 2017, 30.46 million people in the 
rural area lived under the poverty 
line, which accounts for about 3 per 
cent of the total population. By lifting 
over 700 million people out of poverty 
in the past 4 decades, China has con-
tributed more than any other country 
to global poverty reduction and the 
achievement of the first of the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals — the 
eradication of extreme poverty and 
hunger.
In the past thirty years, the gov-








































threshold almost every year: from 206 
yuan (annual income) in 1985 to over 
3,000 yuan in 2017. Central and local 
governments have invested trillions of 
yuan towards the eradication of pover-
ty; the government’s special fund for 
poverty reduction reached 106 billion 
yuan in 2018. Investments were made 
in infrastructure, such as road and wa-
ter conservancy projects, and subsidis-
ing healthcare and education. In some 
places, local governments promoted 
the development of tourism and other 
business by making available low-in-
terest microloans in state-owned de-
velopment banks for villagers to build 
their own small businesses and even 
sell local goods online to benefit from 
China’s e-commerce boom. 
Simply raising the living stand-
ards of people in rural areas and im-
proving the accessibility of health 
services reduce the morbidity rates 
of preventable diseases and improve 
people’s health. Yet hard work remains 
ahead for China to eradicate poverty. 
Among the forty-three million people 
living below the national poverty line, 
including in urban areas, ten million 
suffer from disabilities; they have even 
fewer resources and far more barriers 
to lifting themselves out of poverty. 
Just as poverty engenders poor health, 
poor health engenders poverty, cre-
ating a vicious cycle, exacerbated by 
the insufficient supply of healthcare 
services and the dearth of heathcare 
workers in the poorest regions. The 
inequality in health, rooted in income, 
wealth, and socioeconomic status in 
general, is certain to cause social fric-
tion and spark moral debates and soul 
searching in the foreseeable future. 
The popularity of Dying to Survive 
shows that this issue is one close to 
people’s hearts. The related problems 
of more equitable healthcare delivery 
and poverty alleviation need to be re-
dressed before China can become a 




















































THE STATE ADVANCES,  




IN THE LATTER PART OF 2018, China’s State 
President and Communist Party (CCP) General 
Secretary Xi Jinping 习近平 made a series of widely 
reported public statements about Party support 
for the private sector. He appeared on television 
in an interview alongside Politburo member, Vice-
Premier Liu He 刘鹤 — a key architect of China’s 
current set of economic and financial policies — and 
convened what Hong Kong’s South China Morning 
Post described as an ‘unprecedented forum’ to hear 
the views of business representatives.1 The Party, Xi 
reassured his audience, placed equal importance 
on private enterprises and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).
Shangri-la 


















































State media called Xi’s media blitz an ‘anti-anxiety pill’, an antidote to a 
growing sense of unease among China’s business community about the 
rapid expansion of SOEs at the expense of the private sector. An online 
essay published by former investment banker Wu Xiaoping 吴小平 in Sep-
tember 2018 had added to entrepreneurs’ alarm by suggesting that hav-
ing helped advance China’s economy, the private sector should now fade 
away.2 Even though online commentators poured ridicule on the essay, 
the viral attention it received was a reminder that in China, where the 
state wields much of its power through direct control of economic activ-
ity, private enterprise can still feel ideologically vulnerable. Anti-private 
business sentiment has been on the rise in recent years, not only on the 
fringe of policy debate, but also in the corridors of power. A growing cho-
rus of leftist intellectuals have called time on private business. Earlier in 
the year, Zhou Xincheng 周新城 — a professor of Marxism at the Renmin 
University of China — wrote in the Party theoretical journal Qizhi 旗帜 
that ‘Communists can sum up their theory in one sentence — eliminate 
private ownership’.3  
A billboard extols the virtues of Great Leader Xi Jinping’s Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era
Image: Ben Hillman
In 2018, China celebrated the fortieth anniversary of economic re-
form and an ‘open door’ to the outside world 改革开放 — the policy shift 
that began turning the country from an impoverished economic backwa-
ter into the global economic powerhouse that it is today. Central to the 
economic reforms was the enabling of private enterprise. One of the first 
reforms was to allow farmers to sell surplus produce on the open mar-
ket. Village and collective enterprises soon emerged and larger industrial 
corporations eventually followed. Private enterprise has become an in-
creasingly important part of China’s growth story for the past forty years, 
contributing to an estimated sixty per cent of GDP growth and generating 
ninety per cent of new jobs in 2017.4 According to CCP ideology, however, 
a successful private sector is not the endgame for economic policy, but a 
stage in the country’s progress toward communism. Party theorists under 
Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 justified the economic reforms by arguing that Chi-
na was at an early stage of socialism and needed to adopt market policies 
to boost economic growth before a more egalitarian socialist society could 
be created — a theory that became known as Socialism with Chinese Char-
acteristics 中国特色社会主义.  
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has reaffirmed the centrality of 
Party ideology, rebranding it Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a 
New Era 新时代中国特色社会主义. Some of the elements of Xi’s New Era 
are already apparent. Politically, China has become more authoritarian. Xi 
has overseen a strengthening of the Party and the state apparatus through 
which he and the Party wield power. Political opponents and dissenters 
have received harsh treatment. Obedience is demanded of civil society and 
academia. As many as a million Uyghurs and Turkic Muslims have been 
incarcerated in ‘re-education’ camps to purge them of loyalties and values 
external to official ideology.5 (See Chapter 4 ‘Internment and Indoctrina-
tion — Xi’s “New Era” in Xinjiang’, pp.98–111.) In the economic realm, Xi’s 
policies have strengthened state control of the economy by empowering 
SOEs, which has diminished the value of private firms — a phenomenon 


















































国进民退. In 2018, private sector profits were down twenty-two per cent 
year on year — their biggest decline since 1978. By contrast, SOE profits 
were up seventeen per cent in the first ten months of the year.6 This devel-
opment is a major reversal of the trend of the past three decades, during 
which time private firms’ return on assets has been consistently higher — 
as much as triple — than that of state-controlled firms.7 
‘What Good is Your Money?’
Shortly after Xi made his morale-boosting remarks, I met with local entre-
preneurs in Yunnan, in south-west China. At a dinner with local business-
men, some of whom I had known for many years, Xi’s remarks were the 
subject of lively debate. My fellow diners agreed that conditions for the 
private sector, such as access to finance and government contracts, were 
the worst in living memory, and that this was a result of Xi’s preference 
for SOE-led economic growth. The diners did not agree, however, whether 
Xi’s more recent, reassuring remarks signalled a favourable policy shift. 
‘The problem is that the Centre always says what you want to hear, 
but there’s a big gap between what they say and what they do’, remarked 
the owner of a small construction firm. ‘Yes, well at least they’re saying it’, 
said another. ‘So I guess the comments are progress of sorts.’ Others spoke 
of ongoing mistrust of business, quoting old sayings that disparage busi-
ness such as ‘if it’s not crooked, it’s not business’ 无奸不商. They linked it 
to both Confucian values, which placed the merchant below everyone but 
soldiers in the social hierarchy as well as ideology, and the power differen-
tial in China’s politics-in-command economy. As one of them put it, ‘what 
good is your money if a low-level Party cadre can halt your activities with 
a stroke of a pen?’ 
After years of special treatment for SOEs, it appears that China’s eco-
nomic policy has reached the same critical juncture as in the early 1990s, 
when the Party lunged to the left in response to the crisis in 1989, after 
people took to the streets first to protest corruption and then to demand 
democracy and a free press before the army’s violent suppression of the 
movement. As the Party-state moved to assert control over the private so-
cial and economic activity that they perceived had led to the chaos, it took 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s trip to the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ) in 1992 — a historic trip now popularly referred to as Deng’s 
Southern Tour 南巡 — to reassert the Party’s support for economic reform 
and an ‘open door’ to the outside world. A pro-business official at the table 
that night predicted that 2018, forty years after the start of the reform era, 
would be remembered as the year in which China’s leaders either con-
firmed their commitment to economic liberalisation or decided that state 
capitalism was their preferred path for economic development. 
In the Yunnan locality where the dinner took place, the local econom-
ic situation was dire. Over the past two decades, tourism had taken over 
from mining as Yunnan’s main economic driver, allowing private enter-
prise to flourish and outpace the SOEs that had previously dominated the 
local economy. In Zhongdian — a county in Diqing Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture that changed its name to Shangri-la in 2001 — local authorities 
offered tax breaks and other concessions to tourism-related enterprises. 
One firm helped the county develop and promote a circuit of scenic spots, 
including a gorge along the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, a series of 
SOE-led construction of 





















































limestone terraces, and a turquoise-blue lake ringed by forest. At each site, 
the company managed visitor access, making improvements to paths and 
steps, and erecting ticket gates to collect entrance fees. In return for an 
agreed annual rent to the county government, the company collected and 
kept all the revenue from ticket sales.8 
Tourism began driving rapid economic growth in Yunnan province. 
Between 2006 and 2016 the value of the province’s hotel and catering in-
dustry increased by 600 per cent, from AU$1.6 billion to AU$9.6 billion.9 
In Shangri-la, local entrepreneurs, sometimes in partnership with outside 
investors, built hotels and guesthouses in the town centre. Hundreds of 
townsfolk opened small shops and eateries. Others developed new prod-
ucts such as local herbal medicines and dried meats to sell to tourists. One 
local Tibetan man made a fast fortune by selling locally produced Tibet-
an knives; he proudly displayed his newfound wealth by driving the first 
Hummer to hit the county’s streets.
The county government established an SEZ along its southern border, 
close to the bigger and more prosperous city of Lijiang. Low taxes, cheap 
land, and abundant hydropower attracted new private enterprises, includ-
ing a barley wine distillery and food processing plants. A growing number 
of tourists, and government expenditure kept the economy pumping.
As Beijing began investing more in regional infrastructure, oppor-
tunities for private business increased. Big construction firms moved in 
from outside the region, but local subcontractors sprung up, too. When I 
first visited Shangri-la in the early 2000s, one of the richest men in town 
was the Tibetan owner of a concrete factory who had not attended school 
past the fourth grade. The region’s private sector expanded rapidly dur-
ing the 2000s, generating jobs that were often difficult to fill.10 (See my 
Forum ‘Shangri-la and the Curse of Xi Jinping’ in the China Story Yearbook 
2017: Prosperity, pp.71–75, for more details.) In the early days of tourism 
development, the best jobs were taken by Han Chinese, but opportunities 
eventually spread to ethnic Tibetans and other groups.11
Cleaning Up
The private sector boom rolled on until Xi came to power in 2012. Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign hit hard as extravagant local government spending, 
including on state-sponsored travel, was reigned in, and the local gift 
economy shrank. These developments, and a crackdown on dodgy tour 
operators in 2015, dealt a major blow to the local tourism industry.12 Yunnan 
had become notorious for cut-price holiday packages, which unscrupulous 
operators often sold below actual cost to unsuspecting tourists, in the 
expectation that profits would be recouped from commissions delivered 
by shopping centres selling souvenirs and local produce set up along 
highways for the specific purpose of syphoning cash from tour groups.
In Diqing, a lucrative way to extract cash from tourists was to sell 
them local herbal remedies such as the prized caterpillar fungus, literally 
worth more than its weight in gold. The scams here are similar to those in 
many other parts of China. As tourists are ushered into the roadside ware-
houses, a fake shopper known as a tuo 托 would appear, and, speaking 
in the group’s native dialect, exclaim the value and quality of the fungus 
being sold. The tuo would order a large quantity, the group’s guide might 



















































add that this was the best place to buy the prized herb, and the tuo would 
then encourage the shoppers to have the fungus ground into a powder for 
easier transport and preservation. During the grinding process, the shop 
assistant would substitute different, less valuable herbs. The local opera-
tors, including the guides, would then make their profits from shopping 
commissions and rip-offs.
Following an incognito trip to the province’s tourism hot spots in 2015, 
Yu Fan 余繁, the Yunnan Deputy Party Secretary responsible for tourism, 
recommended urgent action to clean up the travel business. The Provincial 
Governor, Ruan Chengfa 阮成发, issued an order to close all such souvenir 
warehouses. In the words of one travel guide I spoke to, provincial officials 
succeeded, ‘a little too well’. The rip-off joints were effectively shut down, 
but instead of changing their business models, they simply moved to the 
neighbouring provinces of Guanxi and Guizhou, where standards were as 
lax as they had previously been in Yunnan.
As visitor numbers declined, hotels and restaurants started going 
bust. Private owners of ticketed attractions sought to offload their assets. 
The only buyers were cash-flushed SOEs. The Yunnan Tourism Investment 
Company swooped on Shangri-la’s top attractions, including Tiger Leaping 
Gorge and the Snub-nosed Monkey Reserve in neighbouring Weixi County. 
Diqing’s regional tourism investment company purchased the Balegezong 
Gorge, a premier tourist attraction, only to on-sell it to the bigger invest-
ment company owned by Yunnan province itself. As one local business-
man observed: ‘it’s like watching fish being eaten by bigger and bigger 
fish’.
The Big Fish
In the past few years of studying economic development in the south-west, 
I have observed the SOE juggernaut re-establish the state’s predominant 
position in the local economy. Energised by easy access to cheap capital 
and Xi Jinping’s pro-SOE policies, local or provincial-level investment com-
panies, originally established to fund investment projects in line with Par-
ty policies, quickly expanded, setting up subsidiaries and buying up assets. 
In Diqing, the Yunnan Construction and Investment Holding Group, the 
City Construction Investment Company, the Yunnan Energy Investment 
Company, and the Yunnan Cultural Industries Investment Company all 
seem to have sprung up overnight, with their shiny new offices in the cen-
tre of Shangri-la’s expanding town. Within a few years, these SOEs have 
become major players in the regional economy.
As economic conditions worsened for private businesses, they turned 
to banks for loans, but were often refused — the SOEs having hoovered up 
local banks’ available capital. Under Xi, banks across China have tightened 
their lending standards — especially when it comes to private firms. As 
one ex-local banker told me, 
These days, if you lend a businessman money and he defaults, you will 
be suspected of corruption and investigated. If you lend an SOE mon-
ey and it can’t meet repayments, the leaders will arrange for count-
less extensions. If the SOE defaults it’s nothing more than an internal 
administrative problem. The bank won’t be blamed. So why would 
banks lend to private firms when SOEs are so hungry for capital?
Chinese banks typically require private firms to pay a deposit of equal 
value to the loan amount or provide collateral of up to four or five times 
the value of the loan. As in other parts of China, some firms use equity 
(stock) in their company as collateral, forfeiting ownership if they default. 
Through such defaults, SOEs across China have been able to buy private 
firms and their assets on the cheap.
One hotel owner I spoke to had mortgaged his house to secure a busi-
ness loan, estimating his house to be worth more than double the loan 
amount. He was further required to demonstrate sufficient cash flow to 


















































meet such stringent bank requirements and 
were thus denied loans, forcing them to ei-
ther sell up or turn to private money lend-
ers. Private money lenders, often connected 
to organised crime, are ubiquitous in China. 
As my hotelier friend told me, ‘I can make a 
phone call today and get a bag of cash deliv-
ered tomorrow. It will cost me twenty to thir-
ty per cent in interest. I don’t want to do this 
if I can avoid it. If I can’t make repayments 
I’d be in big trouble.’ In the past few years, 
as many as four Diqing business owners 
who were unable to repay debts, including 
a restaurateur I knew personally, committed 
suicide.
In response to the economic downturn, 
the central government has pulled the fiscal 
stimulus levers, providing grants for infrastructure and rural develop-
ment.13 In Diqing, work began on a railway in 2014 and on a 200-kilometre 
above-ground freeway in 2017 (both scheduled for completion in 2020). 
But local entrepreneurs say that the fiscal stimulus provided little respite 
for the private sector because the benefits mostly went to SOEs. As one 
prefecture official explained, ‘SOEs are winning the contracts because the 
government thinks they are low risk. The contracts are subject to less scru-
tiny, and if something goes wrong it can be fixed politically. When govern-
ment funds take time to arrive, the SOEs can borrow against the contracts 
and start work immediately.’ The Yunnan Construction and Investment 
Holding Group, founded only in 2016, now dwarfs other enterprises in Di-
qing. It holds the freeway and railway contracts, worth a combined total 
value of 100 billion yuan (AU$22 billion), and also spent a staggering 1.2 
billion yuan (AU$250 million) to build the world’s largest stupa at the en-
trance to the town. In late 2018, the company began digging the founda-
SOE-constructed Stupa at the entrance 
to Shangri-la town
Image: Ben Hillman
tions for an enormous expansion of Shangri-la’s old town centre, doubling 
the size of the recently constructed ‘old’ town.
There’s another reason for the rise of SOE-led development. Under Xi, 
the Party Organisation Bureau — the agency responsible for vetting and 
promoting key Party officials — has strengthened the practice of rotating 
officials between regions. This practice dates back to dynastic times, and 
was intended to inhibit graft by preventing officials from getting too close 
to the people in their jurisdiction; for this reason, too, mandarins were not 
allowed to serve in their home towns. Party secretaries used to be local 
residents. This is less likely these days. Local cadres are no longer so close-
ly connected to the political and economic networks through which spoils 
might be shared. According to a former official at the local Department of 
Commerce, ‘rather than deal with local economic interests, outsider Party 
secretaries are more likely to bring in SOEs’.
Local entrepreneurs can still pick up subcontracting work from SOEs, 
but their profits were squeezed to such an extent that it is not worth it. And 
SOEs are expanding so rapidly they are moving into spheres of econom-
ic activity that had once been the exclusive domain of the private sector 
— for example, boutique hotels and resorts. Their resources and political 
connections have made SOEs formidable competitors. One hotelier told 
me he had been fined a large sum by the police because a staff member 
had made a mistake when entering a foreign guest’s passport number into 
the police-controlled online guest registration system. He maintained that 
no SOE-run hotel would have been subjected to such a fine.
Who Will Advance, and Who Will Retreat?
In the face of such pressures, some local businessmen have decided to re-
tire, investing their money in stocks and mutual funds. In other parts of 
China, some entrepreneurs would prefer to invest abroad, but capital con-


















































‘By far the best option for many businesspeople is to sell to an SOE 
or enter into a partnership with an SOE’, my local government informant 
asserted. When I asked him about Xi’s pro-business reassurances, he said, 
‘it is going to take much more than promises’. He suggested that local gov-
ernments, banks, and SOEs would need to change their behaviour, with 
local Party bosses made responsible for the survival of the private sector. 
‘Over the next twelve months, we will see whether the Party intends to 
reverse the policy of “the state advances, and the private sector retreats”.’
I reminded him of his earlier remark about the Party having come to 
a crossroads similar to that it faced in 1992 when Deng embarked on his 
Southern Tour. Perhaps Xi might similarly choose the path of liberalisa-
tion. ‘I don’t think so,’ he responded. ‘The SOEs have become a very pow-
erful tool for the Party. But in China you never know what will happen.’ 
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AT THE BEGINNING OF 2018, there were 68.5 million displaced peo-
ple worldwide, including 25.4 million 
refugees — the highest number in the 
sixty-eight-year history of the Office 
of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In June 
2018, the UN published the final draft 
of the Global Compact on Refugees — a 
follow-up on the New York Declaration 
for Refugees and Migrants that was 
unanimously adopted by 193 states at 
the UN Leaders’ Summit for Refugees 
and Migrants in 2016. The UN General 
Assembly adopted the Global Compact 
on 17 December 2018, the US and Hun-
gary being the only states having voted 
against it. 
In August 2018, the US reduced 
its contribution to the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Pales-
tine Refugees in the Near East — the 
UN agency mandated to support the 
five million Palestinian refugees in 
the Middle East — by eighty per cent. 
The US is the largest donor and most 
influential actor in the international 
refugee protection regime, but, un-
der President Trump, it has reduced 
its commitments to helping refugees 
generally; in September, Trump an-
nounced that he would cap the refugee 
intake in 2019 at 30,000, down from 
110,000 when he took office.
As in other areas where the US 
is in retreat, China has stepped for-
ward. China’s involvement in the in-
ternational refugee protection system 
increased notably in 2018. China ac-
ceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and the 1967 Refugee Protocol in 1982. 
But it has long been perceived mainly 
T H E  P O W E R  O F  G I V I N G :  C H I N A 
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as a refugee-generating country, and 
has generally maintained a low profile 
in the international discourse on refu-
gee protection. Although remaining a 
major source of refugees and asylum 
seekers, China is also emerging as a 
destination and transit country and 
has demonstrated interest in greater 
involvement in refugee affairs.1 Lead-
ing scholars in refugee studies have 
noted that China is one of the most po-
tentially influential actors in the inter-
national refugee protection regime.2  
Having pledged to provide addi-
tional funds to aid international refu-
gee assistance efforts at the 2016 UN 
Summit for Refugees and Migrants 
and the 2017 Belt and Road Forum for 
International Cooperation, in 2018, 
China funded an unprecedented num-
ber of refugee aid projects in Asia and 
Africa, and gave much publicity to its 
refugee aid as well. This included:3 
(1) US$1 million aid to Syrian refugee 
students in Lebanon, through the 
United Nations International Chil-
dren’s Emergency Fund4 
(2) US$2 million for a program that 
upgraded essential services at 
Syrian refugee camps in the Kurd-
istan region of Iraq, through the 
UNHCR5 
(3) US$2 million for the provision of 
food and other materials to refu-
gee camps in Zimbabwe, through 
the UNHCR6 
(4) Funding for the rehabilitation of a 
community centre for Palestinian 
refugees in Baghdad, through the 
UNHCR7 
(5) US$6 million to aid refugees and 
drought-affected people in Ethio-
pia, through the World Food Pro-
gram (WFP)8 
(6) US$1 million to Syrian and Iraqi 
refugees in Iran, through the WFP9 
The Rohingya Refugee Camp, Bangladesh
Source: @Arnab Dasgupta, Flickr
(7) US$1.5 million to Syrian refugees 
in Jordan, through the WFP10 
(8) US$500,000 to Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon, through the WFP11  
(9) About US$500,000 for the safe-
guard of food security at refugee 
camps in Zimbabwe, through the 
WFP12 
(10) Offering to provide further hu-
manitarian assistance, including 
emergency material aid and con-
struction of facilities, to Rohingya 
refugees in Bangladesh.13  
The fact that China made public pledg-
es to fund refugee assistance projects 
and formed partnership with various 
international organisations to channel 
Chinese aid suggests a desire to be seen 
by the international community as an 
active contributor to the international 
refugee protection regime. This repre-
sents a shift from its previous low-key 
approach. At the 2017 Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation,14 
President Xi promised to provide US$1 
billion to international organisations 
for refugee-related projects in Asia 
and Africa, so China’s monetary aid to 
refugees is likely to grow in the coming 
years. 
Besides humanitarian assistance, 
in 2018, China continued with its offer 
to mediate between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar on Rohingya refugees. It had 
already proposed a three-phase solu-
tion to the Rohingya refugee crisis in 
September 2017. This is one of the few 
occasions where China has actively 
sought to play the role of mediator, as 
the principle of non-interference has 
long been a cornerstone of Chinese 
foreign policy. 
As pointed out by international 
and Chinese commentators,15 sever-
al factors have probably contributed 
to China’s deepening involvement in 
the international refugee protection 
system. First, China has an interest in 
the stability of countries along the Belt 
and Road, especially where there are 
growing Chinese investments, which 
includes Bangladesh. Second, China’s 
increasing involvement is consistent 
with its perceived ambition to position 
itself as a provider of public services 
and solutions to global problems.16 
Third, the international community, 
especially the UNHCR, the European 
Union, Germany, Malaysia, and Bang-
ladesh, has actively sought to engage 
China in issues around refugee protec-
tion.17 
China’s treatment of refugees 
and asylum seekers within China is 
another story. As of October 2018, the 
























































refugee claims, provides very limited 
financial support to refugees identi-
fied by the UNHCR, and does not allow 
them to work.18 Refugee advocates also 
criticise China’s reluctance to grant 
the UNHCR access to North Korean es-
capees and displaced ethnic Kokangs 
and Kachins from Myanmar. If China 
aspires to establish itself as a solution 
provider in global refugee affairs, 
it will have to convince the interna-
tional community that it upholds the 
core principles of refugee protection, 
including the principle of non-refoule-
ment.
China may not be purely altruistic 
in its funding for international refu-
gee protection. Yet its external refugee 
policies are set to make a major con-
tribution to refugee welfare. Through 
constructive dialogue and strategic 
partnerships, the international com-
munity may be able to engage China 
even more deeply in the future in this 
matter of great global concern.
Shan and Kachin 
refugees in China

































































THE INCREASING number of Chi-nese citizens living, working, and 
travelling abroad has created an ob-
ligation for the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) to protect them. The Chi-
nese leadership had previously accept-
ed that, in most cases, other powers 
would evacuate Chinese citizens along 
with their own from situations of un-
rest abroad. But this has changed in 
the last decade, leading to new policies 
and capabilities which have in turn 
generated new expectations among 
the Chinese population. This phenom-
enon can be explained as the response 
of a rising power needing to protect its 
people and interests overseas as its in-
fluence expands. It could also be seen 
as a justification for the projection of 
power to underwrite China’s growing 
stake in world affairs. A recent and 
highly nationalistic genre of Chinese 
movies uses the former to explain the 
latter, in a clear move to establish such 
operations by the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) as ‘the new normal’ for 
both domestic and international audi-
ences.
Policy and Precedent
China’s 1982 Constitution expresses 
the state’s intention to protect its peo-
ple and interests abroad. But it didn’t 
have the capacity to enforce its policy 
of Overseas Citizen Protection 海外公
民保护 until this century. The stimulus 
for change arrived in 2004, when four-
teen Chinese workers were killed in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The domes-
tic uproar caused the Chinese Commu-
P R OT E C T I N G  C I T I Z E N S 
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quake. According to SIPRI, the 48,000 
Chinese evacuated in 2011 equalled 
more than five times the total number 
evacuated between 1980 and 2010. 
The evacuation from Libya was 
the first to significantly involve the 
PLA, largely in a coordination role, 
with limited assistance from the PLA 
Air Force and the PLA Navy. This op-
eration saw 35,860 overseas Chinese 
evacuated over twelve days using sev-
enty-four civilian aircraft, fourteen 
ships, and approximately one hun-
dred buses.3 This gave China’s military 
reason to purchase more amphibious 
and airlift capability for contingencies 
where civilian charter would not be 
possible, such as in land-locked coun-
tries or higher threat environments.4 
The evacuation from Yemen in 
2015, carried out exclusively by the 
nist Party (CCP) to acknowledge that 
large numbers of Chinese were living 
in high-risk environments overseas.1
As a study by the Stockholm Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) reveals, Chi-
na started to conduct small-scale evac-
uations using non-military means to 
extract citizens in times of crisis or 
disaster from the Solomon Islands, 
Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Lebanon in 
2006; Chad and Thailand in 2008; and 
Haiti and Kyrgyzstan in 2010.2 Prior 
to this, the only evacuations of note 
had been from Indonesia in the mid-
1960s and Kuwait in 1990. The largest 
Chinese evacuations to date occurred 
in 2011, during the Arab Spring upris-
ings, when China retrieved 1,800 citi-
zens from Egypt, 2,000 from Syria, and 
35,860 from Libya, along with 9,000 
from Japan after the Tohoku earth-
China Eastern Airlines 
Airbus seen in Malta 
evacuating Chinese 
nationals from Libya 
following the anti-
Gaddafi uprising in Libya 
in 2011
Source: Claude Attard 
Bezzina, Flickr
military, was the first time the Chinese 
navy had evacuated citizens of other 
countries as well.5 Between 30 March 
and 2 April 2015, the naval command 
diverted a Chinese flotilla of three PLA 
Navy vessels from a counter-piracy 
mission in the Gulf of Aden to the port 
of Aden. They evacuated 629 Chinese 
nationals and 279 foreign citizens 
from fifteen other nations to Djibouti.6 
Chinese observers viewed the opera-
tion as a successful demonstration of 
the navy’s new rapid-reaction capa-
bilities, developed through missions 
in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali 
coast.7 
Capability and Expectation
As China’s state and non-state overseas 
interests have grown, so have the mil-
itary’s ability to protect them and the 
expectations of an expanding, social 
media-savvy middle class that it will. 
The geostrategic requirements of Xi 
Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative are 
reflected in China’s Military Strategy 
2015, which required the PLA to devel-
op a force structure able to ‘protect the 
security of strategic Sea Lines of Com-
munication and overseas interests’.8 
Accordingly, the Central Military Com-
mission decided to expand the PLA Ma-
rine Corps from 20,000 to 100,000, with 
many stationed overseas.9 A significant 
portion of these marines will be based 
at China’s first declared overseas mili-
tary bases, in the port of Obock in Dji-
bouti,10 and more are likely to be based 
at Gwadar in Pakistan.11 They will pro-
tect Chinese oil imports from the Mid-
dle East at strategic nodes along the 
Belt and Road. 
The Marine Corps and bases are 
part of China’s strategy of ‘far seas 
Platforms that Chinese 
Marines could use for 
evacuation operations: 
a PLA Navy Type 071 
‘Yuzhao’ Class Amphibious 
Transport Dock, which 
carries four Type 726 ‘Yuyi’ 
Class Hovercraft 































































protection’ 远海护卫, which requires 
the navy to safeguard overseas inter-
ests, including resources, strategic sea 
lanes, overseas citizens, investments, 
and commercial entities. It has led to 
the development of a blue-water navy 
capable of operating globally with air-
craft carriers and amphibious capabil-
ities.12 
A New Movie Genre13 
As China’s security posture and foreign 
policy become more assertive, stories 
about evacuation operations commu-
nicate these capabilities to the Chinese 
population and to the world. The 2017 
blockbuster Wolf Warrior 2 战狼II, set 
in an unidentified war-torn African 
country (in a loose reference to the 
Libyan evacuations of 2011), became 
Chinese cinema’s highest earning film 
ever. It tells the story of a Chinese spe-
cial forces soldier who comes out of re-
tirement to fight Western mercenaries 
and facilitate the evacuation of a group 
of distressed Chinese.14 
China’s official foreign policy 
is that of non-interference in other 
nations’ affairs. The movie’s tagline 
suggests the very opposite: ‘Whoever 
offends China will be killed no matter 
how far away the target is’ 犯我中华者
虽远必诛.15 The final frame of the mov-
ie reinforces the expectation that Chi-
na will use its power to protect its in-
creasing interests abroad. On the back 
cover of a PRC passport, the following 
is written in Chinese characters: ‘Citi-
zens of the Peoples’ Republic of Chi-
na: When you are in danger overseas, 
don’t give up! Remember, behind you, 




In 2018, the movie Operation Red 
Sea 红海行动, directed by Hong Kong 
filmmaker Dante Lam, was presented 
in Chinese cinemas as part of the cel-
ebrations of the ninetieth anniversary 
of the founding of the PLA. It depicted 
an even more dubious representation 
of a Chinese evacuation operation 
(apparently based on the evacuation 
from Yemen in 2015). The movie tells 
the implausible tale of a team of eight 
Chinese ‘Sea Dragon’ Marines who are 
deployed into the desert of a fictional 
African country (‘Yewaire’) during a 
coup d’état in search of one Chinese 
hostage, creating an impressive trail of 
destruction, engaging in a tank battle, 
and leaving some of their team killed 
in action.17 The real evacuation from 
Yemen in 2015 saw around 900 evacu-
ees being loaded onto three PLA Navy 
ships in the shortest time possible. To 
my knowledge, this occurred without 
any combat, which is obviously the 
preferred outcome in such missions. 
The movie apparently sought to 
be more realistic and less jingoistic 
than its immediate predecessors. It is 
certainly more violent. Professor Song 
Geng of the University of Hong Kong 
noted that ‘Some of the fans of the film 
have no experience of going abroad. 
The film caters to the fantasy of the 
common people as China’s economic 
power rises … [they are] longing for 
the renegotiation of China’s place in 
the world.’18 Film critic Guo Songmin 
was less impressed: ‘Frankly speaking, 
in these several movies, China has im-
agined itself as another US’.19 
The PLA has had no significant 
combat experience since the Sino- 
Vietnamese war of 1979, and this is 
viewed as a vulnerability by the PLA.20 
Such films provide a counter-narrative 
of combat readiness to address this 
sensitivity. Recent Chinese war movies 
also showcase some of the PLA’s latest 
military equipment. The Chinese Navy 
provided significant assistance to the 
filmmakers of Operation Red Sea, in-
cluding the use of a frigate and an 
































































amphibious ship.21 The Army provided 
similar support for Wolf Warrior 2, as 
did the Airforce for Sky Hunter 空天
猎. Chinese naval expert Li Jie believes 
that these movies aim to ‘generate 
pride in the nation’.22 
So What?
As the PLA’s capability to project force 
and protect Chinese citizens overseas 
continues to grow, so does the Party’s 
readiness to use the policy of Overseas 
Citizen Protection, and the Chinese 
people’s expectation that they will do 
so. As China’s global interests, diaspo-
ra and footprint continue to expand, 
this may result in unexpected frictions 
when Overseas Citizen Protection is 
applied to situations outside China’s 
traditional core interests.
One example would be a re-
currence of the anti-Chinese riots 
experienced in Tonga and the Solo-
mon Islands in 2006, and Papua New 
Guinea in 2009. Significant numbers 
of overseas Chinese are often at risk in 
Melanesia, where traditional partners 
(such as Australia, New Zealand, or the 
United States) expect to provide evac-
uation forces and, if necessary, sta-
bilisation support. Without adequate 
preparation, clear communication, 
and shared understanding, an evacua-
tion operation by the PLA in the South 
Pacific could contribute to, or generate, 
unintended consequences. Such a de-
velopment could be disadvantageous 
to the host nation, its traditional part-
ners, and China. This concept has been 




























C H R O N O L O G Y
2018 
1 January: China prohibits the impor-
tation of twenty-four types of waste 
material; a further sixteen types, in-
cluding motors and wire are banned 
from 31 December 2018, forcing other 
countries who had relied on China to 
do their recycling to look elsewhere for 
solutions. 
9 January: Continuing a crackdown 
on unauthorised worship, the Peo-
ple’s Armed Police destroy the Golden 
Lampstand Church 金灯台教堂 in Lin-
fen, Shanxi. Built with US$3 million in 
donations, the church served a congre-
gation of 50,000.
20 January: China-born Swedish cit-
izen and Hong Kong publisher Gui 
Minhai 桂敏海, first taken to China 
from Thailand in 2015 and later un-
der house arrest in China, is detained 
and ‘disappeared’ a second time while 
travelling on a train from Shanghai to 
Beijing with two Swedish diplomats. 
4 February: China effectively bans all 
cryptocurrency trading. In March, the 
Governor of the People’s Bank of Chi-
na calls the growth of digital currency 
‘technologically inevitable’.



























6 February: After public outcry in 
China, Mercedes Benz apologises for 
sharing a quotation from the Dalai 
Lama on its Instagram feed: ‘Look at 
situations from all angles, and you will 
become more open’. 
1 March: US President Donald Trump 
announces tariffs on China. 
11 March: China’s National People’s 
Congress votes to remove term limits 
on the Chinese presidency. Xi Jinping 
no longer has to retire in 2022 at the 
end of his second term. 
16 March: Trump signs the Taiwan 
Travel Act, which ‘encourages visits 
between officials of the United States 
and Taiwan at all levels’. Beijing accus-
es the Act of violating the one-China 
principle. Taiwan president Tsai Ing-
wen 蔡英文 visits parts of the US later 
in the year, inciting Beijing’s fury.
19 March: The government dissolves 
the Ministry of Culture and merges 
it with the former National Tourism 
Administration to create the Minis-
try of Culture and Tourism. Also in 
March, the government abolishes the 
five-year-old State Administration of 
Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Tel-
evision, placing responsibility for all 
of these areas directly under control 
of the Propaganda Department of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Com-
munist Party. 
23 March: US steel and aluminium tar-
iffs go into effect (25 per cent on steel 
for countries that imported US$10.2 
billion, such as China). Certain coun-
tries, such as Australia, are given tem-
porary exemptions.
26 March: Kim Jong-un, leader of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
arrives by train in Beijing to meet with 
Xi Jinping. The pair hold further talks 
in Dalian (7–8 May) and again in Bei-
jing (19 June).
2 April: China imposes tariffs on US 
products worth US$2.4 billion, such as 
aluminium waste and some primary 
produce.
2 April: China’s first prototype space 
station, launched in September 2011 
as part of its plan to build a manned 
space station by 2022, re-enters the 
earth’s atmosphere above the South 
Pacific.
3 April: The State Council Information 
Office issues the white paper China’s 
Policies and Practices on Protecting 
Freedom of Religious Belief. It clearly 
states the limitations of that freedom: 
‘Chinese religious groups must con-
duct religious activities in the Chinese 
context, practice core socialist values, 
carry forward the fine traditions of the 
Chinese nation, and actively explore 
religious thought which conforms to 
the reality in China’. 
13 April: In a surveillance-state mile-
stone, a fugitive is identified by facial 
identification software at a pop con-
cert in Zhejiang and then arrested. 
1 May: The Dominican Republic 
switches its diplomatic alliance from 
Taiwan to China. On 24 May, Burkina 
Faso does the same, leaving Swaziland 
as Taiwan’s sole diplomatic ally in 
Africa.
19 May: An H-6K bomber, capable of 
carrying supersonic cruise missiles, 
lands at a Chinese military base in the 
South China Sea for the first time.
21 May: China launches the explorato-
ry Queqiao satellite as part of its mis-
sion to land a probe on the dark side 
of the moon. (The Chang’e 4 ultimately 
completed a soft landing there on 3 
January 2019).
2 June: In Singapore, US Defence Sec-
retary James Mattis criticises China’s 
militarisation of the South China Sea. 
Mattis visits Beijing later in June, 
where Xi tells him: ‘We cannot lose one 
inch of territory passed down by our 
ancestors’.
8 June: Beijing awards Russian Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin China’s first 
friendship medal. 
8 June: Chinese technology firm ZTE 
agrees to pay a US$1 billion fine and 
change its board and management af-
ter the US lifts its ban on it purchasing 
smart phone components from US sup-
pliers. (The two-month ban was for the 
violation of sanctions against selling 
US-made products to Iran.) Trading of 
ZTE shares in Hong Kong recommence 
a week later and they promptly plunge 
thirty-nine per cent.
11 June: Protests in Vietnam over con-
cern that three new Special Economic 
Zones to be founded with Chinese in-
vestment may lead to Chinese control 
over Vietnamese territory. 
4 July: Australian citizen and for-
mer Rio Tinto executive Stern Hu, 
sentenced to ten years in prison for 


























a case believed to have political over-
tones, is released for good behaviour 
after nine years.
6 July: US tariffs on US$34 billion 
of Chinese goods commence (as an-
nounced on 15 June), as do Chinese 
tariffs on US$34 billion of American 
goods (out of a total of US$50 billion 
also announced on 15 June).
10 July: Liu Xia 刘霞, the widow of 
Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo 
刘晓波, who died in custody in 2017, 
leaves Beijing for Germany. Liu had 
been under effective house arrest 
since her late husband won the Nobel 
Prize in 2010.
4 August: Without giving any notice, 
authorities begin demolishing dissi-
dent artist Ai Weiwei’s 艾未未 famous 
Beijing studio. The demolition crew 
damages and destroys numerous art-
works. Officially, the reason is to make 
way for urban development.
20 August: At a joint press conference 
in Beijing with Premier Li Keqiang 
李克强, Malaysian Prime Minister Ma-
hatir Mohammed alludes to interna-
tional concerns about China’s growing 
influence in trade: ‘You don’t want a 
situation where there’s a new version 
of colonialism happening because 
poor countries are unable to compete 
with rich countries in terms of just 
open, free trade’. Nevertheless, his vis-
it concludes with a positive outlook for 
future collaboration.
21 August: El Salvador breaks diplo-
matic ties with Taipei to forge them 
with Beijing. Taiwan’s foreign minister 
Joseph Wu promises that ‘Taiwan will 
not engage in dollar nor debt-trap di-
plomacy with China’. 
23 August: Both US and China impose 
US$6 billion of tariffs, completing the 
US$50 billion announced earlier in 
June and April, respectively.
23 August: Due to security concerns, 
the Australian government bans Hua-
wei and ZTE from offering 5G technol-
ogy in Australia. In November, New 
Zealand also blocks Huawei.
27 August: Didi Chuxing 滴滴出行, the 
world’s most-used ride sharing ser-
vice, suspends services after a second 
female passenger is raped and mur-
dered in one calendar year. The com-
pany begins re-evaluating its business 
model with an eye to an initial public 
offering in early 2019.
3 September: Fifty-three members of 
the Forum on China-Africa Coopera-
tion attend the group’s third meeting, 
in Beijing. The tone is positive, stress-
ing further cooperation and mutually 
beneficial economic development.
13 September: China lends Venezuela 
US$5 billion, with the loan repayable 
in cash or oil.
22 September: The Vatican and Bei-
jing sign an agreement to share re-
sponsibility in the appointment of 
bishops. Days later, the Pope claims 
that the agreement will allow ‘the or-
derly and harmonious growth of the 
Catholic community in China’.
23 September: The controversial 
Hong Kong link to China’s high-speed 
rail network opens. Passengers from 
West Kowloon station can reach Bei-
jing in nine hours and Shenzhen in fif-
teen minutes. Mainland immigration 
officials are stationed inside a Hong 
Kong train station for the first time.
24 September: US tariffs of US$200 
billion commence on Chinese imports. 
Half of the tariffs are on intermediate 
goods (such as industrial machinery) 
and nearly one quarter are for con-
sumer goods. Chinese tariffs on US$60 
billion of US imports also commence.
24 September: The US proposes to sell 
Taiwan US$330 million in arms, pre-
dominantly parts for fighter jets. There 
has been bipartisan support in the US 
for such sales since the US diplomati-
cally recognised the PRC in 1979.
25 September: Meng Hongwei 孟宏伟, 
the first Chinese president of Interpol, 
who had disappeared from his home 
in France, arrives back in China and 
texts his wife a knife emoji, indicating 
he was in danger.
4 October: US Vice-President Mike 
Pence criticises China and accuses it of 
attempting to influence US society and 
politics.
7 October: Meng Hongwei resigns as 
Interpol president. The Chinese gov-
ernment announces he is in detention 
and under investigation for taking 
bribes.
25 October: Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe meets with Xi Jinping in 
Beijing. They renew their commitment 
to free trade, and agree to improve 
communication and work together on 


























11 November: The annual online ‘Sin-
gle’s Day’ shopping extravaganza sees 
US$30.6 billion in sales on the Alibaba 
platform, a new record.
17 November: Responding to pro-Tai-
wan independence sentiments ex-
pressed at the Golden Horse film awards 
in Taipei, the film star Fan Bingbing 
范冰冰 shows her sixty-three million 
followers on Weibo a map of China 
that includes Taiwan and tells them 
that ‘China cannot lose an inch’. This is 
her second only public statement since 
her three-month detainment earlier in 
the year for tax evasion.
18 November: For the first time ever, 
the leaders attending the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, 
meeting in Papua New Guinea, are un-
able to agree on a written declaration. 
The US had proposed reforming the 
World Trade Organisation, and Chi-
na objected. Neither side would com-
promise, reflecting the more general 
animosity between the two countries, 
and preventing leaders from reaching 
consensus. 
23 November: Four Pakistani na-
tionals are killed in an attack on the 
Chinese consulate in Karachi. The 
Balochistan Liberation Army, which 
is deemed a terrorist organisation by 
Pakistan and the US, and objects to 
Chinese investments in the traditional 
homeland of the Baloch people in Paki-
stan’s west, claims responsibility.
26 November: Shenzhen-based scien-
tist He Jiankui 贺建奎 claims to have 
used the CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing 
technology to edit the genes of twin 
girls so that they have a lifetime pro-
tection against HIV. His experiment is 
roundly condemned by ethicists and 
scientists, including China’s National 
Health Commission.
26  November: Mid-term elections in 
Taiwan see the ruling Democratic Pro-
gressive Party lose ground to the oppo-
sition Kuomintang, which embraces 
a one-China policy. An associated ref-
erendum rejects same-sex marriage, 
complicating efforts to legalise same-
sex marriage within two years of a 
positive ruling by the Constitutional 
Court in May 2017.
1 December: Meeting at the G20 sum-
mit in Argentina, Xi Jinping and Don-
ald Trump agree to a ninety-day truce 
on raising tariffs.
1 December: Meng Wangzhou 
孟晚舟, Huawei’s chief financial of-
ficer, is arrested in Vancouver. She 
is wanted in the US on allegations of 
fraud, in particular for breaking US 
sanctions on Iran. A Global Times arti-
cle describes Meng’s detention as ‘basi-
cally kidnapping’; she is later released 
on CA$10 million (US$7.4 million) bail. 
Within the month, China detains Cana-
dians including former diplomat and 
International Crisis Group employee, 
Michael Kovrig, and Michael Spavor, a 
businessman, in what is widely seen as 
politically motivated tit-for-tat.
20 December: The Asian Studies Asso-
ciation of Australia announces that its 
journal, Asian Studies Review, would 
be excluded from arts, humanities, 
and social science packages sold to li-
braries in China ‘because some of its 
content is deemed inappropriate to 
the government’. It was one of eighty-
three foreign journals to face similar 
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A ‘moderately prosperous society’ with no Chinese 
individual left behind — that’s the vision for China set out 
by Chinese President Xi Jinping in a number of important 
speeches in 2017. ‘Moderate’ prosperity may seem like a 
modest goal for a country with more billionaires (609 at 
last count) than the US. But the ‘China Story’ is a complex 
one. The China Story Yearbook 2017: Prosperity surveys 
the important events, pronouncements, and personalitites 
that defined 2017. It also presents a range of perspectives, 
from the global to the individual, the official to the 
unofficial, from mainland China to Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. Together, the stories present a richly textured 
portrait of a nation that in just forty years has lifted itself 
from universal poverty to (unequally distributed) wealth, 
changing itself and the world in the process.
PREVIOUS CHINA STORY 
YEARBOOKS
2016: Control 
‘More cosmopolitan, more lively, more global’ is how the 
China Daily summed up the year 2016 in China.
It was also a year of more control. The Chinese 
Communist Party laid down strict new rules of conduct 
for its members, continued to assert its dominance over 
everything from the Internet to the South China Sea and 
announced a new Five-Year Plan that Greenpeace called 
‘quite possibly the most important document in the world 




































2013: Civilising China  
As China becomes wealthier and more confident on 
the global stage, it also expects to be respected and 
accommodated as a major global force — and as a 
formidable civilisation. Through a survey and analysis of 
China’s regional posture, urban change, social activism 
and law, mores, the Internet, history, and thought — in 
which the concept of ‘civilising’ plays a prominent role — 
China Story Yearbook 2013 offers insights into the country 
today and its dreams for the future.
2014: Shared Destiny 
The People’s Republic of China under the leadership of 
the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping, has declared 
that it shares in the destiny of the countries of the Asia 
and Pacific region, as well as of nations that are part of 
an intertwined national self-interest. The China Story 
Yearbook 2014 takes the theme of Shared Destiny  
共同命运 and considers it in the context of China’s current 
and future potential.
2015: Pollution 
This Yearbook explores the broader ramifications of 
pollution in the People’s Republic for culture, society law 
and social activism, as well as the Internet, language, 
thought, and approaches to history. It looks at how it 
affects economic and political developments, urban 
change, and China’s regional and global posture. 
The Chinese Communist Party, led by ‘Chairman of 
Everything’ Xi Jinping, meanwhile, has subjected 
mainland society to increasingly repressive control in its 
new determination to rid the country of Western ‘spiritual 
pollutants’ while achieving cultural purification through 
‘propaganda and ideological work’.
2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse 
The authors of Red Rising, Red Eclipse survey China’s 
regional posture, urban change, social activism and law, 
human rights and economics, the Internet, history, and 
thought. This inaugural China Story Yearbook offers an 
informed perspective on recent developments in China 
and provides a context for understanding ongoing issues 
that will resonate far beyond the Dragon Year of  
2012–2013. 
